CoChat
Sign Up
Cited by 276Social and Intergroup PsychologyElectoral Systems and Political ParticipationOpinion Dynamics and Social Influence

Cognitive–motivational mechanisms of political polarization in social-communicative contexts

Open access
Jost, John T., Baldassarri, Delia S., Druckman, James N.·2022·Nature Reviews Psychology
DOI 10.1038/s44159-022-00093-5PMC PMC9342595
Open this paper in CoChat — free accountOpen PDF

Abstract

Healthy democratic polities feature competing visions of a good society but also require some level of cooperation and institutional trust. Democracy is at risk when citizens become so polarized that an ‘us versus them’ mentality dominates. Despite a vast multidisciplinary literature, no coherent conceptual framework of the microlevel dynamics that increase or decrease polarization has been presented. In this Review, we provide a conceptual framework to integrate scientific knowledge about cognitive–motivational mechanisms that influence political polarization and the social-communicative contexts in which they are enacted. Ego-justifying and group-justifying motives lead individuals to defend their own pre-existing beliefs and those of their in-group, respectively. However, a distinct class of system-justifying motives contributes to asymmetric forms of polarization. Whereas conservative-rightist ideology is associated with valuing tradition, social order and maintenance of the status quo, liberal-leftist ideology is associated with a push for egalitarian social change. These cognitive–motivational mechanisms interact with social influence processes linked to communication source, message and channel factors, all of which might contribute to increased or decreased polarization. We conclude with a discussion of unanswered questions and ways in which our framework can be extended to the study of culture and institutions. Democracy is at risk when citizens become so polarized that an ‘us versus them’ mentality dominates. In this Review, Jost et al. provide a conceptual framework that integrates scientific knowledge about cognitive–motivational mechanisms that influence political polarization and the social-communicative contexts in which they are enacted.

AI snapshot

Written from the paper’s full text.

TL;DR

This Review proposes a framework linking ego-, group-, and system-justifying cognitive–motivational mechanisms to three types of mass political polarization as they unfold in social-communicative contexts. It argues these mechanisms interact with source, message, and channel factors to increase or decrease issue/ideological polarization, partisan alignment, and affective polarization, with system justification producing asymmetric patterns.

Key findings

  • The paper distinguishes three operational definitions of mass polarization: issue/ideological polarization, partisan alignment, and affective polarization; it argues these can become mutually reinforcing, with evidence that issue polarization can fuel affective polarization and that affective polarization can exacerbate issue polarization and partisan alignment.
  • It identifies three cognitive–motivational mechanisms: ego-justification (for example, selective exposure, confirmation bias, disconfirmation bias, objectivity illusion), group-justification (in-group favouritism, out-group derogation, stereotyping, social projection), and system-justification (defence of the status quo, correlated with conservatism).
  • It reports asymmetric polarization patterns: the correlation between partisanship and ideology rose from roughly r = 0.4 in 1988 to r = 0.6 in 2012; Republicans overestimated the percentage of Democrats who were LGBTQ by 25 points, while Democrats overestimated the percentage of Republicans who were evangelicals by 20 points; support for economic regulation declined sharply among rank-and-file Republicans between 1984 and 2010 while remaining unchanged among Democrats.
  • Social-communicative factors matter: out-group mentions increased sharing of media-outlet posts by estimated diffusion rates of 29–57%, and congressional posts mentioning the out-group increased diffusion by 58–180%; a Facebook deactivation experiment reduced issue polarization and, to a lesser extent, affective polarization, while exposure to counter-attitudinal news reduced affective polarization without changing political opinions.

Methods

  • Design: conceptual/narrative review that integrates multidisciplinary literature and proposes a framework rather than testing new hypotheses with primary data.
  • Data/sample: no original sample; synthesizes published experimental, survey, longitudinal, archival, and social media studies, with primary focus on the US context.
  • Main analysis: organizes evidence around three cognitive–motivational mechanisms (ego-, group-, and system-justification) and social-communicative contexts using McGuire’s communication/persuasion matrix, especially source, message, and channel factors.

Limitations

  • Stated: the authors could not cover structural and institutional factors such as demographic shifts, party systems and electoral rules, and economic performance and inequality; they focus primarily on the US because most relevant research has been conducted there.
  • Stated: the empirical literature has not advanced enough to hypothesize precisely how any given political communication will interact with cognitive–motivational mechanisms in specific contexts; few studies actually connect mechanisms to polarization outcomes, and the framework cannot easily explain historically changing polarization levels or elites’ communication strategies.
  • Evident: as a narrative review, it does not use a systematic search or meta-analytic procedure, and receiver/target factors and cross-national institutional variation are acknowledged but not fully developed.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1038/s44159-022-00093-5

Cites

324 of 324 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Claims the paper makes

83 of 438 cited sources checked · 35 supported · 3 flagged · accuracy not yet measured

  • Interpretationcitation

    Once categorical boundaries between 'us and them' are drawn, destructive social psychological processes may kick in, including stereotyping, prejudice, in-group favouritism, out-group derogation and even dehumanization.

    “Once categorical boundaries between ‘us and them’ are drawn, a whole host of destructive social psychological processes may kick in, including stereotyping, prejudice, in-group favouritism, out-group derogation and even dehumanization3,55,93–95.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 5 sources checked
    • cites [3] Finkel, E. J. et al. Political sectarianism in America. Science 370, 533–536 (2020). This article discusses the causes and consequences of a concept related to affective polarization — political sectarianism — which involves othering, aversion and moralization. source
    • cites [55] Moore-Berg, S. L., Hameiri, B. & Bruneau, E. The prime psychological suspects of toxic political polarization. Curr. Opin. Behav. Sci. 34, 199–204 (2020). source
    • cites [93] Kinder, D. R. & Kam, C. D. Us Against Them: Ethnocentric Foundations of American Opinion (Univ. Chicago Press, 2010). source
    • cites [94] Van Bavel, J. J. & Pereira, A. The partisan brain: an identity-based model of political belief. Trends Cogn. Sci. 22, 213–224 (2018). source

      Section II (p. 9) reports a preference for policies proposed by political in-group members, and Section II (p. 12) reports less trust in political out-group members. These support in-group favouritism and some negative out-group responses, but the cited paper does not establish the full list of processes—particularly stereotyping and dehumanization—or the claim for categorical ‘us and them’ boundaries generally. (LLM, conf=0.84)

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
    • cites [95] Lees, J. & Cikara, M. Inaccurate group meta-perceptions drive negative out-group attributions in competitive contexts. Nat. Hum. Behav. 4, 279–286 (2020). source
  • Premisecitation

    Individuals assume, in a self-serving manner, that they process information in a more rational, impartial and accurate way than others do (naive realism and objectivity illusion).

    “Closely related to the phenomenon of myside bias are ‘naive realism’ and the objectivity illusion, whereby individuals assume, in a self-serving manner, that they process information in a more rational, impartial and accurate way than others do120.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [120] Schwalbe, M. C., Cohen, G. L. & Ross, L. D. The objectivity illusion and voter polarization in the 2016 presidential election. Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA 117, 21218–21229 (2020). source
  • Interpretationcitation

    All of these mechanisms, sometimes grouped under 'myside bias', can contribute to issue polarization, insofar as individuals often become more extreme in their opinions after selectively processing the evidence on specific topics such as capital punishment, immigration, healthcare policy or climate change.

    “All of these mechanisms, which are sometimes grouped under the general rubric of ‘myside bias’111–113, can contribute to issue polarization, insofar as individuals often become more extreme in their opinions after selectively processing the evidence on specific topics such as capital punishment, immigration, healthcare policy or climate change114,115.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim2 of 5 sources checked
    • cites [111] Mercier, H. in Cognitive Illusions: Intriguing Phenomena In Thinking, Judgment And Memory (ed. Pohl, R. F.) 99–114 (Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group, 2017).

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

    • cites [112] Drummond, C. & Fischhoff, B. Does “putting on your thinking cap” reduce myside bias in evaluation of scientific evidence? Think. Reason. 25, 477–505 (2019). source
    • cites [113] Stanovich, K. E. The Bias That Divides Us: The Science And Politics Of Myside Thinking (MIT Press, 2021). source

      Split into 2 atoms — 1 confirmed, 1 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
    • cites [114] Lord, C. G., Ross, L. & Lepper, M. R. Biased assimilation and attitude polarization: the effects of prior theories on subsequently considered evidence. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 37, 2098–2109 (1979). source
    • cites [115] Ditto, P. H. et al. At least bias is bipartisan: a meta-analytic comparison of partisan bias in liberals and conservatives. Perspect. Psychol. Sci. 14, 273–291 (2019). source

      Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 2 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Interpretationcitation

    People may engage in counterfactual thinking about 'what might have been' in a creative but self-serving (or group-serving) manner in order to maintain their own pre-existing attitudes.

    “Other studies suggest that people might engage in counterfactual thinking about ‘what might have been’ in a creative but self-serving (or group-serving) manner in order to maintain their own pre-existing attitudes.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [128] Effron, D. A. It could have been true: how counterfactual thoughts reduce condemnation of falsehoods and increase political polarization. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 44, 729–745 (2018). source
  • Findingcitation

    Republicans who were consistently exposed to messages from a liberal Twitter bot exhibited backlash, expressing even more conservative opinions as a result.

    “For instance, Republicans who were consistently exposed to messages from a liberal Twitter bot exhibited backlash, expressing even more conservative opinions as a result127.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [127] Bail, C. A. et al. Exposure to opposing views on social media can increase political polarization. Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA 115, 9216–9221 (2018). source
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 32
  • May combine two claims. 67
  • The quote only partly states this claim. 1

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    Group polarization is a dynamic property of a single social group, not strictly a property of individuals.

    “Thus, from a social psychological perspective, group polarization is a dynamic property of a single social group — a shifting of group behaviour over time in a more extreme direction, but in the same direction in which the group started. It is not, strictly speaking, a property of individuals”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [19] Sieber, J. & Ziegler, R. Group polarization revisited: a processing effort account. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 45, 1482–1498 (2019). source

      The Abstract (page not supplied) defines group polarization as a change in individual preferences from before to after group discussion, in the direction favored by the group's average prediscussion preferences. This supports the directional-shift aspect, but contradicts the claim that polarization is not, strictly speaking, a property of individuals. Experiment 3’s Results (page not supplied) also calculate polarization scores from individuals’ attitude changes. (LLM, conf=0.88)

      Checked by a reasoning model — may be wrong.

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingcitation

    Many people are amenable to having their misperceptions of the other side corrected, which lowers affective polarization.

    “Many people, it seems, are amenable to having their misperceptions of the other side corrected, which lowers affective polarization150,153,154.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 3 sources checked
    • cites [150] Ahler, D. J. & Sood, G. The parties in our heads: misperceptions about party composition and their consequences. J. Polit. 80, 964–981 (2018). source
    • cites [153] Druckman, J. N., Klar, S., Krupnikov, Y., Levendusky, M. & Ryan, J. B. (Mis-) estimating affective polarization. J. Polit. 84, 1106–1117 (2022). source
    • cites [154] Mernyk, J. S., Pink, S. L., Druckman, J. N. & Willer, R. Correcting inaccurate metaperceptions reduces Americans’ support for partisan violence. Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA 119, e2116851119 (2022). source

      The Discussion reports that correcting misperceptions about out-party support for violence reduced support for partisan violence, but had no effect on measures of affective polarization in Study 3. The claimed reduction in affective polarization is therefore contrary to this paper’s finding. (LLM, conf=0.91)

      Checked by a reasoning model — may be wrong.

