False Polarization and False Moderation: Political Opponents Overestimate the Extremity of Each Other’s Ideologies but Underestimate Each Other’s Certainty
Abstract
Past research finds that people hold moderate views on political issues while believing others are extreme. This false polarization has been demonstrated across a variety of different attitude dimensions and is explained by naive realism, the belief that one holds an unbiased view of reality. We argue that because people believe they see the world objectively, they should be very certain about their opinions, more certain than others expect. In three studies, we tested this false moderation of attitude certainty hypothesis and attempted to replicate past research on false polarization of attitude stance and perceived ideology of others. All three studies revealed a false moderation effect on judgements of certainty. Additionally, we replicate the finding that people false polarize others’ ideology but do not find evidence for false polarization of specific stance.
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The objectivity illusion can lead people to underestimate the epistemic confidence of their adversaries, by assuming that their adversaries are more aware of their own biases than they actually may be.
“Paradoxically, the objectivity illusion can lead people to underestimate the epistemic confidence of their adversaries, by assuming that their adversaries are more aware of their own biases than they actually may be122.”
From Cognitive–motivational mechanisms of political polarization in social-communicative contexts (2022) · cites this paper as [122]
Partisans might represent their adversaries as more obstructionist, more ideologically extreme, more prejudiced against the in-group, or more violent than they actually are.
“Partisans might also represent their adversaries as more obstructionist95, more ideologically extreme122,151–153, more prejudiced against the in-group55, or more violent154 than they actually are.”
From Cognitive–motivational mechanisms of political polarization in social-communicative contexts (2022) · cites this paper as [122]
Media coverage that is critical of polarization among political elites can reduce issue polarization among citizens, presumably because people do not want to be seen as extremists.
“By contrast, media coverage that is critical of polarization among political elites can reduce issue polarization among citizens, presumably because people do not want to be seen (by themselves or others) as extremists122,158–160.”
From Cognitive–motivational mechanisms of political polarization in social-communicative contexts (2022) · cites this paper as [122]
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References 13 · Cited by 33
- Authors
- Blatz, C. W., & Mercier, B.
- Affiliations
- MacEwan University (CA)
- University of California, Irvine (US)
- Corresponding author
- Blatz, Craig W.
- ORCID
- Mercier, Brett
- Venue
- Social Psychological and Personality Science
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2017-06-22
- Volume
- 9
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 521-529
- ISSN
- 1948-5506 (ISSN-L)
- 1948-5514
- OpenAlex
- W2684965817
- Cited by
- 33
- References
- 13
- Citations by year
- 2026: 5 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 6 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 6 · 2019: 2 · 2018: 1
- FWCI
- 6.30
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Social Psychological and Personality Science (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social and Intergroup Psychology
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
- Physical Sciences › Physics and Astronomy › Statistical and Nonlinear Physics › Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence
- Keywords
- attitude certainty, naive realism, political attitudes, replication
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