Varieties of Empathy, Neuroscience and the Narrativist Challenge to the Contemporary Theory of Mind Debate
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This article will defend the centrality of empathy and simulation for our understanding of individual agency within the conceptual framework of folk psychology. It will situate this defense in the context of recent developments in the theory of mind debate. Moreover, the article will critically discuss narrativist conceptions of social cognition that conceive of themselves as alternatives to both simulation and theory theory.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Mindblindness: An Essay on Autism and Theory of Mind
Baron-Cohen, S. (1995) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4635.001.0001 · Cited by 3,428
The Function of Fiction is the Abstraction and Simulation of Social Experience
Mar, R. A., & Oatley, K. (2008) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/j.1745-6924.2008.00073.x · Cited by 1,345 · cited 1×
“Yet, as various authors have pointed out, narratives are particularly successful in transmitting such information because reading narratives is an exercise in perspective taking and identification with a narrative’s characters (see Currie & Ravenscroft, 2002; Harris, 2000; Mar & Oatley, 2008).”
BackgroundSinger, T. (2006) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2006.06.011 · Cited by 1,079 · cited 3×
“…other people as minded agents: (a) an elementary and developmentally very early system and (b) a cognitively more complex perspective on other minds, which develops later on (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Gallagher & Hutto, 2008; Goldman, 2006; Nichols & Stich, 2003; Singer, 2006; Stueber, 2006).”
Background2. Understanding others through primary interaction and narrative practice
Gallagher, S., & Hutto, D. D. (2008) · Converging Evidence in Language and Communication Research · doi:10.1075/celcr.12.04gal · Cited by 540 · cited 3×
“…other people as minded agents: (a) an elementary and developmentally very early system and (b) a cognitively more complex perspective on other minds, which develops later on (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Gallagher & Hutto, 2008; Goldman, 2006; Nichols & Stich, 2003; Singer, 2006; Stueber, 2006).”
BackgroundDissecting the neural mechanisms mediating empathy
Decety, J. (2011) · Emotion Review · doi:10.1177/1754073910374662 · Cited by 521 · cited 1×
“In his critique of mirror neuron research, Decety (2010, 2011) seems to understand the term mirror neuron in this narrower sense and distinguishes mirror neurons from “shared neural substrates,” which he continues to believe form one basis of empathy.”
BackgroundTo what extent is the experience of empathy mediated by shared neural circuits
Decety, J. (2010) · Emotion Review · doi:10.1177/1754073910361981 · Cited by 148
Cited by
Gallagher, S. (2020) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198846345.001.0001 · Cited by 359
The Dark Side of Empathy: Mimesis, Deception, and the Magic of Alterity
Bubandt, N., & Willerslev, R. (2015) · Comparative Studies in Society and History · doi:10.1017/s0010417514000589 · Cited by 141
“…within the fields of philosophy (Kögler and Stueber 2000; 2006; Zahavi 2001), neuroscience (Baron-Cohen 2012; Decety and Ickes 2009; Gallese 2003; Stueber 2012), primatology (Preston and de Waal 2002; de Waal 2009b), psychology (Eisenberg and Strayer 1987; Farrow and Woodruff 2007; Halpern…”
BackgroundGifts of Cooperation, Mauss and Pragmatism
Adloff, F. (2016) · Routledge · doi:10.4324/9781315692982 · Cited by 61
Empathy at the confluence of neuroscience and empirical literary studies
Burke, M., Kuzmicova, A., Mangen, A., & Schilhab, T. (2016) · Scientific Study of Literature · doi:10.1075/ssol.6.1.03bur · Cited by 44
“We have to be able to separate and compare these two perspectives (Gallagher & Frith, 2003; Stueber, 2012).”
Comment: Understanding Reasons Without Reenactment: Comment on Stueber
Hutto, D. D. (2012) · Emotion Review · doi:10.1177/1754073911421384 · Cited by 1
Metadata
- Authors
- Stueber, K. R.
- Venue
- Emotion Review
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2012-01
- Volume
- 4
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 55-63
- ISSN
- 1754-0739 (ISSN-L)
- 1754-0747
- OpenAlex
- W2319571185
- Cited by
- 85
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 14.50
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.