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation

    These market incentives both reflect and exacerbate ideological and affective forms of polarization, insofar as emotionally charged material, such as that which is contemptuous of ideological adversaries, is more likely to go 'viral' than more measured types of political discourse.

    “These market incentives both reflect and exacerbate ideological and affective forms of polarization, insofar as emotionally charged material, such as that which is contemptuous of ideological adversaries, is more likely to go ‘viral’ than more measured types of political discourse260,263,269,270.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim3 of 4 sources checked
    • cites [260] Rathje, S., Van Bavel, J. J. & van der Linden, S. Out-group animosity drives engagement on social media. Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2024292118 (2021). This study of social media platforms finds that messages expressing negative emotions (such as anger, moral outrage and mockery) about the ideological out-group were especially likely to be shared on Facebook and Twitter, compared to other types of message. source

      Split into 2 atoms — 1 confirmed, 1 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
    • cites [263] Kim, T. Violent political rhetoric on Twitter. Political Sci. Res. Methods. https://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2022.12 (2022). source

      Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 0 partially supported, 2 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.

      Checked by a reasoning model — may be wrong.

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
    • cites [269] Brady, W. J., Wills, J., Jost, J. T., Tucker, J. & Van Bavel, J. J. Emotion shapes the diffusion of moralized content in social networks. Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA 114, 7313–7318 (2017). This study shows that moral-emotional language in political messages diffuse at high rates within (but not between) ideological groups on social media, showing how social media can affect polarization through immersion in an ideological network. source

      Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 2 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
    • cites [270] Brady, W. J., Wills, J. A., Burkart, D., Jost, J. T. & Van Bavel, J. J. An ideological asymmetry in the diffusion of moralized content on social media among political leaders. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 148, 1802–1813 (2019). source

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Conservative-rightist ideology is associated with valuing tradition, social order and maintenance of the status quo, whereas liberal-leftist ideology is associated with a push for egalitarian social change.

    “Whereas conservative-rightist ideology is associated with valuing tradition, social order and maintenance of the status quo, liberal-leftist ideology is associated with a push for egalitarian social change.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 9 sources checked
    • cites [107] Jost, J. T. Left And Right: The Psychological Significance Of A Political Distinction (Oxford Univ. Press, 2021).

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

    • cites [149] Eibach, R. Ideological polarization and social psychology. Oxford Res. Encyc. Psychol. https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190236557.013.240 (2021). source
    • cites [163] Sidanius, J. & Liu, J. H. The Gulf War and the Rodney King beating: implications of the general conservatism and social dominance perspectives. J. Soc. Psychol. 132, 685–700 (1992). source
    • cites [164] Duckitt, J. A dual-process cognitive-motivational theory of ideology and prejudice. Adv. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 33, 41–113 (2001). source
    • cites [165] Van Assche, J., Dhont, K. & Pettigrew, T. F. The social-psychological bases of far-right support in Europe and the United States. J. Commun. Appl. Soc. 29, 385–401 (2019). source

      The paper’s discussion of right-wing ideologies describes resistance to change and social conservatism, and its section on European far-right followers says supporters tend to resist cultural change and endorse inequality. It associates lower authoritarianism and social-dominance scores with left-wing support, but does not say that liberal-leftist ideology pushes for egalitarian social change. Page numbers are unavailable in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.85)

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
    • cites [166] Womick, J., Rothmund, T., Azevedo, F., King, L. A. & Jost, J. T. Group-based dominance and authoritarian aggression predict support for Donald Trump in the 2016 US presidential election. Soc. Psychol. Pers. Sci. 10, 643–652 (2019). source
    • cites [167] Forscher, P. S. & Kteily, N. S. A psychological profile of the alt-right. Perspect. Psychol. Sci. 15, 90–116 (2020). source
    • cites [168] Nilsson, A. & Jost, J. T. The authoritarian-conservatism nexus. Curr. Opin. Behav. Sci. 34, 148–154 (2020). source
    • cites [169] Knuckey, J. & Hassan, K. Authoritarianism and support for Trump in the 2016 presidential election. Soc. Sci. J. 59, 47–60 (2022). source

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    Group polarization can be explained by persuasive argumentation: during group discussion, people are exposed to additional arguments in favour of the position that the average group member was already inclined to take.

    “The first has to do with persuasive argumentation: during group discussion, people are exposed to additional arguments in favour of the position that the average group member was already inclined to take19,20.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 2 sources checked
    • cites [19] Sieber, J. & Ziegler, R. Group polarization revisited: a processing effort account. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 45, 1482–1498 (2019). source
    • cites [20] Gilovich, T., Keltner, D., Chen, S. & Nisbett, R. E. Social Psychology Revised edn (W. W. Norton, 2016).

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    There is a strong consensus among scholars of politics in the USA that liberal and conservative political elites have grown increasingly polarized over the past few decades.

    “For example, there is a strong consensus among scholars of politics in the USA that liberal and conservative political elites (including members of Congress, party activists, donors and judicial appointees) have grown increasingly polarized over the past few decades27–34.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 8 sources checked
    • cites [27] Layman, G. C., Carsey, T. M. & Horowitz, J. M. Party polarization in American politics: characteristics, causes, and consequences. Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 9, 83–110 (2006). source
    • cites [28] Poole, K. T. & Rosenthal, H. On party polarization in congress. Daedalus 136, 104–107 (2007). source
    • cites [29] Fiorina, M. P. & Abrams, S. J. Political polarization in the American public. Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 11, 563–588 (2008). source
    • cites [30] Bonica, A. Mapping the ideological marketplace. Am. J. Polit. Sci. 58, 367–386 (2014). source
    • cites [31] Hare, C. & Poole, K. T. The polarization of contemporary American politics. Polity 46, 411–429 (2014). source
    • cites [32] Abramowitz, A. I. The Great Alignment: Race, Party Transformation, and the Rise of Donald Trump (Yale Univ. Press, 2018). source
    • cites [33] Neal, Z. P. A sign of the times? Weak and strong polarization in the US Congress, 1973–2016. Soc. Netw. 60, 103–112 (2020). source
    • cites [34] Bonica, A. & Sen, M. Estimating judicial ideology. J. Econ. Perspect. 35, 97–118 (2021). source

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation

    Group polarization is the tendency for members of a social group to arrive at a consensus through group discussion and other social interaction that is more extreme but in the same direction as the average of their initial opinions on a given issue.

    “It refers to the oft-observed tendency for members of a social group to arrive at a consensus (through group discussion and other forms of social interaction) that is more extreme but in the same direction as the average of their initial opinions on a given issue19.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [19] Sieber, J. & Ziegler, R. Group polarization revisited: a processing effort account. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 45, 1482–1498 (2019). source

      The paper’s Abstract (page unavailable) defines group polarization as a postdiscussion shift in individual preferences toward the direction favored by the group’s average prediscussion preferences. Experiment 3’s Method says participants were asked to reach a consensus, but the paper does not define polarization as arriving at an extreme consensus; it measures individuals’ attitude changes. The consensus element of the citing sentence is therefore not supported as part of the definition. (LLM, conf=0.83)

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    The literature on mass political polarization in the USA has yielded mixed findings about whether ordinary citizens are deeply divided, whether polarization threatens democratic functioning, and the nature of the threat.

    “The body of literature on mass political polarization in the USA has yielded mixed findings: ordinary citizens are deeply divided9,31,35,41–49 or they are not10,29,36,50–54; polarization poses a huge threat to democratic functioning3,11,55, is not a problem at all13,56–58 or the nature of the threat is ambiguous7,59,60.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim2 of 10 sources checked
    • cites [9] Abramowitz, A. I. Transformation and polarization: the 2008 presidential election and the new American electorate. Elect. Stud. 29, 594–603 (2010). source
    • cites [31] Hare, C. & Poole, K. T. The polarization of contemporary American politics. Polity 46, 411–429 (2014). source
    • cites [35] Levendusky, M. The microfoundations of mass polarization. Polit. Anal. 17, 162–176 (2009). source
    • cites [41] Abramowitz, A. I. & Saunders, K. L. Is polarization a myth? J. Polit. 70, 542–555 (2008). source
    • cites [42] Bafumi, J. & Shapiro, R. Y. A new partisan voter. J. Polit. 71, 1–24 (2009). source
    • cites [43] Jacoby, W. G. Is there a culture war? Conflicting value structures in American public opinion. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 108, 754–771 (2014). source
    • cites [44] Iyengar, S. & Westwood, S. J. Fear and loathing across party lines: new evidence on group polarization. Am. J. Polit. Sci. 59, 690–707 (2015). source
    • cites [45] Mason, L. “I disrespectfully agree”: the differential effects of partisan sorting on social and issue polarization. Am. J. Polit. Sci. 59, 128–145 (2015). source
    • cites [46] Lelkes, Y. Mass polarization: manifestations and measurements. Public Opin. Q. 80, 392–410 (2016). source
    • cites [47] Lupton, R. N., Smallpage, S. M. & Enders, A. M. Values and political predispositions in the age of polarization: examining the relationship between partisanship and ideology in the United States, 1988–2012. Br. J. Polit. Sci. 50, 1–20 (2017). This study uses over-time data to show that alignment between ideology and partisanship has increased asymmetrically among those with conservative value orientations, presumably owing to Republican discourse emphasizing traditional family values and resistance to social change. source

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    The extent to which elite-level polarization has influenced the belief systems of ordinary citizens remains a matter of debate.

    “At the same time, the extent to which elite-level polarization has influenced the belief systems of ordinary citizens remains a matter of debate8,27,35–40.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 8 sources checked
    • cites [8] Baldassarri, D. & Gelman, A. Partisans without constraint: political polarization and trends in American public opinion. Am. J. Sociol. 114, 408–446 (2008). source
    • cites [27] Layman, G. C., Carsey, T. M. & Horowitz, J. M. Party polarization in American politics: characteristics, causes, and consequences. Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 9, 83–110 (2006). source
    • cites [35] Levendusky, M. The microfoundations of mass polarization. Polit. Anal. 17, 162–176 (2009). source
    • cites [36] Fiorina, M. P., Abrams, S. J. & Pope, J. C. Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America 3rd edn (Pearson Longman, 2010).

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

    • cites [37] Layman, G. C., Carsey, T. M., Green, J. C., Herrera, R. & Cooperman, R. Activists and conflict extension in American party politics. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 104, 324–346 (2010). source
    • cites [38] Levendusky, M. Clearer cues, more consistent voters: a benefit of elite polarization. Polit. Behav. 32, 111–131 (2010). source
    • cites [39] Druckman, J. N., Peterson, E. & Slothuus, R. How elite partisan polarization affects public opinion formation. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 107, 57–79 (2013). source
    • cites [40] Baldassarri, D. & Park, B. Was there a culture war? Partisan polarization and secular trends in US public opinion. J. Polit. 82, 809–827 (2020). This analysis of trends in public opinion in the USA over time finds partisan polarization on economic and civil rights issues, whereas opinions on moral issues followed a trend of secularization. Both Democrats and Republicans have increasingly adopted more progressive moral views, but Republicans changed their views more slowly than Democrats. source

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Premisecitation

    The mixed findings on mass political polarization reflect a literature that has been vague in identifying precise psychological mechanisms and how they operate across social-communicative contexts.

