Naturalizing Perception: Developing the Gibsonian Approach to Perception along Evolutionary Lines
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We believe that one of the most important aspects of Gibson's ecological psychology is his attempted naturalization of perception, that is, his attempt to place perception in the context of evolutionary theory. However, the dominant neo-Gibsonian approach to perception has been criticized for being inconsistent with evolutionary theory. We argue that a central tenet of this approach indeed runs counter to evolutionary considerations. Based on an evolutionary analysis of the use of information, we sketch an alternative development of Gibson's pioneering ideas. A truly naturalistic theory of perception, we argue, should recognize both suboptimalities in perception and variation among the members of a population in what informational variables are used. Like other variable organismal features, the use of information is a function of multiple factors. We will compare this naturalistic ecological approach with both Gibson's own perspective and more recent frameworks.
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Selectionist explanations in ecological psychology comprise variation in action systems, encounter with the environment, and selective retention or amplification based on behavioral success.
“Selectionist explanations in ecological psychology consist of three elements: first, there is variation in animal's action systems.”
From Productive pluralism: The coming of age of ecological psychology. (2024) · cites this paper as Withagen & Chemero, 2009
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References 98 · Cited by 72
- Authors
- Withagen, R., & Chemero, A.
- Affiliations
- University of Groningen (NL)
- Franklin & Marshall College (US)
- Venue
- Theory & Psychology
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2009-06
- Volume
- 19
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 363-389
- ISSN
- 0959-3543 (ISSN-L)
- 1461-7447
- OpenAlex
- W2111222319
- Cited by
- 72
- References
- 98
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 10 · 2020: 8 · 2019: 4 · 2018: 4 · 2017: 3 · 2016: 3 · 2015: 3 · 2014: 5 · 2013: 2 · 2012: 4
- FWCI
- 2.91
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- research.rug.nl
- Locations
- Theory & Psychology (publishedVersion)
- University of Groningen research database (University of Groningen / Centre for Information Technology) (publishedVersion, other-oa)
- University of Groningen research database (University of Groningen / Centre for Information Technology) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Funders
- Rijksuniversiteit Groningen
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Visual perception and processing mechanisms
- Keywords
- ecological psychology, James Gibson, evolutionary theory, information use
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