Cited by 40Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political ViolenceSocial and Intergroup PsychologyPsychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment

Bombing Versus Negotiating: How Preferences for Combating Terrorism Are Affected by Perceived Terrorist Rationality

Pronin, Emily, Kennedy, Kathleen, Butsch, Sarah·2006·Basic and Applied Social Psychology

Abstract

This research demonstrates that the degree of bias or rationality that people impute to terrorists influences the types of strategies that they advocate for combating terrorism. In 2 experiments, participants read depictions of terrorists that described their decision making as either rooted in rationality and objectivity or as distorted by irrationality and bias. When terrorists were depicted as biased and irrational (vs. as objective and rational), participants were more likely to advocate military action against terrorism and less likely to advocate diplomacy. This effect was mediated by perceptions of terrorists' capacity for reason rather than by affective responses toward terrorists. This research also shows that perceptions of terrorists as rational and objective versus irrational and biased are not simply fixed in individuals' minds but can be influenced by contextual manipulations, including putative news reports.

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Crossref · 10.1207/s15324834basp2804_12

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  • Viewing out-group members as biased can exacerbate group conflict.

    “The extent to which affective evaluations guide attributions of bias is an important question, as viewing out-group members as biased can exacerbate group conflict (Kennedy & Pronin, 2008; Pronin et al., 2006).”

    From Everyone I Don’t Like Is Biased: Affective Evaluations and the Bias Blind Spot (2026) · cites this paper as Pronin et al., 2006

  • This attribution of bias can then encourage individuals to engage in conflict-escalating actions that, over time, lead to stronger negative affect and consequently, greater attributions of bias.

    “This attribution of bias can then encourage individuals to engage in conflict-escalating actions (as has been shown in prior work; Kennedy & Pronin, 2008; Pronin et al., 2006) that, over time, lead to stronger negative affect and consequently, greater attributions of bias.”

    From Everyone I Don’t Like Is Biased: Affective Evaluations and the Bias Blind Spot (2026) · cites this paper as Pronin et al., 2006

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Authors
Pronin, E., Kennedy, K., & Butsch, S.
Affiliations
Princeton University (US)
Venue
Basic and Applied Social Psychology
Published
2006-12
Volume
28
Issue
4
Pages
385-392
ISSN
  • 0197-3533 (ISSN-L)
  • 1532-4834
OpenAlex
W2091167001
Cited by
40
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 1 · 2018: 4 · 2017: 3 · 2016: 2 · 2015: 3 · 2014: 4 · 2013: 1 · 2012: 3
FWCI
9.29
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
Basic and Applied Social Psychology (publishedVersion)
Funders
Princeton University
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social and Intergroup Psychology
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
Keywords
terrorism, military action, diplomacy, news articles

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