    “These mixed findings reflect a literature that has been vague in identifying precise psychological mechanisms and how they operate across social-communicative contexts61.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [61] van Baar, J. M. & FeldmanHall, O. The polarized mind in context: interdisciplinary approaches to the psychology of political polarization. Am. Psychol. https://doi.org/10.1037/amp0000814 (2022). source

      The Introduction says our psychological grasp of polarization remains limited and that it is unclear at which processing step polarization takes hold, particularly in naturalistic social and political discourse. It also calls for studying interactions between cognition and context. The cited passages do not say that mixed findings on mass polarization result from this lack of precision. (LLM, conf=0.84)

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Issue or ideological polarization implies either symmetric polarization, in which two groups move in opposite, more extreme directions, or asymmetric polarization, in which one group becomes more extreme than the other.

    “This implies either that two groups — such as liberals and conservatives or leftists and rightists — are moving in opposite, more extreme directions (symmetric polarization) or that one group is becoming more extreme than the other (asymmetric polarization10,34,47,48,73–75).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 7 sources checked
    • cites [10] McCarty, N., Poole, K. T. & Rosenthal, H. Polarized America: the Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches (MIT Press, 2016).

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

    • cites [34] Bonica, A. & Sen, M. Estimating judicial ideology. J. Econ. Perspect. 35, 97–118 (2021). source
    • cites [47] Lupton, R. N., Smallpage, S. M. & Enders, A. M. Values and political predispositions in the age of polarization: examining the relationship between partisanship and ideology in the United States, 1988–2012. Br. J. Polit. Sci. 50, 1–20 (2017). This study uses over-time data to show that alignment between ideology and partisanship has increased asymmetrically among those with conservative value orientations, presumably owing to Republican discourse emphasizing traditional family values and resistance to social change. source
    • cites [48] Webster, S. W. & Abramowitz, A. I. The ideological foundations of affective polarization in the US electorate. Am. Polit. Res. 45, 621–647 (2017). This article uses survey and experimental data to show that ideological beliefs (polarization) influence affective polarization, especially when it comes to social welfare issues. source
    • cites [73] Hacker, J. & Pierson, P. in Solutions to Political Polarization in America (ed. Persily, N.) 59–70 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2015). source
    • cites [74] Grossmann, M. & Hopkins, D. A. Asymmetric Politics: Ideological Republicans and Group Interest Democrats (Oxford Univ. Press, 2016). source
    • cites [75] Franks, A. S. & Hesami, F. Seeking evidence of the MAGA cult and Trump derangement syndrome: an examination of (a)symmetric political bias. Societies 11, 113 (2021). source

      Section 1.4 (Overview; page unavailable) describes symmetric polarization as Trump supporters’ views shifting toward his position while detractors’ views shift against it. Sections 1.2 and 1.3 discuss unequal versus comparable political bias between liberals and conservatives. The paper does not establish the claim’s broader definition in terms of two groups moving toward more extreme ideological positions. (LLM, conf=0.82)

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    Affective polarization occurs when members of different social groups or political parties hold strong positive or negative attitudes or feelings about the groups themselves, owing to in-party love and/or out-party animus.

    “Finally, affective polarization (Fig. 1c) occurs when members of different social groups (or political parties) hold strong positive or negative attitudes (or feelings) about the groups themselves (not just their policy preferences49,79), owing to ‘in-party love’ and/or ‘out-party animus’80.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 3 sources checked
    • cites [49] Iyengar, S., Lelkes, Y., Levendusky, M., Malhotra, N. & Westwood, S. J. The origins and consequences of affective polarization in the United States. Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 22, 129–146 (2019). source
    • cites [79] Iyengar, S., Sood, G. & Lelkes, Y. Affect, not ideology: a social identity perspective on polarization. Public. Opin. Q. 76, 405–431 (2012). source
    • cites [80] Brewer, M. B. in The Cambridge Handbook of the Psychology of Prejudice (eds Sibley, C. G. & Barlow, F. K.) 90–110 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2017). source

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Other intervention strategies focus on correcting misperceptions, encouraging more complex thinking, and reducing anger and competitive feelings.

    “Other intervention strategies focus on correcting misperceptions, encouraging more complex thinking, and reducing anger and competitive feelings26,131,132.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 3 sources checked
    • cites [26] Lees, J. & Cikara, M. Understanding and combating misperceived polarization. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 376, 20200143 (2021). This article reviews work on false polarization (when partisans hold inaccurate beliefs about the other side), identifies conditions false polarization leads to actual polarization, and suggests why correcting perceptions about the other party’s beliefs can be effective. source
    • cites [131] Huber, M., Van Boven, L., Park, B. & Pizzi, W. T. Seeing red: anger increases how much Republican identification predicts partisan attitudes and perceived polarization. PLoS ONE 10, e0139193 (2015). source

      The Introduction’s “Incidental Anger” section links anger to intergroup conflict, and the General Discussion says anger inductions might increase actual and perceived partisan differences. This supports the rationale for addressing anger, but the paper does not describe an intervention that reduces anger or competitive feelings. It also does not address correcting misperceptions or encouraging more complex thinking. (LLM, conf=0.80)

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
    • cites [132] Fernbach, P. M. & Boven, L. V. False polarization: cognitive mechanisms and potential solutions. Curr. Opin. Psychol. 43, 1–6 (2022). This essay addresses how false polarization — where partisans hold false beliefs about the other side — can lead to actual polarization owing to categorical thinking, oversimplification and emotional amplification. source

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation

    The backlash among Republicans exposed to a liberal Twitter bot suggests the presence of ego-defensiveness: Republicans were not merely indifferent to liberal messaging but actively sought to combat it or compensate for its anticipated effects.

    “This suggests the presence of ego-defensiveness: Republicans were not merely indifferent to liberal messaging but actively sought to combat it or to compensate for its anticipated effects.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [127] Bail, C. A. et al. Exposure to opposing views on social media can increase political polarization. Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA 115, 9216–9221 (2018). source

      Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 2 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation

    Group-justifying mechanisms involve group-serving tendencies to advance and maintain the interests and assumptions of the in-group against one or more out-groups.

    “Group-justifying mechanisms, which are central to social identity theory88,90,91,94, involve group-serving tendencies to advance and maintain the interests and assumptions of the in-group against one or more out-groups (‘us versus them’).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 4 sources checked
    • cites [88] Brewer, M. B. In-group bias in the minimal intergroup situation: a cognitive-motivational analysis. Psychol. Bull. 86, 307 (1979). source
    • cites [90] Tajfel, H. & Turner, J. C. in Psychology of Intergroup Relations (eds Worchel, S. & Austin, W. A.) 7–24 (Nelson-Hall, 1986).

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

    • cites [91] Mason, L. Uncivil Agreement: How Politics Became Our Identity (Univ. Chicago Press, 2018). source
    • cites [94] Van Bavel, J. J. & Pereira, A. The partisan brain: an identity-based model of political belief. Trends Cogn. Sci. 22, 213–224 (2018). source

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Partisans might represent their adversaries as more obstructionist, more ideologically extreme, more prejudiced against the in-group, or more violent than they actually are.

    “Partisans might also represent their adversaries as more obstructionist95, more ideologically extreme122,151–153, more prejudiced against the in-group55, or more violent154 than they actually are.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim2 of 6 sources checked
    • cites [95] Lees, J. & Cikara, M. Inaccurate group meta-perceptions drive negative out-group attributions in competitive contexts. Nat. Hum. Behav. 4, 279–286 (2020). source
    • cites [122] Blatz, C. W. & Mercier, B. False polarization and false moderation: political opponents overestimate the extremity of each other’s ideologies but underestimate each other’s certainty. Soc. Psychol. Pers. Sci. 9, 521–529 (2018). source
    • cites [151] Westfall, J., Van Boven, L., Chambers, J. R. & Judd, C. M. Perceiving political polarization in the United States: party identity strength and attitude extremity exacerbate the perceived partisan divide. Perspect. Psychol. Sci. 10, 145–158 (2015). source
    • cites [152] Levendusky, M. & Malhotra, N. (Mis)perceptions of partisan polarization in the American public. Public Opin. Q. 80, 378–391 (2016). source
    • cites [153] Druckman, J. N., Klar, S., Krupnikov, Y., Levendusky, M. & Ryan, J. B. (Mis-) estimating affective polarization. J. Polit. 84, 1106–1117 (2022). source
    • cites [154] Mernyk, J. S., Pink, S. L., Druckman, J. N. & Willer, R. Correcting inaccurate metaperceptions reduces Americans’ support for partisan violence. Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA 119, e2116851119 (2022). source

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingcitation

    Belief in climate change has declined among Republicans and self-identified conservatives but not among Democrats and self-identified liberals.

    “belief in climate change, which has declined among Republicans and self-identified conservatives but not among Democrats and self-identified liberals182,183.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 2 sources checked
    • cites [182] Jacquet, J., Dietrich, M. & Jost, J. T. The ideological divide and climate change opinion: “top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches. Front. Psychol. 5, 1458 (2014). source

      The ‘Ideological Divide: Public Opinion Data’ section reports rising polarization and lower climate-change belief among conservatives than liberals in a 2010 survey. It does not establish that belief declined over time among Republicans and conservatives while remaining stable among Democrats and liberals; the surveys quoted do not provide those group-specific trends. No page number is available in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.84)

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
    • cites [183] Jenkins-Smith, H. C. et al. Partisan asymmetry in temporal stability of climate change beliefs. Nat. Clim. Change 10, 322–328 (2020). source

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingcitation

    The social context did not affect unobservable health behaviours such as vaccination, nor did it affect Democrats' behaviour with regard to any outcomes, including masking.

    “However, the social context did not affect unobservable health behaviours such as vaccination, nor did it affect Democrats’ behaviour with regard to any outcomes, including masking325.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [325] Baxter-King, R., Brown, J. R., Enos, R. D., Naeim, A. & Vavreck, L. How local partisan context conditions prosocial behaviors: mask wearing during COVID-19. Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA 119, e2116311119 (2022). source

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    These developments have the capacity to exacerbate all three types of polarization, insofar as individuals bring their own political attitudes and beliefs into alignment with those who are spatially proximate and tend to form negative impressions, including misperceptions, about those with whom they rarely interact.

    “These developments have the capacity to exacerbate all three types of polarization, insofar as individuals bring their own political attitudes and beliefs into alignment with those who are spatially proximate329,331 and tend to form negative impressions, including misperceptions, about those with whom they rarely interact332.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 3 sources checked
    • cites [329] Martin, G. J. & Webster, S. W. Does residential sorting explain geographic polarization? Polit. Sci. Res. Meth. 8, 215–231 (2020). source
    • cites [331] Brown, J. R., Enos, R. D., Feigenbaum, J. & Mazumder, S. Childhood cross-ethnic exposure predicts political behavior seven decades later: evidence from linked administrative data. Sci. Adv. 7, eabe8432 (2021). source

      Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 2 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
    • cites [332] Levendusky, M. Our Common Bonds: Using What Americans Share to Overcome the Partisan Divide (Univ. Chicago Press, 2023). source

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingcitation

    Whether offline or online, people tend to share information and discuss politics with like-minded others, but they are seldom completely cut off from disagreement.

