Does Tax Risk Affect Investor Valuation of Tax Avoidance?
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Abstract
We examine how investors value tax avoidance (measured as the level of cash effective tax rates [ETRs]) and tax risk (measured as the volatility of cash ETRs), and how these constructs interact to influence firm value. Our results suggest that investors positively value tax avoidance but negatively value tax risk and, most importantly, that greater tax risk moderates the positive valuation of tax avoidance. In additional analyses, we find that contemporaneous measures of tax avoidance and tax risk provide insight into future tax cash flows and that our results hold using GAAP ETR-based measures of tax avoidance and tax risk. Finally, our results are robust to a battery of sensitivity checks including controlling for idiosyncratic and systematic risk, the cost of equity capital, and unrecognized tax benefits in the post-FIN 48 period, among others. Broadly, our findings provide new evidence on how taxes affect firm value and suggest that tax avoidance and tax risk should be considered jointly rather than in isolation.
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Citations
Cites
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“However, unlike the traditional risk-return trade-off suggested in the intertemporal CAPM model (Merton, 1973) in which the conditional mean and the conditional variance of stock returns are positively correlated, tax avoidance and tax risk are not necessarily positively correlated, on average.”
BackgroundThe Cross‐Section of Volatility and Expected Returns
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“Cash ETRs are more in line with the spirit of the definition of tax avoidance as the ‘‘reduction of explicit taxes’’ (Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010), and Variable DV = FUTURE_ DV = FUTURE_ DV = FUTURE_ TAXAVOID TAXRISK TAXAVOID Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient t-stat t-stat t-stat INTERCEPT –0.118**…”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialAccounting Information, Disclosure, and the Cost of Capital
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“Following Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew (2008), we measure tax avoidance using the 5-year cash ETR, and following Guenther et al. (2017) and Hutchens and Rego (2015),2 we measure tax risk using the standard deviation of annual cash ETRs over the same period.”
MethodInfluentialToward an Implied Cost of Capital
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BackgroundMethodResultInfluentialPE Ratios, PEG Ratios, and Estimating the Implied Expected Rate of Return on Equity Capital
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BackgroundTax Reporting Aggressiveness and Its Relation to Aggressive Financial Reporting
Frank, M. M., Lynch, L. J., & Rego, S. O. (2009) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr.2009.84.2.467 · Cited by 1,523 · cited 1×
“Finally, Frank, Lynch, and Rego (2009) find that the market generally prices tax avoidance in a timely manner, except when the firm also exhibits high levels of aggressive financial reporting. specific contexts, other studies suggest that tax avoidance may negatively influence firm value.”
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“The four measures come from Ohlson and JuettnerNauroth (2005), Easton (2004), Claus and Thomas (2001), and Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001).”
BackgroundExpected EPS and EPS Growth as Determinantsof Value
Ohlson, J. A., & Juettner-Nauroth, B. E. (2005) · Review of Accounting Studies · doi:10.1007/s11142-005-1535-3 · Cited by 1,413
Leverage, investment, and firm growth
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Corporate Tax Avoidance and Firm Value
Desai, M. A., & Dharmapala, D. (2009) · Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.1162/rest.91.3.537 · Cited by 1,118 · cited 6×
“For example, Desai and Dharmapala (2009) find that tax avoidance is positively associated with firm value in the presence of strong corporate governance. Similarly, Wilson (2009) investigates the stock returns of firms engaging in corporate tax shelters and finds that positive returns are concentrated in well governed…”
InfluentialHanlon, M., & Slemrod, J. (2009) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2008.09.004 · Cited by 1,109 · cited 4×
“Consistent with Hanlon and Slemrod (2009), we find that among retail firms, tax risk has a significantly larger (p \ .10) moderating effect on the positive valuation of tax avoidance than it does among nonretail firms.”
BackgroundInfluentialAn Examination of Corporate Tax Shelter Participants
Wilson, R. J. (2009) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr.2009.84.3.969 · Cited by 1,105 · cited 1×
“Similarly, Wilson (2009) investigates the stock returns of firms engaging in corporate tax shelters and finds that positive returns are concentrated in well governed firms.”
