Cited by 79Mental Health and PsychiatryMedicine, History, and PhilosophyPhilosophy and History of Science

Defining mental disorder. Exploring the 'natural function' approach

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Varga, Somogy·2011·Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine

Abstract

Due to several socio-political factors, to many psychiatrists only a strictly objective definition of mental disorder, free of value components, seems really acceptable. In this paper, I will explore a variant of such an objectivist approach to defining metal disorder, natural function objectivism. Proponents of this approach make recourse to the notion of natural function in order to reach a value-free definition of mental disorder. The exploration of Christopher Boorse's 'biostatistical' account of natural function (1) will be followed an investigation of the 'hybrid naturalism' approach to natural functions by Jerome Wakefield (2). In the third part, I will explore two proposals that call into question the whole attempt to define mental disorder (3). I will conclude that while 'natural function objectivism' accounts fail to provide the backdrop for a reliable definition of mental disorder, there is no compelling reason to conclude that a definition cannot be achieved.

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Crossref · 10.1186/1747-5341-6-1

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Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

  • Skepticism around the clinical utility of syndromal diagnoses is not unique to ENTS.

    “Skepticism around the clinical utility of syndromal diagnoses is not unique to ENTS.”

    From Psychological Treatment of Exhaustion Due to Persistent Non-Traumatic Stress: A Scoping Review. (2024) · cites this paper as [114]

    In the Introduction’s discussion of psychopharmacological taxonomy (page unavailable), Varga questions whether a proposed way of classifying mental disorders is reliable and coherent. That supports the broader point that skepticism about psychiatric classification exists outside ENTS, but the paper does not specifically assess the clinical utility of syndromal diagnoses. (LLM, conf=0.77)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Mental health professionals and researchers have long debated the most effective ways to define and classify mental disorders.

    “Mental health professionals and researchers have long debated the most effective ways to define and classify mental disorders [114].”

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Research works printed but not linked: 3

  1. Kutchins H Kirk S Making Us Crazy 1997 New York: The Free Press
  2. Cooper R Classifying Madness 2005 Dordrecht: Springer
  3. Wakefield JC The concept of mental disorder: diagnostic implications of the harmful dysfunction analysis World Psychiatry 2007 6 149 156 18188432 PMC2174594

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Authors
Varga, S.
Affiliations
University of Copenhagen (DK)
Corresponding author
Varga, Somogy
Venue
Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine
Published
2011
Volume
6
Issue
1
Pages
1
ISSN
1747-5341 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2147319679
Cited by
79
References
46
Citations by year
2025: 5 · 2024: 7 · 2023: 6 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 5 · 2020: 7 · 2019: 5 · 2018: 5 · 2017: 5 · 2016: 8 · 2015: 8 · 2014: 6 · 2013: 3 · 2012: 5
FWCI
41.88
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
cc-by
Locations
  • Philosophy Ethics and Humanities in Medicine (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
Funders
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Mental Health and Psychiatry
  • Health Sciences › Medicine › Psychiatry and Mental health › Medicine, History, and Philosophy
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy and History of Science
Keywords
mental illness, definition of mental disorder, natural functions, Christopher Boorse
MeSH terms
Mental Disorders, Humans, Philosophy, Medical, Social Environment, Social Values

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