    “Whether offline202–204 or online205–207, people tend to share information and discuss politics with like-minded others, but they are seldom completely cut off from disagreement208.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 7 sources checked
    • cites [202] Klofstad, C. A., McDermott, R. & Hatemi, P. K. The dating preferences of liberals and conservatives. Polit. Behav. 35, 519–538 (2013). source
    • cites [203] Huckfeldt, R., Mendez, J. M. & Osborn, T. Disagreement, ambivalence, and engagement: the political consequences of heterogeneous networks. Polit. Psychol. 25, 65–95 (2004). source
    • cites [204] Lee, B. & Bearman, P. Political isolation in America. Netw. Sci. 8, 333–355 (2020). The study documents trends in the composition of political discussion networks and shows that American’s core discussion networks shrink during heated political times. source
    • cites [205] Gentzkow, M. & Shapiro, J. M. Ideological segregation online and offline. Q. J. Econ. 126, 1799–1839 (2011). source
    • cites [206] Bakshy, E., Messing, S. & Adamic, L. A. Exposure to ideologically diverse news and opinion on Facebook. Science 348, 1130–1132 (2015). source
    • cites [207] Barberá, P., Jost, J. T., Nagler, J., Tucker, J. A. & Bonneau, R. Tweeting from left to right: is online political communication more than an echo chamber? Psychol. Sci. 26, 1531–1542 (2015). This study estimates ideological preferences of 3.8 million Twitter users in the USA and finds that ideological segregation in social media is less extreme than previously thought. Moreover, liberals are more likely than conservatives to engage in cross-ideological dissemination of information online. source
    • cites [208] Barberá, P. in Social Media and Democracy: The State of the Field (eds Persily, N. & Tucker, J.) (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2020).

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingcitation

    In one study, a randomly assigned group of Facebook users deactivated Facebook for four weeks prior to the 2018 USA midterm election; compared to a matched control group, deactivation reduced issue polarization, and to a lesser extent, affective polarization.

    “In one study, a randomly assigned group of Facebook users deactivated Facebook for four weeks prior to the 2018 USA midterm election. When compared to a matched control group, deactivation reduced issue polarization, and to a lesser extent, affective polarization271.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [271] Allcott, H. et al. Polarization and public health: partisan differences in social distancing during the coronavirus pandemic. J. Public Econ. 191, 104254 (2020). source

      Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 0 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 2 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingcitation

    Emphasizing a superordinate national identity can reduce out-group animus as well as affective and ideological polarization.

    “emphasizing a superordinate national identity can reduce out-group animus as well as affective and ideological polarization281–283, consistent with social identity theory90,92,139.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 6 sources checked
    • cites [281] Levendusky, M. Americans, not partisans. J. Polit. 80, 59–70 (2018). source
    • cites [282] Talaifar, S. & Swann, W. B., Jr. Deep alignment with country shrinks the moral gap between conservatives and liberals. Polit. Psychol. 40, 657–675 (2019). source
    • cites [283] Boxell, L., Conway, J., Druckman, J. N. & Gentzkow, M. Affective polarization did not increase during the COVID-19 pandemic. Q. J. Polit. Sci. Forthcoming https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3785328 (2021). source

      Section 2.2 reports that a coronavirus prime improved feelings toward the opposing party and reduced affective polarization. The Discussion proposes a new sense of national unity as a possible mechanism, but the experiment did not isolate an emphasis on national identity, and the paper does not report a reduction in ideological polarization. Page numbers are unavailable in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.87)

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
    • cites [90] Tajfel, H. & Turner, J. C. in Psychology of Intergroup Relations (eds Worchel, S. & Austin, W. A.) 7–24 (Nelson-Hall, 1986).

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

    • cites [92] Van Bavel, J. J. & Packer, D. The Power of Us: Harnessing Our Shared Identities to Improve Performance, Increase Cooperation, and Promote Social Harmony (Little Brown Spark, 2021).

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

    • cites [139] Dovidio, J. F., Gaertner, S. L. & Kafati, G. Group identity and intergroup relations: the common in-group identity model. Adv. Group. Process. 17, 1–35 (2000). source

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingcitation

    Retweets often included anger-related language; anger inflames political polarization by, among other things, increasing cognitive oversimplification and categorical thinking that divides 'us' and 'them'.

    “Retweets often included anger-related language260; this is important because anger inflames political polarization by, among other things, increasing cognitive oversimplification and categorical thinking that divides ‘us’ and ‘them.’132.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 2 sources checked
    • cites [260] Rathje, S., Van Bavel, J. J. & van der Linden, S. Out-group animosity drives engagement on social media. Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2024292118 (2021). This study of social media platforms finds that messages expressing negative emotions (such as anger, moral outrage and mockery) about the ideological out-group were especially likely to be shared on Facebook and Twitter, compared to other types of message. source

      Citation 260 attaches to the retweets clause, not the later explanation of how anger affects polarization. The Results (Study 1: Major Media Outlets; Study 2: Congress Members) find that negative-affect language is associated with higher retweet rates, but do not establish how often retweets included anger-specific language. Page numbers are unavailable in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.79)

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
    • cites [132] Fernbach, P. M. & Boven, L. V. False polarization: cognitive mechanisms and potential solutions. Curr. Opin. Psychol. 43, 1–6 (2022). This essay addresses how false polarization — where partisans hold false beliefs about the other side — can lead to actual polarization owing to categorical thinking, oversimplification and emotional amplification. source

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    There is clearly a market for political misinformation, and technology companies such as Twitter and Facebook profit from the spread of 'fake news', which increases customer engagement and therefore advertising revenue.

    “there is clearly a market for political misinformation255, and technology companies such as Twitter and Facebook profit from the spread of ‘fake news’, which increases customer engagement and therefore advertising revenue256.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 2 sources checked
    • cites [255] Allcott, H. & Gentzkow, M. Social media and fake news in the 2016 election. J. Econ. Perspect. 31, 211–236 (2017). source

      The citation is attached to the claim about Twitter and Facebook profiting, rather than the preceding claim about a market for misinformation. “Who Produces Fake News?” says viral stories can earn advertising revenue when users click through to the original site, but attributes that revenue to fake-news producers. “Social Media as a Source of Political Information” describes platforms as conducive to fake-news circulation; it does not establish that Twitter or Facebook profit from it through increased engagement and advertising revenue. (LLM, conf=0.82)

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
    • cites [256] Spohr, D. Fake news and ideological polarization: filter bubbles and selective exposure on social media. Bus. Inf. Rev. 34, 150–160 (2017). source

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingcitation

    Patterns of online ideological segregation resemble offline patterns of media consumption, and most social media users are exposed to reasonable levels of ideological heterogeneity.

    “patterns of online ideological segregation resemble offline patterns of media consumption205, and most social media users are exposed to reasonable levels of ideological heterogeneity206,207,257,266–268.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim3 of 7 sources checked
    • cites [205] Gentzkow, M. & Shapiro, J. M. Ideological segregation online and offline. Q. J. Econ. 126, 1799–1839 (2011). source
    • cites [206] Bakshy, E., Messing, S. & Adamic, L. A. Exposure to ideologically diverse news and opinion on Facebook. Science 348, 1130–1132 (2015). source
    • cites [207] Barberá, P., Jost, J. T., Nagler, J., Tucker, J. A. & Bonneau, R. Tweeting from left to right: is online political communication more than an echo chamber? Psychol. Sci. 26, 1531–1542 (2015). This study estimates ideological preferences of 3.8 million Twitter users in the USA and finds that ideological segregation in social media is less extreme than previously thought. Moreover, liberals are more likely than conservatives to engage in cross-ideological dissemination of information online. source
    • cites [257] Kligler-Vilenchik, N., Baden, C. & Yarchi, M. Interpretative polarization across platforms: how political disagreement develops over time on Facebook, Twitter, and WhatsApp. Soc. Media Soc. 6, 2056305120944393 (2020). source

      The cited paper reports evidence suggesting that most social media users remain regularly exposed to opposing standpoints (passage [1], labeled Abstract in our copy). That supports the heterogeneity point, but the citing sentence states it as fact while the paper presents it as a suggestion in a contested debate. The offline-media comparison is attached to a different citation, not this source. (LLM, conf=0.82)

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
    • cites [266] Hargittai, E., Gallo, J. & Kane, M. Cross-ideological discussions among conservative and liberal bloggers. Public Choice 134, 67–86 (2008). source
    • cites [267] Dubois, E. & Blank, G. The echo chamber is overstated: the moderating effect of political interest and diverse media. Inf. Commun. Soc. 21, 729–745 (2018). source
    • cites [268] Guess, A., Nyhan, B., Lyons, B. & Reifler, J. Avoiding the Echo Chamber About Echo Chambers (Knight Foundation, 2018).

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    Other studies find no connection between affective polarization and support for democratic norms.

    “Research to date paints a confusing picture, with some studies indicating a negative relationship between affective polarization and support for democratic norms302,303, and others finding no connection between the two13,58.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 2 sources checked
    • cites [13] Broockman, D. E., Kalla, J. L. & Westwood S. J. Does affective polarization undermine democratic norms or accountability? Am. J. Polit. Sci. (in the press).

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

    • cites [58] Voelkel, J. G. et al. Interventions reducing affective polarization do not improve anti-democratic attitudes. Nat. Hum. Behav. https://doi.org/10.31219/osf.io/7evmp (2021). source

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingcitation

    In general, sharing personal experiences rather than facts appears to foster respect and humanize politicians, even in the eyes of their adversaries, thereby reducing affective polarization.

    “In general, sharing personal experiences rather than facts appears to foster respect and humanize politicians, even in the eyes of their adversaries, thereby reducing affective polarization292,297.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 2 sources checked
    • cites [292] Kubin, E., Puryear, C., Schein, C. & Gray, K. Personal experiences bridge moral and political divides better than facts. Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA 118, e2008389118 (2021). source

      The General Discussion reports that personal experiences foster more respect for political opponents than facts, and the meta-analyses report greater willingness to interact with them. But the paper says its studies examined everyday Americans and that it is unclear whether the benefits extend to interactions between elected officials. It does not establish that sharing experiences humanizes politicians or reduces affective polarization as a measured outcome. (LLM, conf=0.91)

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
    • cites [297] Carpenter, C. J. Cognitive dissonance, ego-involvement, and motivated reasoning. Ann. Int. Comun. Assoc. 43, 1–23 (2019). source

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    Some studies indicate a negative relationship between affective polarization and support for democratic norms.

    “Research to date paints a confusing picture, with some studies indicating a negative relationship between affective polarization and support for democratic norms302,303, and others finding no connection between the two13,58.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 2 sources checked
    • cites [302] Lelkes, Y. & Westwood, S. J. The limits of partisan prejudice. J. Polit. 79, 485–501 (2017). source
    • cites [303] Kingzette, J. et al. How affective polarization undermines support for democratic norms. Public Opin. Q. 85, 663–677 (2021). source

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingcitation

    Experimental studies suggest that increasing system justification motivation may, in some cases, raise the national attachment levels of people who hold liberal views so that they more closely resemble those of people who hold conservative views, thereby temporarily reducing polarization on issues of patriotism - but not nationalism.