BackgroundAnalyst Coverage and Intangible Assets
Barth, M. E., Kasznik, R., & McNichols, M. F. (2001) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/1475-679x.00001 · Cited by 1,074
Tax‐Avoidance Activities of U.S. Multinational Corporations*
Rego, S. O. (2003) · Contemporary Accounting Research · doi:10.1506/vann-b7ub-gmfa-9e6w · Cited by 1,030
Earnings Innovations, Earnings Persistence, and Stock Returns
Kormendi, R. C., & Lipe, R. C. (1987) · The Journal of Business · doi:10.1086/296400 · Cited by 896 · cited 1×
“Moreover, investors positively value persistent earnings (e.g., Kormendi & Lipe, 1987), implying that volatility is negatively valued.”
BackgroundIncentives for Tax Planning and Avoidance: Evidence from the Field
Graham, J. R., Hanlon, M., Shevlin, T. J., & Shroff, N. (2012) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2148407 · Cited by 867
Hasan, I., Hoi, C. K. (., Wu, Q., & Zhang, H. (2014) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.03.004 · Cited by 653
Earnings volatility and earnings predictability
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DYRENG, S. D., & LINDSEY, B. P. (2009) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/j.1475-679x.2009.00346.x · Cited by 595 · cited 2×
“The four measures come from Ohlson and JuettnerNauroth (2005), Easton (2004), Claus and Thomas (2001), and Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001).”
Do IRS Audits Deter Corporate Tax Avoidance?
Hoopes, J. L., Mescall, D., & Pittman, J. A. (2012) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr-50187 · Cited by 575 · cited 2×
“Other research suggests that unlike other expenses, taxes are monitored by third parties (Hoopes et al., 2012), and tax avoidance can be a potential ‘‘hot button’’ issue if investors perceive firms as failing to pay their ‘‘fair share’’ (Dyreng et al.”
BackgroundThe Reputational Costs of Tax Avoidance
Gallemore, J., Maydew, E. L., & Thornock, J. R. (2013) · Contemporary Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/1911-3846.12055 · Cited by 551
Is Tax Avoidance Related to Firm Risk?
Guenther, D. A., Matsunaga, S. R., & Williams, B. (2016) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr-51408 · Cited by 547 · cited 15×
“This conclusion complements the findings of Guenther et al. (2017), who identify that low ETRs (tax avoidance) are not associated with higher volatility of ETRs (tax risk) or higher overall firm risk, and Neuman (2016), who argues that not all firms pursue tax minimization and indeed forego some tax avoidance opportun…”
BackgroundMethodResultInfluentialPublic Pressure and Corporate Tax Behavior
DYRENG, S. D., HOOPES, J. L., & WILDE, J. H. (2016) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/1475-679x.12101 · Cited by 533 · cited 2×
“, 2012), and tax avoidance can be a potential ‘‘hot button’’ issue if investors perceive firms as failing to pay their ‘‘fair share’’ (Dyreng et al., 2016).”
Seeking Shelter: Empirically Modeling Tax Shelters Using Financial Statement Information
Lisowsky, P. (2010) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr.2010.85.5.1693 · Cited by 483 · cited 1×
“Although not the primary focus of their study, in untabulated additional analyses the authors use proxies for more aggressive forms of tax planning, in particular predicted UTBs and the likelihood of tax shelter participation (Lisowsky, 2010).”
BackgroundDoes Idiosyncratic Risk Really Matter?
BALI, T. G., CAKICI, N., YAN, X. (., & ZHANG, Z. (2005) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00750.x · Cited by 428
The Effect of Corporate Tax Avoidance on the Cost of Equity
Goh, B. W., Lee, J., Lim, C. Y., & Shevlin, T. J. (2013) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2237742 · Cited by 422
Do Publicly Disclosed Tax Reserves Tell Us About Privately Disclosed Tax Shelter Activity?
