The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Mutiny and nonviolence in the Arab Spring
Abstract
Recent studies of civil resistance indicate that security force defections can heavily influence the outcome of nonviolent uprisings against authoritarian regimes. Yet we know little about why, when, and how mutiny occurs. In this article, I ask: what factors influence the likelihood of military defections during a nonviolent conflict? In reviewing various literatures, I identify ten factors that facilitate or obstruct mutiny. I propose that two of these are particularly influential: (1) whether troops receive economic or political benefits from the regime; and (2) whether troops perceive the regime as fragile, based on the international community’s response to the conflict. Specifically, I argue that troops who receive benefits from a regime are more likely to remain loyal while those who receive no such benefits are more likely to defect. However, even the most underprivileged troops are unlikely to defect if they believe that the state is strong enough to withstand a major civilian uprising. Soldiers’ perception of regime strength is partly shaped by whether outside nations support the opposition, thereby weakening the state, or send troops to reinforce the regime’s control. Using a qualitative comparative method, I illustrate these dynamics through an examination of several Arab Spring uprisings: Egypt, where the military sided with civil resisters; Bahrain, where troops remained loyal to the state; and Syria, where the military split. Then, to encourage more research on this topic, I use these three cases to generate additional hypotheses about defections that others can test against a wider set of cases. I conclude with a discussion of the questions that future researchers should explore and the types of methodological approaches that are needed in this field of study.
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Citations
Cites
What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?
Geddes, B. (1999) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.2.1.115 · Cited by 2,025 · cited 1×
“Finally, if there are legal or constitutional measures that ensure the military’s ongoing position in a new regime, then soldiers may be more willing to side with the movement (Geddes, 1999).”
BackgroundThe Political Economy of the Resource Curse
Ross, M. L. (1999) · World Politics · doi:10.1017/s0043887100008200 · Cited by 1,991
The Political Economy of Dictatorship
Wintrobe, R. (1998) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139174916 · Cited by 1,008
Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict
Stephan, M. J., & Chenoweth, E. (2008) · International Security · doi:10.1162/isec.2008.33.1.7 · Cited by 621
The Struggle for Power in Syria: Politics and Society under Asad and Ba'th Party
Dam, N. V. (2011) · doi:10.5040/9780755611508 · Cited by 99
Cited by
Egypt in a Time of Revolution: Contentious Politics and the Arab Spring
Ketchley, N. (2017) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316882702 · Cited by 290
Fresh carnations or all thorn, no rose? Nonviolent campaigns and transitions in autocracies
Celestino, M. R., & Gleditsch, K. S. (2013) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343312469979 · Cited by 265
Sticks, Stones, and Molotov Cocktails: Unarmed Collective Violence and Democratization
Kadivar, M. A., & Ketchley, N. (2018) · Socius: Sociological Research for a Dynamic World · doi:10.1177/2378023118773614 · Cited by 158
Sometimes Less Is More: Censorship, News Falsification, and Disapproval in 1989 East Germany
Gläßel, C., & Paula, K. (2020) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12501 · Cited by 98
Metadata
- Authors
- Nepstad, S. E.
- Venue
- Journal of Peace Research
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2013-05-01
- Volume
- 50
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 337-349
- ISSN
- 0022-3433 (ISSN-L)
- 1460-3578
- OpenAlex
- W2033227033
- Cited by
- 235
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 44.31
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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