    “Experimental studies suggest that increasing system justification motivation may, in some cases, raise the national attachment levels of people who hold liberal views so that they more closely resemble those of people who hold conservative views, thereby temporarily reducing polarization on issues of patriotism — but not nationalism, defined as an attitude of superiority towards other countries282”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 4 sources checked
    • cites [282] Talaifar, S. & Swann, W. B., Jr. Deep alignment with country shrinks the moral gap between conservatives and liberals. Polit. Psychol. 40, 657–675 (2019). source
    • cites [287] van der Toorn, J., Nail, P., Liviatan, I. & Jost, J. T. My country, right or wrong: does activating system justification motivation eliminate the liberal–conservative gap in patriotism? J. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 54, 50–60 (2014). source
    • cites [288] Kobayashi, T. & Katagiri, A. The “rally around the flag” effect in territorial disputes: experimental evidence from Japan–China relations. J. East Asian Stud. 18, 299–319 (2018). source

      Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 2 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
    • cites [289] Porat, R., Tamir, M., Wohl, M. J., Gur, T. & Halperin, E. Motivated emotion and the rally around the flag effect: liberals are motivated to feel collective angst (like conservatives) when faced with existential threat. Cogn. Emot. 33, 480–491 (2019). source

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Historically speaking, polarization in the USA reflects social patterns that began with Southern realignment following civil rights legislation, the rise of single-issue interest groups, changes in campaign finance law, and the withdrawal of moderates from party politics and primary races, especially on the political right.

    “Historically speaking, polarization in the USA reflects social patterns that began with Southern realignment following civil rights legislation, the rise of single-issue interest groups, changes in campaign finance law, and the withdrawal of moderates from party politics and primary races, especially on the political right10,27,31,34,37,72,342,343).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 8 sources checked
    • cites [10] McCarty, N., Poole, K. T. & Rosenthal, H. Polarized America: the Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches (MIT Press, 2016).

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

    • cites [27] Layman, G. C., Carsey, T. M. & Horowitz, J. M. Party polarization in American politics: characteristics, causes, and consequences. Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 9, 83–110 (2006). source
    • cites [31] Hare, C. & Poole, K. T. The polarization of contemporary American politics. Polity 46, 411–429 (2014). source
    • cites [34] Bonica, A. & Sen, M. Estimating judicial ideology. J. Econ. Perspect. 35, 97–118 (2021). source
    • cites [37] Layman, G. C., Carsey, T. M., Green, J. C., Herrera, R. & Cooperman, R. Activists and conflict extension in American party politics. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 104, 324–346 (2010). source
    • cites [72] McCarty, N. Polarization: What Everyone Needs To Know (Oxford Univ. Press, 2019). source
    • cites [342] Thomsen, D. M. Opting Out Of Congress: Partisan Polarization And The Decline Of Moderate Candidates (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2017). source
    • cites [343] Pierson, P. & Schickler, E. Madison’s constitution under stress: a developmental analysis of political polarization. Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 23, 37–58 (2020). source

      The Development of Modern Political Polarization links modern polarization to party realignment over civil rights, and The Shifting Relationship Between Interest Groups and Parties describes the growth and partisan alignment of interest groups. Shifts in State Parties and Federalism discusses nomination reforms that increased activists’ influence. The passages do not establish changes in campaign finance law or a withdrawal of moderates from party politics and primary races, particularly on the right; they describe reduced moderating influence by party organizations instead. Page numbers were not available in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.87)

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    In Germany, opinions about whether to welcome asylum seekers became highly polarized, with opponents embracing system-justifying stereotypes and exhibiting motivated reasoning on the question of whether asylum seekers increase rates of criminal activity.

    “In Germany, opinions about whether to welcome asylum seekers became highly polarized, with opponents embracing system-justifying stereotypes and exhibiting motivated reasoning on the question of whether asylum seekers increase rates of criminal activity319.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [319] Glinitzer, K., Gummer & Wagner, M. Learning facts about migration: politically motivated learning of polarizing information about refugees. Polit. Psychol. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12734 (2021). source

      Split into 2 atoms — 1 confirmed, 1 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    In European countries, there are longstanding territorial, religious and social class cleavages and more recent cleavages pertaining to globalization and integration with the European Union.

    “In European countries, there are longstanding territorial, religious and social class cleavages and more recent cleavages pertaining to globalization and integration with the European Union333,334.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 2 sources checked
    • cites [333] Kriesi, H. et al. Globalization and the transformation of the national political space: six European countries compared. Eur. J. Polit. Res. 45, 921–956 (2006). source
    • cites [334] Hooghe, L. & Marks, G. Cleavage theory meets Europe’s crises: Lipset, Rokkan, and the transnational cleavage. J. Eur. Public Policy 25, 109–135 (2018). source

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingcitation

    People were more favourable towards a policy proposal when it was described as coming from the in-party rather than the out-party, suggesting that general group-based attitudes drove issue preferences.

    “For instance, people were more favourable towards a policy proposal when it was described as coming from the in-party rather than the out-party85, suggesting that general group-based attitudes drove issue preferences, thereby leading to issue polarization.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [85] Cohen, G. L. Party over policy: the dominating impact of group influence on political beliefs. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 85, 808–822 (2003). source

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingcitation

    Follow-up research indicated that the in-party policy proposal effect was true for Republican but not Democratic supporters.

    “However, follow-up research indicated that this was true for Republican but not Democratic supporters86.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [86] Bullock, J. G. Elite influence on public opinion in an informed electorate. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 105, 496–515 (2011). source

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingcitation

    Longitudinal research demonstrated that ideological consistency at time 1 predicted affective polarization at time 2, and affective polarization at time 1 predicted ideological consistency at time 2, all other things being equal.

    “Moreover, longitudinal research demonstrated that ideological consistency at time 1 predicted affective polarization at time 2, and affective polarization at time 1 predicted ideological consistency at time 2, all other things being equal82,87.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites [82] Enders, A. M. & Lupton, R. N. Value extremity contributes to affective polarization in the US. Polit. Sci. Res. Meth. 9, 857–866 (2021). source
    • cites [87] Lelkes, Y. Affective polarization and ideological sorting: a reciprocal, albeit weak, relationship. Forum 16, 67–79 (2018). source

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingcitation

    In a large-scale experiment, participants were more affectively polarized in the divergent condition, expressing more warmth towards the more extreme candidate whose ideology they shared and less warmth towards the more extreme candidate whose ideology they did not share; this effect was stronger for participants who were more interested in politics and more ideologically extreme.

    “In feeling thermometer ratings, participants were more affectively polarized in the divergent condition, expressing more warmth towards the more extreme candidate whose ideology they shared and less warmth towards the more extreme candidate whose ideology they did not share. This effect was stronger for participants who were more interested in politics and more ideologically extreme themselves83.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [83] Rogowski, J. C. & Sutherland, J. L. How ideology fuels affective polarization. Polit. Behav. 38, 485–508 (2016). source

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingcitation

    Learning about policy disagreements between rank-and-file Democrats and Republicans made partisan identities more salient and caused participants to express more warmth towards in-party members and less warmth towards out-party members.

    “Another series of experiments demonstrated that learning about policy disagreements between rank-and-file Democrats and Republicans made partisan identities more salient and caused participants to express more warmth towards in-party members and less warmth towards out-party members81.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [81] Dias, N. & Lelkes, Y. The nature of affective polarization: disentangling policy disagreement from partisan identity. Am. J. Polit. Sci. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12628 (2021). source

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingcitation

    Since the 1960s, those who endorse liberal attitudes have increasingly joined the Democratic Party, and those who endorse conservative attitudes have increasingly joined the Republican Party.

    “Consistent with this argument, there is abundant evidence that since the 1960s those who endorse liberal attitudes have increasingly joined the Democratic Party, and those who endorse conservative attitudes have increasingly joined the Republican Party35,110.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites [35] Levendusky, M. The microfoundations of mass polarization. Polit. Anal. 17, 162–176 (2009). source
    • cites [110] Noel, H. Political Ideologies and Political Parties in America (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2014). source

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingcitation

    Media coverage that is critical of polarization among political elites can reduce issue polarization among citizens, presumably because people do not want to be seen as extremists.

    “By contrast, media coverage that is critical of polarization among political elites can reduce issue polarization among citizens, presumably because people do not want to be seen (by themselves or others) as extremists122,158–160.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 4 sources checked
    • cites [122] Blatz, C. W. & Mercier, B. False polarization and false moderation: political opponents overestimate the extremity of each other’s ideologies but underestimate each other’s certainty. Soc. Psychol. Pers. Sci. 9, 521–529 (2018). source
    • cites [158] Cialdini, R. B., Levy, A., Herman, C. P. & Evenbeck, S. Attitudinal politics: the strategy of moderation. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 25, 100–108 (1973). source
    • cites [159] Levendusky, M. & Malhotra, N. Does media coverage of partisan polarization affect political attitudes? Polit. Commun. 33, 283–301 (2016). source
    • cites [160] Robison, J. & Mullinix, K. J. Elite polarization and public opinion: how polarization is communicated and its effects. Polit. Commun. 33, 261–282 (2016). source

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingcitation

    In one study, Republicans overestimated the percentage of Democrats who were LGBTQ by 25 points, whereas Democrats overestimated the percentage of Republicans who were evangelicals by 20 points.

    “In one study, Republicans overestimated the percentage of Democrats who were LGBTQ by 25 points, whereas Democrats overestimated the percentage of Republicans who were evangelicals by 20 points150.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [150] Ahler, D. J. & Sood, G. The parties in our heads: misperceptions about party composition and their consequences. J. Polit. 80, 964–981 (2018). source

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingcitation

    Analyses of historical trends in public opinion from 1972 to 2016 reveal that Democrats were early adopters of more egalitarian views about gender, civil rights and gay rights, as well as more progressive on moral issues, whereas Republicans resisted these secular trends and were slower to change their attitudes.

    “analyses of historical trends in public opinion from 1972 to 2016 reveal that Democrats were early adopters of more egalitarian views about gender, civil rights and gay rights, as well as more progressive on moral issues, whereas Republicans resisted these secular trends and were slower to change their attitudes40.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [40] Baldassarri, D. & Park, B. Was there a culture war? Partisan polarization and secular trends in US public opinion. J. Polit. 82, 809–827 (2020). This analysis of trends in public opinion in the USA over time finds partisan polarization on economic and civil rights issues, whereas opinions on moral issues followed a trend of secularization. Both Democrats and Republicans have increasingly adopted more progressive moral views, but Republicans changed their views more slowly than Democrats. source

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingcitation

    Support for governmental regulation of the economy declined sharply among rank-and-file Republicans between 1984 and 2010, while it remained unchanged among Democrats.

    “support for governmental regulation of the economy declined sharply among rank-and-file Republicans between 1984 and 2010, while it remained unchanged among Democrats175.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [175] Brooks, C. & Manza, J. A broken public? Americans’ responses to the great recession. Am. Sociol. Rev. 78, 727–748 (2013). source

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingcitation

    Possessing ideologically homogeneous networks exacerbates issue and affective polarization, whereas having a heterogeneous network facilitates the correction of stereotypical misconceptions and decreases polarization.