LISOWSKY, P., ROBINSON, L., & SCHMIDT, A. (2013) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/joar.12003 · Cited by 396 · cited 1×
“However, Lisowsky, Robinson, and Schmidt (2013) use confidential tax return data to validate that UTBs are correlated with a firm’s likelihood of engaging in tax shelters, suggesting that UTBs may be informative to investors despite the subjectivity inherent in their calculation.”
BackgroundDo investors value smooth performance?☆
ROUNTREE, B., WESTON, J., & ALLAYANNIS, G. (2008) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2008.02.002 · Cited by 281 · cited 2×
“In addition, in untabulated robustness tests (included in the Online Appendix), similar to Rountree et al. (2008), we include controls for systematic and idiosyncratic risk (market beta using value-weighted daily market returns and annualized standard deviation of the residuals from regressing…”
BackgroundMethodProduct Market Power and Tax Avoidance: Market Leaders, Mimicking Strategies, and Stock Returns
Kubick, T. R., Lynch, D., Mayberry, M. A., & Omer, T. C. (2013) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2215924 · Cited by 269
Materiality and Contingent Tax Liability Reporting
Gleason, C. A., & Mills, L. F. (2002) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr.2002.77.2.317 · Cited by 232 · cited 2×
“…statements, providing investors with additional information regarding firms’ tax positions that was generally not available in the pre-FIN 48 period (Gleason & Mills, 2002).23 Koester (2012) documents that investors positively price UTBs, suggesting that while the firm may have to return a portion…”
BackgroundAn Empirical Examination of Corporate Tax Noncompliance
Hanlon, M., Mills, L., & Slemrod, J. (2007) · Taxing Corporate Income in the 21st Century · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511510823.014 · Cited by 190
Assessing Tax Risk: Practitioner Perspectives
Neuman, S. S., Omer, T. C., & Schmidt, A. P. (2016) · Contemporary Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/1911-3846.12556 · Cited by 150
Does Tax Aggressiveness Reduce Financial Reporting Transparency?Preprint
Balakrishnan, K., Blouin, J. L., & Guay, W. R. (2011) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1792783 · Cited by 142
Empirical Evidence on the Impact of Book-Tax Differences on Divergence of Opinion among Investors
Comprix, J., Graham, R. C., & Moore, J. A. (2011) · Journal of the American Taxation Association · doi:10.2308/jata.2011.33.1.51 · Cited by 121 · cited 1×
“We note that Barth, Kasznik, and McNichols (2001) also observe signs contrary to expectation for these two controls, and Comprix, Graham, and Moore (2011) observe signs contrary to expectation for recorded intangibles.”
BackgroundGupta, S., Laux, R. C., & Lynch, D. P. (2011) · Contemporary Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/1911-3846.12180 · Cited by 118
Relative Valuation of Alternative Methods of Tax Avoidance
Inger, K. K. (2013) · Journal of the American Taxation Association · doi:10.2308/atax-50606 · Cited by 101 · cited 6×
“We follow prior research examining investor valuation of corporate tax avoidance (e.g., Desai & Dharmapala, 2009; Inger, 2014), and measure our variable TOBINQ as the ratio of the market value of assets (calculated as the market value of equity 4 months after fiscal year-end plus total assets minus common equity) to t…”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialFirm Valuation and the Uncertainty of Future Tax Avoidance
Jacob, M., & Schütt, H. H. (2013) · European Accounting Review · doi:10.1080/09638180.2019.1642775 · Cited by 100
An Empirical Examination of Corporate Tax NoncompliancePreprint
Hanlon, M., Mills, L. F., & Slemrod, J. (2006) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.891226 · Cited by 60
Effective Tax Strategies: It's Not Just MinimizationPreprint
Neuman, S. S. (2014) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2496994 · Cited by 21
Investor Valuation of Tax Avoidance Through Uncertain Tax PositionsPreprint
Koester, A. (2011) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1761621 · Cited by 15
Metadata
- Authors
- Drake, K. D., Lusch, S. J., & Stekelberg, J.
- Venue
- Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2017-02-01
- Volume
- 34
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 151-176
- ISSN
- 0148-558X (ISSN-L)
- 2160-4061
- OpenAlex
- W3125294438
- Cited by
- 235
- References
- 47
- FWCI
- 35.46
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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