Individual's expulsion to nasty environment promotes cooperation in public goods games
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Previous studies of games on dynamic graphs have almost specified pairwise interactions using the prisoner's dilemma game. We instead here for the first time explore coevolutionary dynamics in the context of interactions being characterized by the public goods game. Individuals are endowed with the capacity to adjust both their strategy and their social ties, occurring exclusively dependent on their payoffs. Under strategy updating, focal individuals are more likely to imitate their neighbors performing better. Meanwhile, they would abstain from engaging in the most defective neighborhoods if the opportunities of adjusting social ties arise, representing trait of individuals that they prefer better but exclude nasty environments. How often strategy dynamics and adaptation of social ties separately progress is governed by a tunable parameter. We experimentally found that opportune tradeoff of these two dynamics peaks cooperation, an observation absent whenever either dynamics is considered. We confirm that the stabilization of cooperation resulting from the partner switching remains effective under some more realistic situation where the maximal number of social ties one can admit is restrained.
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Cites
Classes of small-world networks
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Reputation-based partner choice promotes cooperation in social networks
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Self-citationCooperation Prevails When Individuals Adjust Their Social Ties
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Indirect reciprocity, image scoring, and moral hazard
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Cited by
Evolutionary dynamics of group interactions on structured populations: a review
Perc, M., Gómez-Gardeñes, J., Szolnoki, A., Floría, L. M., & Moreno, Y. (2013) · Journal of The Royal Society Interface · doi:10.1098/rsif.2012.0997 · Cited by 1,340
Reward and cooperation in the spatial public goods game
Szolnoki, A., & Perc, M. (2010) · EPL (Europhysics Letters) · doi:10.1209/0295-5075/92/38003 · Cited by 689
Interdependent network reciprocity in evolutionary games
Wang, Z., Szolnoki, A., & Perc, M. (2013) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep01183 · Cited by 485
Evolution of public cooperation on interdependent networks: The impact of biased utility functions
Wang, Z., Szolnoki, A., & Perc, M. (2012) · EPL (Europhysics Letters) · doi:10.1209/0295-5075/97/48001 · Cited by 354
Effectiveness of conditional punishment for the evolution of public cooperation
Szolnoki, A., & Perc, M. (2013) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2013.02.008 · Cited by 173
Metadata
- Authors
- Wu, T., Fu, F., & Wang, L.
- Venue
- EPL (Europhysics Letters)
- Publisher
- IOP Publishing
- Published
- 2009-11-01
- Volume
- 88
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 30011
- ISSN
- 0295-5075 (ISSN-L)
- 1286-4854
- OpenAlex
- W2053581666
- Cited by
- 57
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 16.28
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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