    “possessing ideologically homogeneous networks exacerbates issue and affective polarization, whereas having a heterogeneous network facilitates the correction of stereotypical misconceptions and decreases polarization223–227.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 5 sources checked
    • cites [223] Druckman, J. N. & Nelson, K. R. Framing and deliberation: how citizens’ conversations limit elite influence. Am. J. Polit. Sci. 47, 729–745 (2003). source
    • cites [224] Klar, S. Partisanship in a social setting. Am. J. Polit. Sci. 58, 687–704 (2014). source
    • cites [225] Hart, P. S., Feldman, L., Leiserowitz, A. & Maibach, E. Extending the impacts of hostile media perceptions: influences on discussion and opinion polarization in the context of climate change. Sci. Commun. 37, 506–532 (2015). source
    • cites [226] Hutchens, M. J., Hmielowski, J. D. & Beam, M. A. Reinforcing spirals of political discussion and affective polarization. Commun. Monogr. 86, 357–376 (2019). source
    • cites [227] Rossiter, E. The consequences of interparty conversation on outparty affect and stereotypes. Preprint at http://erossiter.com/files/conversations.pdf (2020).

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingcitation

    Elite polarization predated the rise of mass polarization in the USA by several years, suggesting that voters began to 'catch up' to party leaders over time.

    “Elite polarization predated the rise of mass polarization in the USA by several years, suggesting that voters began to ‘catch up’ to party leaders over time10,42,48.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites [10] McCarty, N., Poole, K. T. & Rosenthal, H. Polarized America: the Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches (MIT Press, 2016).

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

    • cites [42] Bafumi, J. & Shapiro, R. Y. A new partisan voter. J. Polit. 71, 1–24 (2009). source
    • cites [48] Webster, S. W. & Abramowitz, A. I. The ideological foundations of affective polarization in the US electorate. Am. Polit. Res. 45, 621–647 (2017). This article uses survey and experimental data to show that ideological beliefs (polarization) influence affective polarization, especially when it comes to social welfare issues. source

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingcitation

    Over the past three decades, Americans' personal networks have become smaller and more homogeneous in terms of political preferences, apparently because 'important matters' are increasingly framed as ideologically meaningful.

    “over the past three decades, Americans’ personal networks have become smaller and more homogeneous in terms of political preferences, apparently because ‘important matters’ are increasingly framed as ideologically meaningful204.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [204] Lee, B. & Bearman, P. Political isolation in America. Netw. Sci. 8, 333–355 (2020). The study documents trends in the composition of political discussion networks and shows that American’s core discussion networks shrink during heated political times. source

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingreasoning

    Although exposure to counter-attitudinal news did not change participants' political opinions, it did reduce affective polarization compared to a control group, possibly because instructions stressed that new and valuable perspectives would be presented.

    “Although exposure to counter-attitudinal news did not change participants’ political opinions, it did reduce affective polarization (compared to a control group), possibly because instructions to participants stressed that new and valuable perspectives would be presented, which might have quelled ego-justifying, group-justifying and system-justifying motives.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingcitation

    Republican elite discourse has for decades emphasized traditional family values and resistance to social change, and this seems to have increased the correlation between partisanship and ideology more steeply among Republican than Democratic voters.

    “Republican elite discourse has for decades emphasized traditional family values and resistance to social change, and this seems to have increased the correlation between partisanship and ideology more steeply among Republican than Democratic voters47.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [47] Lupton, R. N., Smallpage, S. M. & Enders, A. M. Values and political predispositions in the age of polarization: examining the relationship between partisanship and ideology in the United States, 1988–2012. Br. J. Polit. Sci. 50, 1–20 (2017). This study uses over-time data to show that alignment between ideology and partisanship has increased asymmetrically among those with conservative value orientations, presumably owing to Republican discourse emphasizing traditional family values and resistance to social change. source

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingcitation

    Exposure to ideologically driven networks such as Fox News on the political right and MSNBC on the political left exerts both persuasive and reinforcement effects.

    “Exposure to ideologically driven networks (such as Fox News on the political right and MSNBC on the political left) exerts both persuasive245,246 and reinforcement effects247.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites [245] DellaVigna, S. & Kaplan, E. The Fox News effect: media bias and voting. Q. J. Econ. 120, 1187–1234 (2007). source
    • cites [246] Martin, G. J. & Yurukoglu, A. Bias in cable news: persuasion and polarization. Am. Econ. Rev. 107, 2565–2599 (2017). source
    • cites [247] Hopkins, D. J. & Ladd, J. M. The consequences of broader media choice: evidence from the expansion of Fox News. Q. J. Polit. Sci. 9, 115–135 (2014). source

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingcitation

    Exposure to same-party and other-party messages on partisan media platforms often increases affective polarization, in the latter case because of resistance to change and the spontaneous generation of counterarguments.

    “exposure to same-party and other-party messages on partisan media platforms often increases affective polarization, in the latter case because of resistance to change and the spontaneous generation of counterarguments249.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [249] Druckman, J. N., Gubitz, S. R., Levendusky, M. S. & Lloyd, A. How incivility on partisan media (de-)polarizes the electorate. J. Polit. 81, 291–295 (2019). source

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingcitation

    In another experiment, thousands of Facebook users were randomly assigned to subscribe to liberal or conservative news outlets for at least two weeks; results confirmed that Facebook's algorithm limits exposure to counter-attitudinal news in general, but when participants were assigned to receive counter-attitudinal news they were willing to read and share it.

    “In another experiment, thousands of Facebook users were randomly assigned to subscribe to liberal or conservative news outlets for at least two weeks259. Results of the study confirmed that Facebook’s algorithm limits exposure to counter-attitudinal news in general, but when participants were assigned to receive counter-attitudinal news they were willing to read and share it.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [259] Levy, R. E. Social media, news consumption, and polarization: evidence from a field experiment. Am. Econ. Rev. 111, 831–870 (2021). source

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingcitation

    In 2016, Donald Trump supporters were more likely to justify economic inequality under capitalism and gender disparities under the patriarchal social order, in comparison with supporters of Hillary Clinton, but they were not more likely to justify the general social system in the USA following eight years of Barack Obama's presidency.

    “in 2016, Donald Trump supporters were more likely to justify economic inequality under capitalism and gender disparities under the patriarchal social order, in comparison with supporters of Hillary Clinton, but they were not more likely to justify the general social system in the USA following eight years of Barack Obama’s presidency284.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [284] Azevedo, F., Jost, J. T. & Rothmund, T. “Making America great again”: system justification in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Transl. Issues Psychol. Sci. 3, 231–240 (2017). source

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingcitation

    Prior to 2000, Democrats and Republicans differed little in terms of nationalist beliefs, but as of 2016 they held very different conceptions, apparently because of 9/11, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and racial resentment in response to Barack Obama's presidency.

    “Prior to 2000, Democrats and Republicans differed little in terms of nationalist beliefs, but as of 2016 they held very different conceptions, apparently because of 9/11, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and racial resentment in response to Barack Obama’s presidency286.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [286] Bonikowski, B., Feinstein, Y. & Bock, S. The partisan sorting of “America”: How nationalist cleavages shaped the 2016 US Presidential election. Am. J. Sociol. 127, 492–561 (2021). source

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingcitation

    Exposure to Joe Biden's storytelling increased support for social security among Democrats but not Republicans, thereby increasing issue polarization; however, the narrative did increase liking for Biden in all participants.

    “exposure to Joe Biden’s storytelling increased support for social security among Democrats but not Republicans, thereby increasing issue polarization. However, the narrative did increase liking for Biden in all participants291.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [291] Gooch, A. Ripping yarn: experiments on storytelling by partisan elites. Polit. Commun. 35, 220–238 (2018). source

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingcitation

    Exposure to overly confrontational, uncivil discourse from members of one's own party can lead to depolarization; this is because citizens view such rhetoric as norm-violating and wish to distance themselves from the source of the message.

    “exposure to overly confrontational, uncivil discourse from members of one’s own party can lead to depolarization; this is because citizens view such rhetoric as norm-violating and wish to distance themselves from the source of the message249.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [249] Druckman, J. N., Gubitz, S. R., Levendusky, M. S. & Lloyd, A. How incivility on partisan media (de-)polarizes the electorate. J. Polit. 81, 291–295 (2019). source

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given

    Ego-justifying and group-justifying motives lead individuals to defend their own pre-existing beliefs and those of their in-group, respectively.

    “Ego-justifying and group-justifying motives lead individuals to defend their own pre-existing beliefs and those of their in-group, respectively.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    Issue or ideological polarization is typically operationalized as approaching or arriving at a bimodal distribution of beliefs, opinions and values.

    “This type of polarization is typically operationalized as approaching or arriving at a bimodal distribution of beliefs, opinions and values50,72.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites [50] DiMaggio, P., Evans, J. & Bryson, B. Have Americans’ social attitudes become more polarized? Am. J. Sociol. 102, 690–755 (1996). source
    • cites [72] McCarty, N. Polarization: What Everyone Needs To Know (Oxford Univ. Press, 2019). source

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    Issue or ideological polarization is characterized as moving towards the extremes and away from the centre with respect to issues and/or ideology.

    “First, issue or ideological polarization (Fig. 1a) is characterized as moving towards the extremes and away from the centre with respect to issues and/or ideology29.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [29] Fiorina, M. P. & Abrams, S. J. Political polarization in the American public. Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 11, 563–588 (2008). source

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationnone given

    There are three operational definitions of mass political polarization: issue or ideological polarization, partisan alignment, and affective polarization.

    “There are three operational definitions of mass political polarization (see Fig. 1), which might differ in terms of whether they are psychologically underpinned by cognitive, motivational or affective concerns.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Group polarization can be explained by social comparison processes and conformity to perceived group norms.

    “The second focuses on social comparison processes and conformity to perceived group norms: individuals in a group conform to what they perceive as the group norm.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 4 sources checked
    • cites [21] Hogg, M. A., Turner, J. C. & Davidson, B. Polarized norms and social frames of reference: a test of the self-categorization theory of group polarization. Basic. Appl. Soc. Psychol. 11, 77–100 (1990). source
    • cites [22] McGarty, C., Turner, J. C., Hogg, M. A., David, B. & Wetherell, M. S. Group polarization as conformity to the prototypical group member. Br. J. Soc. Psychol. 31, 1–19 (1992). source
    • cites [23] Sinclair, B. The Social Citizen: Peer Networks And Political Behavior (Univ. Chicago Press, 2012). source
    • cites [24] Sunstein, C. Conformity: The Power Of Social Influences (New York Univ. Press, 2019). source

  • The quote only partly states this claim.

    Interpretationnone given

    There are at least three general classes of psychological mechanism that contribute to political polarization: ego-justifying, group-justifying, and system-justifying.

    “We propose that there are at least three general classes of psychological mechanism that contribute to political polarization.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: No coherent conceptual framework of the microlevel dynamics that increase or decrease polarization has been presented.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    Partisan alignment focuses on the dimensionality of the political space.

    “Second, mass polarization in terms of partisan alignment (Fig. 1b) focuses on the dimensionality of the political space.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites [62] Lipset, S. M. & Rokkan, S. in Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives 1–64 (The Free Press, 1967).

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

    • cites [64] Cox, G. W. Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World’s Electoral Systems (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1997). source
    • cites [76] Guth, J. L. & Nelsen, B. F. Party choice in Europe: social cleavages and the rise of populist parties. Party Politics 27, 453–464 (2021). source

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationcitation

    People may not necessarily hold negative attitudes towards out-party members in particular, but rather towards any person or group that is highly partisan.

