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Cited by 15Electoral Systems and Political ParticipationEuropean Union Policy and GovernancePolitical Theory and Democracy

Shaping Public Opinion about Regional Integration: The Rhetoric of Justification and Party Cues

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Vössing, Konstantin·2021·Political Studies
DOI 10.1177/0032321720905130
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Abstract

The article investigates how justifications used by politicians to explain their positions on policies of regional integration shape public opinion about these policies. I argue that support for a policy position increases when politicians tailor their justifications to the expectations of their audience, and I suggest that this happens even when party cues offer a less effortful way of forming opinions. I test my theoretical expectations in laboratory experiments with diverse samples, which manipulate party cues and justifications for a policy of European integration. I find that citizens use justifications and cues to form opinions. The relative importance of the two factors depends on individual dispositions and political context. In a non-competitive context (study 1), politically invested citizens use cues, while uninvested citizens use justifications. In a competitive context (study 2), the opinions of politically invested citizens are shaped by both factors, while the opinions of uninvested citizens become erratic.

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  • Anti-immigration attitudes were shaped by social-communicative processes, including elite rhetoric and partisan cue-taking.

    “Anti-immigration attitudes were shaped by social-communicative processes, including elite rhetoric and partisan cue-taking337.”

    From Cognitive–motivational mechanisms of political polarization in social-communicative contexts (2022) · cites this paper as [337]

    The Introduction (page unavailable) says politicians’ justifications and party cues shape attitudes about regional integration, and the Conclusion and Discussion reports effects of both forms of elite influence under specified conditions. The paper does not establish that these processes shaped anti-immigration attitudes; its mention of migration as a related issue does not extend the findings to that attitude. (LLM, conf=0.88)

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Authors
Vössing, K.
Affiliations
University of London (GB)
Corresponding author
Vössing, Konstantin
ORCID
Vössing, Konstantin
Venue
Political Studies
Publisher
SAGE Publications
Published
2020-05-22
Volume
69
Issue
3
Pages
492-513
ISSN
  • 0032-3217 (ISSN-L)
  • 1467-9248
DOI
10.1177/0032321720905130
OpenAlex
W3025584385
Cited by
15
References
81
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 2 · 2022: 1 · 2021: 1 · 2020: 4
FWCI
6.90
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Political Studies (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc)
  • City Research Online (City University London) (submittedVersion)
Funders
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (VO 1990/1-1)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › European Union Policy and Governance
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Political Theory and Democracy
Keywords
public opinion formation, regional integration, European integration, policy justification, political rhetoric, party cues, political cues, political investment, opinion formation

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