On the Foundations of Beliefs in Free Will: Intentional Binding and Unconscious Priming in Self-Agency
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The concept of an ability to make choices and to determine one’s own outcomes fits well with experiences that most people have, and these experiences form the basis for beliefs in free will. However, the existence of conscious free will is challenged by modern research findings highlighting the unconscious origins of goal-directed behavior that gives rise to free-will beliefs. This report expands on these insights by revealing that both conscious and unconscious processes play an important role in free-will beliefs. Specifically, Experiment 1 demonstrates that free-will beliefs are strengthened when conscious intentions to produce action outcomes bind the perception of action and outcome together in time. Experiment 2 shows that these beliefs are strengthened when unconscious priming of action outcomes creates illusory experiences of self-agency when the primed outcomes occur. Together, these findings suggest that beliefs in free will are associated with self-agency and are enhanced by both conscious and unconscious information processing of goal-directed behavior.
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Citations
Cites
Voluntary action and conscious awareness
Haggard, P., Clark, S., & Kalogeras, J. (2002) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nn827 · Cited by 1,546
Abnormalities in the awareness of action.
Blakemore, S.-J., Wolpert, D. M., & Frith, C. D. (2002) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(02)01907-1 · Cited by 947
The Unconscious Will: How the Pursuit of Goals Operates Outside of Conscious Awareness
Custers, R., & Aarts, H. (2010) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1188595 · Cited by 573
Self-citation
Cited by
The experience of agency in human-computer interactions: a review
Limerick, H., Coyle, D., & Moore, J. W. (2014) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnhum.2014.00643 · Cited by 241
Psychedelics alter metaphysical beliefs
Timmermann, C., Kettner, H., Letheby, C., Roseman, L., Rosas, F. E., & Carhart-Harris, R. L. (2021) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-021-01209-2 · Cited by 218
Making sense of agency: Belief in free will as a unique and important construct
Feldman, G. (2017) · Social and Personality Psychology Compass · doi:10.1111/spc3.12293 · Cited by 106
van der Weiden, A., Prikken, M., & van Haren, N. E. M. (2015) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2015.09.004 · Cited by 101
“Cognitive outcome expectations, and hence agency attributions, may be crucially modulated by cognitive biases and personal beliefs (Aarts and van den Bos, 2011; Desantis et al., 2011; Fitch, 1970).”
Metadata
- Authors
- Aarts, H., & van den Bos, K.
- Venue
- Psychological Science
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2011-02-11
- Volume
- 22
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 532-537
- ISSN
- 0956-7976 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-9280
- OpenAlex
- W2138769867
- Cited by
- 77
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 3.01
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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