The limits to bridging social capital: Power, social context and the theory of Robert Putnam

Abstract

Although there is general agreement on the definition of social capital as the benefits to be derived from social connections, the type of advantages (more effective transacting across all fields versus contacts for personal advantage) and the beneficiaries (community versus individual) identified by social capital scholars differ. This variety can be addressed with a distinction between the so-called schools of cooperation and competition. This article focuses on the former, particularly the work of Robert Putnam. The author uses Nicos Mouzelis’s critique of rational choice theory, and his distinction between micro and macro actors, as a diagnostic tool to highlight the shortcomings of Putnam’s work and the cooperation school more generally. The author argues that Putnam’s notion of bridging social capital as a solution to problems of intolerance and more general social ills is overblown, given that both diverse social networks and increasing tolerance are the result of deeper social processes not analysed by Putnam. In support of this, the article lists a number of ways in which macro actors influence the ability of social networks to form, and once formed, constrain and enable their agency in either a cooperative or competitive direction. It also criticises the tendency of cooperation theorists to generalise the solution of the collective action problem on the micro level to the macro level. Finally, the article emphasises the importance of analysing the interaction between different collective action problems, as well as the connection between cooperation and competition.