    “(It may be that people do not necessarily hold negative attitudes towards out-party members in particular, but rather towards any person or group that is highly partisan54.)”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [54] Klar, S., Krupnikov, Y. & Ryan, J. B. Affective polarization or partisan disdain? Untangling a dislike for the opposing party from a dislike of partisanship. Public. Opin. Q. 82, 379–390 (2018). source

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation

    Ego-justifying mechanisms involve the self-serving tendency to advance and maintain one's own pre-existing beliefs, opinions and values and to defend against information that might contradict any of those.

    “Ego-justifying mechanisms involve the self-serving tendency to advance and maintain one’s own pre-existing beliefs, opinions and values and to defend against information that might contradict any of those98,99.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites [98] Dunning, D. A newer look: motivated social cognition and the schematic representation of social concepts. Psychol. Inq. 10, 1–11 (1999). source
    • cites [99] Jost, J. T., Hennes, E. P. & Lavine, H. in The Oxford Handbook of Social Cognition (ed. Carlston, D. E.) 851–875 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2013).

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    System-justifying mechanisms reflect that some individuals and groups are motivated to preserve the status quo and resist social change, while others are motivated to challenge or improve upon it.

    “System-justifying mechanisms, which are often overlooked in social psychological analyses of political polarization, reflect the fact that some individuals and groups are motivated to preserve the status quo — and to resist various forms of social change — while others are motivated to challenge or improve upon it100,101.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites [100] Jost, J. T. Resistance to change: a social psychological perspective. Soc. Res. 82, 607–636 (2015). source
    • cites [101] Jost, J. T. A Theory of System Justification (Harvard Univ. Press, 2020). source

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation

    Additional cognitive-motivational mechanisms that may exacerbate issue polarization include selective avoidance of counter-attitudinal information and motivated resistance to attitude change.

    “Additional cognitive–motivational mechanisms that may exacerbate issue polarization include other forms of reduction in cognitive dissonance, such as selective avoidance of counter-attitudinal information and motivated resistance to attitude change (see Table 1), both of which reflect ego-defensive motives to avoid inconsistency and maintain the individual’s pre-existing beliefs, opinions and”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 5 sources checked
    • cites [100] Jost, J. T. Resistance to change: a social psychological perspective. Soc. Res. 82, 607–636 (2015). source
    • cites [123] Greenwald, A. G. The totalitarian ego: fabrication and revision of personal history. Am. Psychol. 35, 603–618 (1980). source
    • cites [124] Vraga, E. K. How party affiliation conditions the experience of dissonance and explains polarization and selective exposure. Soc. Sci. Q. 96, 487–502 (2015). source
    • cites [125] Harmon-Jones, E., & Mills, J. in Cognitive Dissonance: Reexamining a Pivotal Theory in Psychology 3–24 (American Psychological Association, 2019). source
    • cites [126] Stanley, M. L., Henne, P., Yang, B. W. & De Brigard, F. Resistance to position change, motivated reasoning, and polarization. Polit. Behav. 42, 891–913 (2020). source

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation

    Increased alignment between partisanship and ideology reflects a 'sorting' process that increases intergroup conflict.

    “From a more macro-political perspective, increased alignment between partisanship and ideology reflects a ‘sorting’ process that increases intergroup conflict35,38,77.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites [35] Levendusky, M. The microfoundations of mass polarization. Polit. Anal. 17, 162–176 (2009). source
    • cites [38] Levendusky, M. Clearer cues, more consistent voters: a benefit of elite polarization. Polit. Behav. 32, 111–131 (2010). source
    • cites [77] Park, B. How are we apart? Continuity and change in the structure of ideological disagreement in the American public, 1980–2012. Soc. Forces 96, 1757–1784 (2018). This article describes three types of ideological disagreement — polarization, partisan sorting and dimensional alignment — and analyses historical trends in US public opinion for each dimension. source

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    By exaggerating the prototypical characteristics of out-group members, ideologues increase the perceived social distance between different groups and might stereotype, discredit or marginalize the out-group.

    “By exaggerating the prototypical characteristics of out-group members in these ways, ideologues increase the perceived social distance between different groups and might stereotype, discredit or marginalize the out-group.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Some intervention techniques (reducing anger and competition) might reduce ego-defensive motivation itself, whereas others (correcting misperceptions) seek to undo the consequences of ego-defensive processing.

    “Some of these techniques (reducing anger and competition) might reduce ego-defensive motivation itself, whereas others (correcting misperceptions) seek to undo the consequences of ego-defensive processing.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Whereas ego-justifying and group-justifying motives contribute to relatively symmetrical forms of polarization on the liberal-left and conservative-right, system justification mechanisms might contribute to ideological asymmetries.

    “Whereas ego-justifying and group-justifying motives contribute to relatively symmetrical forms of polarization on the liberal-left and conservative-right, a third class of cognitive–motivational mechanisms related to system justification might contribute to ideological asymmetries99,149.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites [99] Jost, J. T., Hennes, E. P. & Lavine, H. in The Oxford Handbook of Social Cognition (ed. Carlston, D. E.) 851–875 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2013).

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

    • cites [149] Eibach, R. Ideological polarization and social psychology. Oxford Res. Encyc. Psychol. https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190236557.013.240 (2021). source

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Premisecitation

    System justification motivation is defined as the (not necessarily conscious) system-serving tendency to defend, bolster and legitimize aspects of the societal status quo.

    “This is because system justification motivation — defined as the (not necessarily conscious) system-serving tendency to defend, bolster and legitimize aspects of the societal status quo — is generally correlated with political conservatism101.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [101] Jost, J. T. A Theory of System Justification (Harvard Univ. Press, 2020). source

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    In game-theoretic terms, people who embrace liberal ideology are more likely than those who embrace conservative ideology to 'cooperate', whereas the latter are more likely to 'defect'.

    “in game-theoretic terms, people who embrace liberal ideology are more likely than those who embrace conservative ideology to ‘cooperate’, whereas the latter are more likely to ‘defect’107.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [107] Jost, J. T. Left And Right: The Psychological Significance Of A Political Distinction (Oxford Univ. Press, 2021).

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Descriptive social norms about what other people think or do and injunctive norms about what people ought to think or do are two major sources of social influence.

    “Descriptive social norms about what other people think or do and injunctive norms about what people ought to think or do are two major sources of social influence322.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [322] Cialdini, R. B. & Jacobson, R. P. Influences of social norms on climate change-related behaviors. Curr. Opin. Behav. Sci. 42, 1–8 (2021). source

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation

    Liberals and conservatives differ in terms of system-justifying versus system-challenging motives, which might help to explain asymmetric polarization.

    “However, they differ in terms of system-justifying (versus system-challenging) motives, which might help to explain asymmetric polarization10,34,47,48,73,74.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 6 sources checked
    • cites [10] McCarty, N., Poole, K. T. & Rosenthal, H. Polarized America: the Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches (MIT Press, 2016).

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

    • cites [34] Bonica, A. & Sen, M. Estimating judicial ideology. J. Econ. Perspect. 35, 97–118 (2021). source
    • cites [47] Lupton, R. N., Smallpage, S. M. & Enders, A. M. Values and political predispositions in the age of polarization: examining the relationship between partisanship and ideology in the United States, 1988–2012. Br. J. Polit. Sci. 50, 1–20 (2017). This study uses over-time data to show that alignment between ideology and partisanship has increased asymmetrically among those with conservative value orientations, presumably owing to Republican discourse emphasizing traditional family values and resistance to social change. source
    • cites [48] Webster, S. W. & Abramowitz, A. I. The ideological foundations of affective polarization in the US electorate. Am. Polit. Res. 45, 621–647 (2017). This article uses survey and experimental data to show that ideological beliefs (polarization) influence affective polarization, especially when it comes to social welfare issues. source
    • cites [73] Hacker, J. & Pierson, P. in Solutions to Political Polarization in America (ed. Persily, N.) 59–70 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2015). source
    • cites [74] Grossmann, M. & Hopkins, D. A. Asymmetric Politics: Ideological Republicans and Group Interest Democrats (Oxford Univ. Press, 2016). source

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Sources are more effective in influencing others when they are perceived as in-group members and as credible, trustworthy, powerful and/or attractive.

    “Sources are more effective in influencing others when they are perceived as in-group members92 and as credible, trustworthy, powerful and/or attractive188.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites [92] Van Bavel, J. J. & Packer, D. The Power of Us: Harnessing Our Shared Identities to Improve Performance, Increase Cooperation, and Promote Social Harmony (Little Brown Spark, 2021).

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

    • cites [188] McGuire, W. J. Constructing Social Psychology: Creative And Critical Processes (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1999). source

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation

    Norms tied to social contexts such as geographic locations influence political preferences and contribute to polarization.

    “These and other studies327,328 highlight the ways in which norms tied to social contexts such as geographic locations influence political preferences and contribute to polarization329.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites [327] Perez-Truglia, R. & Cruces, G. Partisan interactions: evidence from a field experiment in the United States. J. Polit. Econ. 125, 1208–1243 (2017). source
    • cites [328] Perez-Truglia, R. Political conformity: event-study evidence from the United States. Rev. Econ. Stat. 100, 14–28 (2018). source
    • cites [329] Martin, G. J. & Webster, S. W. Does residential sorting explain geographic polarization? Polit. Sci. Res. Meth. 8, 215–231 (2020). source

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Message framing has the potential to reduce polarization to the extent that it assuages ego- and group-justification motives or taps into system-justification motives; however, some frames may increase polarization by eliciting ego- or group-defensiveness, accentuating categorical differences between groups, or highlighting individual and group differences in system-justifying attitudes.

    “Message framing has the potential to reduce polarization to the extent that it assuages ego- and group-justification motives by, for example, alleviating personal or collective insecurity, or taps into system-justification motives by appealing to patriotic traditions. However, some frames may increase polarization by eliciting ego- or group-defensiveness, accentuating categorical differences”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Trafficking in hatred and the politics of provocation and backlash breeds political disengagement, placing the fate of democracy in the hands of a small, non-representative subset of citizens.

    “The latter style breeds political disengagement244, placing the fate of democracy in the hands of a small, non-representative subset of citizens.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [244] Krupnikov, Y. & Ryan J. B. The Other Divide: Polarization And Disengagement In American Politics (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2022). source

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Our psychological framework cannot easily explain historically changing levels of polarization or elites' choice of communication strategies.

    “Fourth, our psychological framework cannot easily explain historically changing levels of polarization or elites’ choice of communication strategies.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given

    There are often political incentives for partisan elites to exploit the more polarizing strategies of message framing to maximize support and turnout among their staunchest constituents.

    “Unfortunately, there are often political incentives for partisan elites to exploit the more polarizing strategies of message framing to maximize support and turnout among their staunchest constituents.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    It is, in principle, possible to layer structural and institutional variables onto our psychological framework, and this would facilitate comparative analysis of political polarization.

    “It is, in principle, possible to layer structural and institutional variables onto our psychological framework, and this would facilitate comparative analysis of political polarization (Box 2).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Liberal-leftists are more willing to challenge the societal status quo and push for egalitarian forms of social change, whereas conservative-rightists are more authoritarian and more protective of cultural traditions as well as longstanding social, economic and political institutions.

