Bombing Versus Negotiating: How Preferences for Combating Terrorism Are Affected by Perceived Terrorist Rationality
Abstract
This research demonstrates that the degree of bias or rationality that people impute to terrorists influences the types of strategies that they advocate for combating terrorism. In 2 experiments, participants read depictions of terrorists that described their decision making as either rooted in rationality and objectivity or as distorted by irrationality and bias. When terrorists were depicted as biased and irrational (vs. as objective and rational), participants were more likely to advocate military action against terrorism and less likely to advocate diplomacy. This effect was mediated by perceptions of terrorists' capacity for reason rather than by affective responses toward terrorists. This research also shows that perceptions of terrorists as rational and objective versus irrational and biased are not simply fixed in individuals' minds but can be influenced by contextual manipulations, including putative news reports.
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Viewing out-group members as biased can exacerbate group conflict.
“The extent to which affective evaluations guide attributions of bias is an important question, as viewing out-group members as biased can exacerbate group conflict (Kennedy & Pronin, 2008; Pronin et al., 2006).”
From Everyone I Don’t Like Is Biased: Affective Evaluations and the Bias Blind Spot (2026) · cites this paper as Pronin et al., 2006
This attribution of bias can then encourage individuals to engage in conflict-escalating actions that, over time, lead to stronger negative affect and consequently, greater attributions of bias.
“This attribution of bias can then encourage individuals to engage in conflict-escalating actions (as has been shown in prior work; Kennedy & Pronin, 2008; Pronin et al., 2006) that, over time, lead to stronger negative affect and consequently, greater attributions of bias.”
From Everyone I Don’t Like Is Biased: Affective Evaluations and the Bias Blind Spot (2026) · cites this paper as Pronin et al., 2006
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Valuing thoughts, ignoring behavior: The introspection illusion as a source of the bias blind spot
Pronin, E., & Kugler, M. B. (2007) · Journal of Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2006.05.011 · Cited by 366 · see citing works
Self-citationHow we see ourselves and how we see others
Pronin, E. (2008) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1154199 · Cited by 353 · see citing works
Self-citationEveryone I Don’t Like Is Biased: Affective Evaluations and the Bias Blind Spot
Walker, A. C., Collins, R. N., Walker, H. E. K., Fugelsang, J. A., & Mandel, D. R. (2026) · Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin · doi:10.1177/01461672261439247 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
- Authors
- Pronin, E., Kennedy, K., & Butsch, S.
- Affiliations
- Princeton University (US)
- ORCID
- Pronin, Emily
- Venue
- Basic and Applied Social Psychology
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2006-12
- Volume
- 28
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 385-392
- ISSN
- 0197-3533 (ISSN-L)
- 1532-4834
- OpenAlex
- W2091167001
- Cited by
- 40
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 1 · 2018: 4 · 2017: 3 · 2016: 2 · 2015: 3 · 2014: 4 · 2013: 1 · 2012: 3
- FWCI
- 9.29
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Basic and Applied Social Psychology (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- Princeton University
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social and Intergroup Psychology
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
- Keywords
- terrorism, military action, diplomacy, news articles
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