The DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Nudgeability: Mapping Conditions of Susceptibility to Nudge Influence
Open accessAbstract
Nudges are behavioral interventions to subtly steer citizens’ choices toward “desirable” options. An important topic of debate concerns the legitimacy of nudging as a policy instrument, and there is a focus on issues relating to nudge transparency, the role of preexisting preferences people may have, and the premise that nudges primarily affect people when they are in “irrational” modes of thinking. Empirical insights into how these factors affect the extent to which people are susceptible to nudge influence (i.e., “nudgeable”) are lacking in the debate. This article introduces the new concept of nudgeability and makes a first attempt to synthesize the evidence on when people are responsive to nudges. We find that nudge effects do not hinge on transparency or modes of thinking but that personal preferences moderate effects such that people cannot be nudged into something they do not want. We conclude that, in view of these findings, concerns about nudging legitimacy should be softened and that future research should attend to these and other conditions of nudgeability.
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Cites
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“…in the choice architecture: On average, people are likely to stick to a selected default option because of the status-quo bias, and people are likely to overestimate the probability of events that received recent media coverage because of the availability bias (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).”
Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social Cognition
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Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition: Advancing the Debate
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Poverty impedes cognitive function.
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BackgroundWhen and why defaults influence decisions: a meta-analysis of default effects
JACHIMOWICZ, J. M., DUNCAN, S., WEBER, E. U., & JOHNSON, E. J. (2019) · Behavioural Public Policy · doi:10.1017/bpp.2018.43 · Cited by 481
Defaults, Framing and Privacy: Why Opting In-Opting Out1
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Warning: You are about to be Nudged
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Cited by
Open Minded: Searching for Truth about the Unconscious Mind
Newell, B. R., & Shanks, D. R. (2023) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/14922.001.0001 · Cited by 17
Metadata
- Authors
- de Ridder, D., Kroese, F., & van Gestel, L.
- Venue
- Perspectives on Psychological Science
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2021-08-23
- Volume
- 17
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 346-359
- ISSN
- 1745-6916 (ISSN-L)
- 1745-6924
- OpenAlex
- W3193328130
- Cited by
- 172
- References
- 10
- FWCI
- 17.08
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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