How to do realistic political theory (and why you might want to)
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
In recent years, a number of realist thinkers have charged much contemporary political theory with being idealistic and moralistic. While the basic features of the realist counter-movement are reasonably well understood, realism is still considered a critical, primarily negative creed which fails to offer a positive, alternative way of thinking normatively about politics. Aiming to counteract this general perception, in this article I draw on Bernard Williams’s claims about how to construct a politically coherent conception of liberty from the non-political value of freedom. I do this because Williams’s argument provides an illuminating example of the distinctive nature of realist political thinking and its attractions. I argue that Williams’s account of realist political thinking challenges the orthodox moralist claim that normative political arguments must be guided by an ideal ethical theory. I then spell out the repercussions Williams’s claims about the significance of political opposition and non-moralised accounts of motivation have for our understanding of the role and purpose of political theory. I conclude by defending the realist claim that action-guiding political theory should accordingly take certain features of our politics as given, most centrally the reality of political opposition and the passions and experiences that motivate them. On this reading political realism offers a viable way of thinking about political values which cannot be understood in terms of the categories of intellectual separation – ideal/nonideal or fact-insensitive/fact-sensitive – that have marked political theory in recent years.
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Citations
Cites
Justice as Fairness: A Restatement
Rawls, J. (2001) · doi:10.2307/j.ctv31xf5v0 · Cited by 5,761
Justice and the Priority of Politics to Morality*
Sangiovanni, A. (2008) · Journal of Political Philosophy · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9760.2007.00291.x · Cited by 417
Cited by
Is There a Distinctively Political Normativity?
Leader Maynard, J., & Worsnip, A. (2018) · Ethics · doi:10.1086/697449 · Cited by 179
A realistic conception of politics: conflict, order and political realism
Burelli, C. (2021) · Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy · doi:10.1080/13698230.2019.1604045 · Cited by 24
Taking rulers' interests seriously: The case for realist theories of legitimacy
Cross, B. (2024) · European Journal of Political Theory · doi:10.1177/14748851221114302 · Cited by 11
“This is partly because the primary task of his theory of legitimacy seems to be that of describing the nature of the relationship between ruler and citizen, rather than that of making normative prescriptions (Hall 2015).”
BackgroundNo Virtue Like Resilience: Machiavelli’s Realistic Justification of Democracy
Burelli, C. (2024) · Political Studies · doi:10.1177/00323217231191396 · Cited by 5
Metadata
- Authors
- Hall, E.
- Venue
- European Journal of Political Theory
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2015-03-23
- Volume
- 16
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 283-303
- ISSN
- 1474-8851 (ISSN-L)
- 1741-2730
- OpenAlex
- W2030033356
- Cited by
- 109
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 26.17
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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