Cited by 8Experimental Behavioral Economics StudiesDecision-Making and Behavioral EconomicsSharing Economy and Platforms

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Transaction Frame Determines Preferences: Valuation of Labor by Employee and Contractor

Open access
Ritov, Ilana, Schurr, Amos·2020·Psychological Science

Abstract

A major concern in today’s economic reality is the extent to which a sharing economy, in comparison with a traditional economy, promotes inequality. In the transformation from a traditional to a sharing economy, wage setting is replaced by contract pricing. The switch to contract trading implies that the party who carries out the labor evaluates the transaction from a buyer’s rather than a seller’s perspective. Drawing on psychological research on constructed and reference-dependent preferences, we predicted that the net valuation of work would decrease when the regimen involved contract trading. Three experiments ( N = 1,105) eliciting work valuation under the two regimens confirmed our prediction, thus pointing to a novel factor that increases inequality.

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1177/0956797620916521

Cites

4 of 4 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

  • Precarious working conditions for gig workers stem in part from ambiguous information about the type of contract offered and role that service providers play.

    “As the review highlights, precarious working conditions for gig workers stem in part from ambiguous information about the type of contract offered and role that service providers play (Ritov & Schurr, 2020).”

    From The Consequences of Participating in the Sharing Economy: A Transparency-Based Sharing Framework (2021) · cites this paper as Ritov & Schurr, 2020

    The Discussion (page not available) reports that labor is valued less when framed as a job contract rather than an employment wage, and links that difference partly to the parties’ roles in the transaction. It does not say that ambiguous information about contracts or service providers’ roles causes precarious working conditions for gig workers. (LLM, conf=0.79)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

Research works printed but not linked: 19

  1. Ashby N. J., 2012, Judgment and Decision Making, 7, 254, 10.1017/S1930297500002230 · DOI
  2. 10.1002/bs.3830090304 · DOI
  3. 10.1287/mnsc.45.8.1057 · DOI
  4. 10.1177/0956797609355572 · DOI
  5. 10.1037/0278-7393.33.3.461 · DOI
  6. 10.1257/jep.5.1.193 · DOI · Paper page
  7. 10.1002/bdm.698 · DOI
  8. 10.2307/1911072 · DOI
  9. 10.1017/CBO9780511618031 · DOI
  10. Morewedge C. K., Giblin C. E. (2015). Explanations of the endowment effect: An integrative review. Trends in Cognitive Sciences , 19, 339–348. · DOI
  11. 10.4159/9780674369542 · DOI · Paper page
  12. 10.1287/mnsc.2013.1783 · DOI
  13. 10.1037/0003-066X.50.5.364 · DOI
  14. Smith A. (2007). An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations: Books I, II, III, IV, and V. Retrieved from http://www.ibiblio.org/ml/libri/s/SmithA_WealthNations_p.pdf. (Original work published 1776) · DOI
  15. 10.1016/0167-2681(80)90051-7 · DOI
  16. 10.1509/jmr.09.0103 · DOI
  17. 10.1017/CBO9780511618031.022 · DOI
  18. 10.4159/9780674726123 · DOI · Paper page
  19. 10.1037/bul0000095 · DOI

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Metadata

Authors
Ritov, I., & Schurr, A.
Affiliations
  • Hebrew University of Jerusalem (IL)
  • Ben-Gurion University of the Negev (IL)
Corresponding author
Ritov, Ilana
Venue
Psychological Science
Published
2020-04-30
Volume
31
Issue
6
Pages
634-643
ISSN
  • 0956-7976 (ISSN-L)
  • 1467-9280
OpenAlex
W3022743871
Cited by
8
References
4
Citations by year
2025: 1 · 2023: 1 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 1 · 2020: 2
FWCI
2.04
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Psychological Science (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Funders
Israel Science Foundation (1068/15 and 1323/16)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Marketing › Sharing Economy and Platforms
Keywords
sharing economy, contract pricing, wage determination, work valuation, reference-dependent preferences, labor market inequality, employee-employer relations
MeSH terms
Adult, Decision Making, Decision Theory, Employment, Female, Financial Management, Humans, Male, Middle Aged, Salaries and Fringe Benefits, Young Adult

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review