The DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Incentive and Tax Effects of Executive Compensation Plans
Abstract
The ability of two (non-mutually exclusive) potential explanations for executive compensation plans is examined. One is that the plans reduce the combined tax liability of the corporation and its managers. The other is that the plans encourage the managers to maximize the value of the firm. It is found that the tax effect can explain some of the popularity of compensation plans, some of the variation in their use across firms, and the timing of changes in the provisions of the plans. However, there are variations in the cross-sectional use of the plans which cannot be explained by taxes, which can be explained by incentive effects.
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Citations
Cites
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Kline, J. V., Berle, A. A., & Means, G. C. (1933) · Columbia Law Review · doi:10.2307/1115736 · Cited by 7,361
Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?
Lazear, E. P. (1979) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260835 · Cited by 2,038
The Modern Corporation and Private Property
Ballantine, H. W., Berle, A. A., & Means, G. C. (1932) · California Law Review · doi:10.2307/3475545 · Cited by 1,332
A Theory of Self-Enforcing Agreements
Telser, L. G. (1980) · The Journal of Business · doi:10.1086/296069 · Cited by 603
A theory of self-enforcing agreements
(1987) · A Theory of Efficient Cooperation and Competition · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511528378.007 · Cited by 599
The association between performance plan adoption and corporate capital investment
Larcker, D. F. (1983) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/0165-4101(83)90003-4 · Cited by 404
Some economic determinants of accounting policy choice
Hagerman, R. L., & Zmijewski, M. E. (1979) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/0165-4101(79)90004-1 · Cited by 372
Brown, P., & Ball, R. (1967) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.2307/2489908 · Cited by 227
Taxes and executive stock options
Hite, G. L., & Long, M. S. (1982) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/0165-4101(82)90003-9 · Cited by 89
Executive Compensation in Large Industrial Corporations.
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Cited by
The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies
Smith, C. W., & Watts, R. L. (1992) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(92)90029-w · Cited by 3,589
Self-citationThe effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions
Healy, P. M. (1985) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/0165-4101(85)90029-1 · Cited by 3,283
The Determinants of Firms' Hedging Policies
Smith, C. W., & Stulz, R. M. (1985) · The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · doi:10.2307/2330757 · Cited by 3,255
Self-citationConservatism in Accounting Part I: Explanations and Implications
Watts, R. L. (2003) · Accounting Horizons · doi:10.2308/acch.2003.17.3.207 · Cited by 2,763
Self-citationPositive Accounting Theory: A Ten Year Perspective.
Watts, R. L., & Zimmerman, J. L. (1990) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/tar-9603274032 · Cited by 2,266
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Smith, C. W., & Watts, R. L.
- Venue
- Australian Journal of Management
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 1982-12
- Volume
- 7
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 139-157
- ISSN
- 0312-8962 (ISSN-L)
- 1327-2020
- OpenAlex
- W1977211709
- Cited by
- 371
- References
- 10
- FWCI
- 45.18
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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