Ideological Conflict and Prejudice: An Adversarial Collaboration Examining Correlates and Ideological (A)Symmetries
Abstract
In an adversarial collaboration, we examined associations among factors that could link ideological conflict—perceiving that members of a group do not share one’s ideology—to prejudice and affiliation interest. We also examined whether these factors would possess similar (“symmetrical”) or different (“asymmetrical”) associative strength among liberals and conservatives. Across three samples (666 undergraduate students, 347 Mechanical Turk workers), ideological conflict was associated with perceived dissimilarity on political and nonpolitical topics, as well as negative emotions. Perceived political and nonpolitical dissimilarity were also associated with negative emotions, prejudice, and lower affiliative intentions among both liberals and conservatives. Importantly, however, perceived political dissimilarity was associated with negative emotions, prejudice, and lower affiliative intentions more strongly among liberals. Some inconsistent evidence also suggested that perceived nonpolitical dissimilarity was associated with prejudice and lower affiliative intentions more strongly among conservatives. These findings document nuance in relationships that could link ideological conflict to prejudice.
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Distorting images of the out-group as deviant, hostile, stubborn, extreme and unreasonable serves to justify treating the out-group unfavourably.
“Presumably, distorting images of the out-group as deviant, hostile, stubborn, extreme and unreasonable serves to justify treating the out-group unfavourably55,89,95,155.”
From Cognitive–motivational mechanisms of political polarization in social-communicative contexts (2022) · cites this paper as [155]
False polarization might become a self-fulfilling prophecy, increasing affective and/or ideological polarization over time because prejudice can arise from even the illusory perception of dissimilarity between in-group and out-group members.
“That is, false polarization might increase affective and/or ideological polarization over time156 because prejudice can arise from even the illusory perception of dissimilarity between in-group and out-group members89,155,157.”
From Cognitive–motivational mechanisms of political polarization in social-communicative contexts (2022) · cites this paper as [155]
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References 59 · Cited by 22
- Authors
- Stern, C., & Crawford, J. T.
- Affiliations
- University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign (US)
- The College of New Jersey (US)
- Corresponding author
- Stern, Chadly
- Venue
- Social Psychological and Personality Science
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2020-03-30
- Volume
- 12
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 42-53
- ISSN
- 1948-5506 (ISSN-L)
- 1948-5514
- OpenAlex
- W3014340377
- Cited by
- 22
- References
- 59
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2025: 2 · 2024: 6 · 2023: 1 · 2022: 8 · 2021: 1 · 2020: 2
- FWCI
- 4.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Social Psychological and Personality Science (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social and Intergroup Psychology
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Academic Freedom and Politics
- Keywords
- ideological conflict, prejudice, perceived dissimilarity, political ideology, liberals and conservatives, ideological asymmetry, negative emotions, intergroup relations
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