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Cited by 98Media Influence and PoliticsMedia Studies and CommunicationPolitical Conflict and Governance

Sometimes Less Is More: Censorship, News Falsification, and Disapproval in 1989 East Germany

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Gläßel, Christian, Paula, Katrin·2020·American Journal of Political Science
DOI 10.1111/ajps.12501
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Abstract

Does more media censorship imply more regime stability? We argue that censorship may cause mass disapproval for censoring regimes. In particular, we expect that censorship backfires when citizens can falsify media content through alternative sources of information. We empirically test our theoretical argument in an autocratic regime—the German Democratic Republic (GDR). Results demonstrate how exposed state censorship on the country's emigration crisis fueled outrage in the weeks before the 1989 revolution. Combining original weekly approval surveys on GDR state television and daily content data of West German news programs with a quasi‐experimental research design, we show that recipients disapproved of censorship if they were able to detect misinformation through conflicting reports on Western television. Our findings have important implications for the study of censoring systems in contemporary autocracies, external democracy promotion, and campaigns aimed at undermining trust in traditional journalism.

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  • Authoritarian, and sometimes democratic, governments have sought to control conventional media through censorship, state-based media systems, synergy between censorship and state media, and cooperation with or pressure on private media producers.

    “Authoritarian, and sometimes democratic (112), governments have sought to control conventional media, including through censorship (113, 114), state-based media systems (115, 116), the synergy between censorship and state media (117, 118), and cooperation with (or pressure on) private media producers (119, 120).”

    From Physical and virtual repertoires of contention (2022) · cites this paper as [113]

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Research works printed but not linked: 7

  1. Braumann, Christa. 1994. "Fernsehforschung in der Ehemali- gen DDR." Rundfunk und Fernsehen 42(4): 524-41.
  2. De Neys, Wim. 2018. Dual Process Theory 2.0. New York: Routledge.
  3. Hausstein, Brigitte. 2008. "Die Soziologische Hörer-und Zuschauerforschung in der DDR: Die Verloren Geglaubten Originaldaten." Info 7: Medien, Archive, Information 23(1): 67-73.
  4. Hesse, Kurt R. 1990. "Fernsehen und Revolution: Zum Ein- fluß der Westmedien auf die Politische Wende in der DDR." Rundfunk und Fernsehen 38(3): 328-42.
  5. Shadmehr, Mehdi, and Dan Bernhardt. 2015. "State Censor- ship." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 7(2): 280-307.
  6. David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, Hanspeter Kriesi, and Holly J. McCammon. Malden, MA: John Wiley and Sons, 294-310.
  7. Wicklund, Robert A. 1974. Freedom and Reactance. New York: Wiley.

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Authors
Gläßel, C., & Paula, K.
Affiliations
University of Mannheim (DE)
ORCID
Venue
American Journal of Political Science
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2019-12-26
Volume
64
Issue
3
Pages
682-698
ISSN
  • 0092-5853 (ISSN-L)
  • 1540-5907
DOI
10.1111/ajps.12501
OpenAlex
W2997005308
Cited by
98
References
64
Citations by year
2026: 9 · 2025: 26 · 2024: 10 · 2023: 30 · 2022: 13 · 2021: 4 · 2020: 6
FWCI
11.58
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • American Journal of Political Science (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • MADOC (University of Mannheim) (acceptedVersion, cc-by)
  • OPUS 4 (Zuse Institute Berlin) (submittedVersion)
  • mediaTUM – the media and publications repository of the Technical University Munich (Technical University Munich) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • mediaTUM – the media and publications repository of the Technical University Munich (Technical University Munich) (submittedVersion)
Funders
  • European Research Council under the European Union's Seventh Framework Program ((FP7/2007-2013)/ERC)
  • University of Mannheim's Graduate School of Economic and Social Sciences funded by the German Research Foundation (336019)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Media Influence and Politics
  • Social Sciences › Communication › Media Studies and Communication
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Political Conflict and Governance
Keywords
media censorship, regime stability, authoritarian regimes, alternative information sources, state television, misinformation detection, external democracy promotion, trust in journalism, 1989 revolutions

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