Understanding the Mind or Predicting Signal-Dependent Action? Performance of Children With and Without Autism on Analogues of the False-Belief Task
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
To evaluate the claim that correct performance on unexpected transfer false-belief tasks specifically involves mental-state understanding, two experiments were carried out with children with autism, intellectual disabilities, and typical development. In both experiments, children were given a standard unexpected transfer false-belief task and a mental-state-free, mechanical analogue task in which participants had to predict the destination of a train based on true or false signal information. In both experiments, performance on the mechanical task was found to correlate with that on the false-belief task for all groups of children. Logistic regression showed that performance on the mechanical analogue significantly predicted performance on the false-belief task even after accounting for the effects of verbal mental age. The findings are discussed in relation to possible common mechanisms underlying correct performance on the two tasks.
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Citations
Cites
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Result
Cited by
Milligan, K., Astington, J. W., & Dack, L. A. (2007) · Child Development · doi:10.1111/j.1467-8624.2007.01018.x · Cited by 1,248
The moral, epistemic, and mindreading components of children’s vigilance towards deception
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Thinking of mental and other representations: The roles of left and right temporo-parietal junction.
Perner, J., Aichhorn, M., Kronbichler, M., Staffen, W., & Ladurner, G. (2006) · Social Neuroscience · doi:10.1080/17470910600989896 · Cited by 245
Thinking in Pictures as a Cognitive Account of Autism
Kunda, M., & Goel, A. K. (2011) · Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders · doi:10.1007/s10803-010-1137-1 · Cited by 114
Metadata
- Authors
- Bowler, D. M., Briskman, J., Gurvidi, N., & Fornells-Ambrojo, M.
- Venue
- Journal of Cognition and Development
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2005-05
- Volume
- 6
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 259-283
- ISSN
- 1524-8372 (ISSN-L)
- 1532-7647
- OpenAlex
- W2048289629
- Cited by
- 61
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 5.36
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Bowler, D. M., Briskman, J., Gurvidi, N., & Fornells-Ambrojo, M. (2005). Understanding the Mind or Predicting Signal-Dependent Action? Performance of Children With and Without Autism on Analogues of the False-Belief Task. Journal of Cognition and Development. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327647jcd0602_5
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