The DOI matches its Crossref record; 59 of the 59 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Signaling Firm Value through Board Structure: An Investigation of Initial Public Offerings
Abstract
The relationship between boards of directors and firm performance, whether in the entrepreneurial context or otherwise, has long intrigued scholars. To date, no systematic relationship has been established, leading researchers to explore specialized contexts where such relationships may emerge. We believe the initial public offering (IPO) process provides a promising context. Relying on signaling theory, we investigate the relationship between board structure and IPO underpricing, a performance indicator unique to the IPO context, among a sample of IPOs during the 1990s. Consistent with signaling theory, board size and board reputation are negatively associated with IPO underpricing, but board composition and board leadership structure are not negatively associated with IPO underpricing.
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Cites
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Cited by
Signaling Theory: A Review and Assessment
Connelly, B. L., Certo, S. T., Ireland, R. D., & Reutzel, C. R. (2011) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/0149206310388419 · Cited by 6,735
Self-citationBoards of Directors and Firm Performance: Integrating Agency and Resource Dependence Perspectives
Hillman, A. J., & Dalziel, T. (2003) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.2003.10196729 · Cited by 3,213
Resource Dependence Theory: A Review
Hillman, A. J., Withers, M. C., & Collins, B. J. (2009) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/0149206309343469 · Cited by 3,178
Miller, T., & Del Carmen Triana, M. (2009) · Journal of Management Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6486.2009.00839.x · Cited by 1,416
Influencing Initial Public Offering Investors with Prestige: Signaling with Board Structures
Certo, S. T. (2003) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/30040731 · Cited by 1,147
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Metadata
- Authors
- Certo, S. T., Daily, C. M., & Dalton, D. R.
- Venue
- Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2001-12
- Volume
- 26
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 33-50
- ISSN
- 1042-2587 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6520
- OpenAlex
- W2781956785
- Cited by
- 497
- References
- 59
- FWCI
- 21.46
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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