The DOI matches its Crossref record; 112 of the 112 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Signaling Theory: A Review and Assessment
Open accessAbstract
Signaling theory is useful for describing behavior when two parties (individuals or organizations) have access to different information. Typically, one party, the sender, must choose whether and how to communicate (or signal) that information, and the other party, the receiver, must choose how to interpret the signal. Accordingly, signaling theory holds a prominent position in a variety of management literatures, including strategic management, entrepreneurship, and human resource management. While the use of signaling theory has gained momentum in recent years, its central tenets have become blurred as it has been applied to organizational concerns. The authors, therefore, provide a concise synthesis of the theory and its key concepts, review its use in the management literature, and put forward directions for future research that will encourage scholars to use signaling theory in new ways and to develop more complex formulations and nuanced variations of the theory.
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“We know from signaling theory (Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 2011) that the chances of successful recruitment will be increased if employers advertise their position broadly and in a way that signals that the employer is diversity-friendly.”
From The Participation of People with Disabilities in the Workplace Across the Employment Cycle: Employer Concerns and Research Evidence (2020) · cites this paper as Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 2011
In the citing paper
“Indeed, accommodations that would have been put in place for employees with disabilities (e.g., telework) benefit employees without disabilities as well; thus, not only are the accommodations less stigmatizing for one group of employees, but they may well help to foster a flexible and inclusive climate (cf. Connelly et al., 2011).”
From The Participation of People with Disabilities in the Workplace Across the Employment Cycle: Employer Concerns and Research Evidence (2020) · cites this paper as Connelly et al., 2011
In the citing paper
“Signaling theories are a body of theoretical work [4, 6] concerned with how individuals (humans and animals) select signals (traits, actions, etc.) to present during communication to convey some desirable quality for achieving a social goal.”
From Designing for Responsible Trust in AI Systems: A Communication Perspective (2022) · cites this paper as [6]
Citations
Cites
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(76)90026-x · Cited by 71,491
Spence, M. (1973) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1882010 · Cited by 19,518
Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have
Myers, S. C., & Majluf, N. S. (1984) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(84)90023-0 · Cited by 18,957
The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem.
Ross, S. A. (1973) · American Economic Review · Cited by 4,269
The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive‐Signalling Approach,
Ross, S. A. (1977) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003485 · Cited by 4,168 · cited 1×
“…executives or managers) who obtain information about an individual (e.g., Spence, 1973), product (e.g., Kirmani & Rao, 2000), or organization (e.g., Ross, 1977) that is not available to outsiders.1 At a broad level, insiders obtain information, some of which is positive and some of which is…”
BackgroundPERCEIVED ORGANIZATIONAL SUPPORT AND LEADER-MEMBER EXCHANGE: A SOCIAL EXCHANGE PERSPECTIVE.
WAYNE, S. J., SHORE, L. M., & LIDEN, R. C. (1997) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.2307/257021 · Cited by 3,768
CORPORATE SOCIAL PERFORMANCE AND ORGANIZATIONAL ATTRACTIVENESS TO PROSPECTIVE EMPLOYEES.
TURBAN, D. B., & GREENING, D. W. (1997) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.2307/257057 · Cited by 3,149
Reputation and imperfect information
Kreps, D. M., & Wilson, R. (1982) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(82)90030-8 · Cited by 3,087
Signaling in Retrospect and the Informational Structure of Markets
Spence, M. (2002) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/00028280260136200 · Cited by 2,435
(2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.4.i · Cited by 2,230
Research works printed but not linked: 9
- Bertalanffy, L., 1974, General systems theory: Foundations, developments, and applications
- Bhattacharya, U., 2001, Costless versus costly signaling: Theory and evidence from share purchases. Working paper
- 10.5465/amr.2003.10196754 · doi:10.5465/amr.2003.10196754 · Paper page
- 10.1177/014920630202800107 · doi:10.1177/014920630202800107 · Paper page
- 10.1177/014920630002600602 · doi:10.1177/014920630002600602 · Paper page
- Rindova, V.P., Paper presented at the Academy of Management Meeting
- Ross, S., 1973, American Economic Review, 63, 134
- 10.1037/0021-9010.85.2.163 · doi:10.1037/0021-9010.85.2.163 · Paper page
- Vehrencamp, S.L., 2000, Handicap, index and conventional signal elements of bird song
Cited by
Signaling in Equity Crowdfunding
Ahlers, G. K. C., Cumming, D., Günther, C., & Schweizer, D. (2015) · Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice · doi:10.1111/etap.12157 · Cited by 1,848
Hahn, R., & Kühnen, M. (2013) · Journal of Cleaner Production · doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2013.07.005 · Cited by 1,775
Walker, K., & Wan, F. (2012) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-011-1122-4 · Cited by 1,198
Increasing Vaccination: Putting Psychological Science Into Action
Brewer, N. T., Chapman, G. B., Rothman, A. J., Leask, J., & Kempe, A. (2017) · Psychological Science in the Public Interest · doi:10.1177/1529100618760521 · Cited by 1,233
The paradox of openness: Appropriability, external search and collaboration
Laursen, K., & Salter, A. J. (2014) · Research Policy · doi:10.1016/j.respol.2013.10.004 · Cited by 1,083
Metadata
- Authors
- Connelly, B. L., Certo, S. T., Ireland, R. D., & Reutzel, C. R.
- Affiliations
- Auburn University (US)
- Arizona State University (US)
- Texas A&M University (US)
- Utah State University (US)
- Venue
- Journal of Management
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2010-12-20
- Volume
- 37
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 39-67
- ISSN
- 0149-2063 (ISSN-L)
- 1557-1211
- OpenAlex
- W2112256230
- Cited by
- 6,735
- References
- 110
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1240 · 2025: 972 · 2024: 723 · 2023: 726 · 2022: 630 · 2021: 548 · 2020: 453 · 2019: 341 · 2018: 300 · 2017: 215 · 2016: 167 · 2015: 158 · 2014: 129 · 2013: 65 · 2012: 49
- FWCI
- 56.19
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- figshare.com
- Licence
- cc-by
- journals.sagepub.com/page/policies/text-and-data-mining-license (tdm)
- Locations
- Journal of Management (publishedVersion)
- Figshare (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management › Management and Organizational Studies
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management › Management Theory and Practice
- Keywords
- signaling theory, information asymmetry, sender-receiver communication, strategic management, entrepreneurship, human resource management, organizational behavior
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Signaling Theory: A Review and Assessment. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1177/0149206310388419
- The paper
- Connelly, B. L., Certo, S. T., Ireland, R. D., & Reutzel, C. R. (2011). Signaling Theory: A Review and Assessment. Journal of Management. https://doi.org/10.1177/0149206310388419
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.