The DOI matches its Crossref record; 50 of the 50 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Joint Actions and Group Agents
Abstract
Joint action and group agency have emerged as focuses of attention in recent social theory and philosophy but they have rarely been connected with one another. The argument of this article is that whereas joint action involves people acting together to achieve any sort of result, group agency requires them to act together for the achievement of one result in particular: the construction of a centre of attitude and agency that satisfies the usual constraints of consistency and rationality in adequate measure. The main discovery in the recent theory of group agency is that this result is not easily achieved; no regular voting procedure will ensure, for example, that a group of individually consistent agents will display consistency in group judgments.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
(1987) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 4,269
Philosophy and Public Affairs: A Philosopher’s Perspective on Government Committees of Inquiry
Warnock, M., & Journal, I. P. (1990) · Irish Philosophical Journal · doi:10.5840/irishphil199071/21 · Cited by 2,576
Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.
Velleman, J. D., & Bratman, M. E. (1991) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2185304 · Cited by 2,384
Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency
Bratman, M. E. (1999) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511625190 · Cited by 1,496
Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.
McCann, H. J., & Bratman, M. E. (1991) · Noûs · doi:10.2307/2215590 · Cited by 1,472
Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox
Sent, E.-M. (2002) · Journal of Economic Issues · doi:10.1080/00213624.2002.11506464 · Cited by 1,059
(1990) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/3839.001.0001 · Cited by 892
Gilbert, M. (1989) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 856
A Theory of Freedom: From the Psychology to the Politics of Agency
Pettit, P. N. (2001) · Cited by 635
Self-citationAggregating Sets of Judgments: An Impossibility Result
List, C., & Pettit, P. (2002) · Economics and Philosophy · doi:10.1017/s0266267102001098 · Cited by 619
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Pettit, P., & Schweikard, D.
- Venue
- Philosophy of the Social Sciences
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2006-03
- Volume
- 36
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 18-39
- ISSN
- 0048-3931 (ISSN-L)
- 1552-7441
- OpenAlex
- W2123677232
- Cited by
- 295
- References
- 50
- FWCI
- 18.44
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Joint Actions and Group Agents. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1177/0048393105284169
- The paper
- Pettit, P., & Schweikard, D. (2006). Joint Actions and Group Agents. Philosophy of the Social Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1177/0048393105284169
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