    “Whereas liberal-leftists are more willing to challenge the societal status quo and push for egalitarian forms of social change, conservative-rightists are more authoritarian and more protective of cultural traditions as well as longstanding social, economic and political institutions101,107,149,166,168,172.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 6 sources checked
    • cites [101] Jost, J. T. A Theory of System Justification (Harvard Univ. Press, 2020). source
    • cites [107] Jost, J. T. Left And Right: The Psychological Significance Of A Political Distinction (Oxford Univ. Press, 2021).

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

    • cites [149] Eibach, R. Ideological polarization and social psychology. Oxford Res. Encyc. Psychol. https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190236557.013.240 (2021). source
    • cites [166] Womick, J., Rothmund, T., Azevedo, F., King, L. A. & Jost, J. T. Group-based dominance and authoritarian aggression predict support for Donald Trump in the 2016 US presidential election. Soc. Psychol. Pers. Sci. 10, 643–652 (2019). source
    • cites [168] Nilsson, A. & Jost, J. T. The authoritarian-conservatism nexus. Curr. Opin. Behav. Sci. 34, 148–154 (2020). source
    • cites [172] Becker, J. C. Ideology and the promotion of social change. Curr. Opin. Behav. Sci. 34, 6–11 (2020). source

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation

    Although source, message, channel, receiver and target variables have been studied for approximately 70 years, we still know fairly little about how they interact with one another.

    “although source, message, channel, receiver and target variables have been studied for approximately 70 years188,189, we still know fairly little about how they interact with one another.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites [188] McGuire, W. J. Constructing Social Psychology: Creative And Critical Processes (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1999). source
    • cites [189] Lasswell, H. D. in The Communication of Ideas (ed. Bryson, L.) (Harper and Brothers, 1948).

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    Today more than half of Americans obtain political news from sources that either did not exist (such as social media) or were still emerging (cable news networks) twenty years ago.

    “Today more than half of Americans obtain political news from sources that either did not exist (such as social media) or were still emerging (cable news networks) twenty years ago316.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [316] Mitchell, A., Jurkowitz, M., Oliphant, J. B. & Shearer, E. Americans who mainly get their news on social media are less engaged, less knowledgeable. Pew Research Center https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/2020/07/30/americans-who-mainly-get-their-news-on-social-media-are-less-engaged-less-knowledgeable/ (2020).

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given

    The empirical literature has not advanced to the point that it is possible to hypothesize with precision how any given attempt at political communication will interact with cognitive-motivational mechanisms in specific social-communication contexts to influence polarization or depolarization.

    “Unfortunately, the empirical literature has not advanced to the point that it is possible to hypothesize with precision how any given attempt at political communication will interact with cognitive–motivational mechanisms in specific social-communication contexts to influence polarization or depolarization.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation

    Personal stories can be manufactured or manipulated and are difficult to verify; to the extent that they are more influential than accurate information, they can be used to mislead followers and sow discord.

    “Personal stories can be manufactured or manipulated and are difficult to verify; to the extent that they are more influential than accurate information, they can be used to mislead followers and sow discord298.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [298] Van Bavel, J. J., Reinero, D. A., Spring, V., Harris, E. & Duke, A. Speaking my truth: why personal experiences can bridge divides but mislead. Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA 118, e2100280118 (2021). source

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    In the USA, there are three major cleavages on economic, civil rights and moral issues, with the moral dimension largely crosscutting the other two dimensions.

    “In the USA, there are three major cleavages on economic, civil rights and moral issues, with the moral dimension largely crosscutting the other two dimensions40,77.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites [40] Baldassarri, D. & Park, B. Was there a culture war? Partisan polarization and secular trends in US public opinion. J. Polit. 82, 809–827 (2020). This analysis of trends in public opinion in the USA over time finds partisan polarization on economic and civil rights issues, whereas opinions on moral issues followed a trend of secularization. Both Democrats and Republicans have increasingly adopted more progressive moral views, but Republicans changed their views more slowly than Democrats. source
    • cites [77] Park, B. How are we apart? Continuity and change in the structure of ideological disagreement in the American public, 1980–2012. Soc. Forces 96, 1757–1784 (2018). This article describes three types of ideological disagreement — polarization, partisan sorting and dimensional alignment — and analyses historical trends in US public opinion for each dimension. source

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation

    Some factors increase polarization, as when highly polarized elites stoke issue, ideological and affective polarization among voters, or when restrictive framing of nationalist messages increases partisan or ideological alignment with respect to immigration or foreign policy; other variables contribute to depolarization, as when strategic framing of environmental values, activation of system-justi

    “Some factors increase polarization, as when highly polarized elites stoke issue, ideological and affective polarization among voters, or when restrictive framing of nationalist messages increases partisan or ideological alignment with respect to immigration or foreign policy. Other variables contribute to depolarization, as when strategic framing of environmental values, activation of system”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationreasoning

    Explaining historically changing levels of polarization or elites' choice of communication strategies would require incorporating structural and institutional factors, such as economic performance, social or cultural cleavages across time, and variation in political systems.

    “This would require incorporating structural and institutional factors, such as economic performance, social or cultural cleavages across time, and variation in political systems.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    Levels of polarization (and their political consequences) depend on a number of contextual factors.

    “Although it is beyond the purview of our analysis, it is important to keep in mind that levels of polarization (and their political consequences) depend on a number of contextual factors65.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [65] Gidron, N., Adams, J. & Horne, W. American Affective Polarization in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2020). source

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationcitation

    All of this parallels polarization trends in other regions, including Europe, the Middle East, and Latin America.

    “All of this parallels polarization trends in other regions, including Europe338, the Middle East11, and Latin America11.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites [338] Bosco, A. & Verney, S. Polarization in southern Europe: elites, party conflicts and negative partisanship. South. Eur. Soc. Politics 25, 257–284 (2020). source
    • cites [11] McCoy, J., Rahman, T. & Somer, M. Polarization and the global crisis of democracy: common patterns, dynamics, and pernicious consequences for democratic politics. Am. Behav. Sci. 62, 16–42 (2018). source

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Polarization led parties in power to enact constitutional reforms to consolidate their power in Hungary, Turkey and Venezuela, whereas power grabs in the USA occurred through the violation of democratic norms and refusal to compromise.

    “For instance, polarization led parties in power to enact constitutional reforms to consolidate their power in Hungary, Turkey and Venezuela, whereas power grabs in the USA occurred through the violation of democratic norms and refusal to compromise11.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [11] McCoy, J., Rahman, T. & Somer, M. Polarization and the global crisis of democracy: common patterns, dynamics, and pernicious consequences for democratic politics. Am. Behav. Sci. 62, 16–42 (2018). source
91 of 91

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    No coherent conceptual framework of the microlevel dynamics that increase or decrease polarization has been presented.

    “Despite a vast multidisciplinary literature, no coherent conceptual framework of the microlevel dynamics that increase or decrease polarization has been presented.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The vast majority of the relevant research to date has been conducted in the US context.

    “We focus primarily on the US context, because this is where the vast majority of the relevant research to date has been conducted.”

  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    The kinds of cognitive and motivational mechanisms described above play mediating (or, in some cases, moderating) roles in explaining whether specific messages communicated by certain sources are persuasive or serve to increase or decrease political polarization.

    “A guiding assumption of this general approach is that the kinds of cognitive and motivational mechanisms described above play mediating (or, in some cases, moderating) roles in explaining, for instance, whether specific messages communicated by certain sources are persuasive — or, in the present context, serve to increase or decrease political polarization.”
3 of 3

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

  • Such goals can lead to antidemocratic attitudes and behaviors.

    “Such goals can lead to antidemocratic attitudes and behaviors.”

    From How to study democratic backsliding (2024) · cites this paper as Jost et al. (2022)

    The Introduction describes supporters trying to overturn an election, and the Summary and future directions describes power grabs and violations of democratic norms. But that section says the precise connections between polarization, abandonment of democratic norms, and political violence are unknown; it does not establish that the unspecified “goals” lead to antidemocratic attitudes and behaviors. (LLM, conf=0.80)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.

  • Facebook deactivation study cites a different study

    Minor

    The cited reference is titled as a study of partisan differences in social distancing during COVID-19, not an experiment deactivating Facebook before the 2018 midterm election.

  • Capitol insurrection dated to both 2020 and 2021

    Minor

    The channel-factors section dates the insurrection to 6 January 2020, whereas the introduction dates it to 6 January 2021.

2 of 2

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

Research works printed but not linked: 13

  1. Sartori, G. Parties And Party Systems: A Framework For Analysis Vol. 1 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1976).
  2. Fiorina, M. P. The decline of collective responsibility in American politics. Daedalus 109, 25–45 (1980).
  3. McCarty, N., Poole, K. T. & Rosenthal, H. Polarized America: the Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches (MIT Press, 2016).
  4. Broockman, D. E., Kalla, J. L. & Westwood S. J. Does affective polarization undermine democratic norms or accountability? Am. J. Polit. Sci. (in the press).
  5. Fiorina, M. P., Abrams, S. J. & Pope, J. C. Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America 3rd edn (Pearson Longman, 2010).
  6. Fiorina, M. P. Unstable majorities: Polarization, Party Sorting, and Political Stalemate (Hoover Press, 2017).
  7. Lipset, S. M. & Rokkan, S. in Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives 1–64 (The Free Press, 1967).
  8. Jost, J. T., Hennes, E. P. & Lavine, H. in The Oxford Handbook of Social Cognition (ed. Carlston, D. E.) 851–875 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2013).
  9. Jost, J. T. Left And Right: The Psychological Significance Of A Political Distinction (Oxford Univ. Press, 2021).
  10. Mercier, H. in Cognitive Illusions: Intriguing Phenomena In Thinking, Judgment And Memory (ed. Pohl, R. F.) 99–114 (Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group, 2017).
  11. Barberá, P. in Social Media and Democracy: The State of the Field (eds Persily, N. & Tucker, J.) (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2020).
  12. Rossiter, E. The consequences of interparty conversation on outparty affect and stereotypes. Preprint at http://erossiter.com/files/conversations.pdf (2020).
  13. Busby, E. C., Flynn, D. J., & Druckman, J. N. in Doing News Framing Analysis II (ed. D’Angelo, P.) (Routledge, 2018).

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Related

Authors
Jost, J. T., Baldassarri, D. S., & Druckman, J. N.
Affiliations
  • New York University (US)
  • Northwestern University (US)
Corresponding author
Jost, John T.
ORCID
Venue
Nature Reviews Psychology
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Published
2022-08-01
Volume
1
Issue
10
Pages
560-576
ISSN
2731-0574 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1038/s44159-022-00093-5
PMC
PMC9342595
OpenAlex
W4289261447
Semantic Scholar
935af93bcb2f1cd167d685cf6e8861b6f934764e
Cited by
276
References
322
Citations by year
2026: 78 · 2025: 85 · 2024: 64 · 2023: 43 · 2022: 5 · 2020: 1
FWCI
9.40
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Nature Reviews Psychology (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed Central (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social and Intergroup Psychology
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
  • Physical Sciences › Physics and Astronomy › Statistical and Nonlinear Physics › Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence
Keywords
political polarization, system justification, ideology, right-wing ideology, left-wing ideology, social influence, communication sources, democratic legitimacy, ingroup identification, us versus them

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Claims read by deepseek-v4.1-flash under definition version 3 (extract-v3) on 2026-10-13.

Classified by jev-1.13-20260917 (gold-guideline-v0.2) on 2026-10-13.

Cited sources are checked by gpt-6-sol.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review