The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Loss Aversion, Framing, and Bargaining: The Implications of Prospect Theory for International Conflict
Abstract
Prospect theory deviates from expected-utility theory by positing that how people frame a problem around a reference point has a critical influence on their choices and that people tend to overweight losses with respect to comparable gains, to be risk-averse with respect to gains and risk-acceptant with respect to losses, and to respond to probabilities in a non-linear manner. This study examines these and related observed anomalies in expected-utility theory, summarizes how prospect theory integrates these anomalies into an alternative theory of risky choice, and explores some of the implications of prospect theory for international conflict and for bargaining and coercion in particular. One hypothesis is that political leaders of adversarial states behave differently when they are bargaining over gains than when they are bargaining over losses. Another is that crisis behavior may be more destabilizing than commonly predicted by rational choice theories because leaders are less willing to make concessions and more willing to risk large losses in the hope of eliminating small losses altogether.
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Citations
Cites
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1914185 · Cited by 48,524
Loss aversion in riskless choice: A reference-dependent model.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1991) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2937956 · Cited by 6,432
Status quo bias in decision making
Samuelson, W., & Zeckhauser, R. (1988) · Journal of Risk and Uncertainty · doi:10.1007/bf00055564 · Cited by 5,897
Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L., & Thaler, R. H. (1991) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.5.1.193 · Cited by 5,019
The Disposition to Sell Winners Too Early and Ride Losers Too Long: Theory and Evidence
SHEFRIN, H., & STATMAN, M. (1985) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1985.tb05002.x · Cited by 3,553 · cited 1×
“This helps to explain the tendency to sell winners too early (to lock in a certain gain) and to hold losers too long (and thus risk a larger loss in the hope of avoiding a certain loss) ( Shefrin and Statman, 1985 ).”
BackgroundExperimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L., & Thaler, R. H. (1990) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261737 · Cited by 3,194 · cited 5×
“One hypothesis that emerges from the literature, however, derives from the tendency toward an instant endowment effect which applies to new acquisitions but not to new losses ( Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, 1990: 1342).”
BackgroundInfluentialCooperation under the security dilemma
Jervis, R. (1978) · World Politics · doi:10.2307/2009958 · Cited by 2,305 · cited 1×
“There has been a great deal of theoretical and empirical research on the conditions under which cooperation is most likely in international politics (Jervis, 1978; Keohane, 1984; Grieco, 1990).”
Background
Cited by
Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations
Levy, J. S. (1997) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1111/0020-8833.00034 · Cited by 633
Self-citationLet Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In
Byman, D. L., & Pollack, K. M. (2001) · International Security · doi:10.1162/01622880151091916 · Cited by 486
A cultural theory of international relations
(2009) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.47-2254 · Cited by 379
Replicating patterns of prospect theory for decision under risk
Ruggeri, K., Alí, S., Berge, M. L., Bertoldo, G., Bjørndal, L. D., Cortijos-Bernabeu, A., Davison, C., Demić, E., Esteban-Serna, C., Friedemann, M., et al. (2020) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-020-0886-x · Cited by 326
Metadata
- Authors
- Levy, J. S.
- Venue
- International Political Science Review
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 1996-04
- Volume
- 17
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 179-195
- ISSN
- 0192-5121 (ISSN-L)
- 1460-373X
- OpenAlex
- W2143975389
- Cited by
- 215
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 3.48
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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