Indirect reciprocity, image scoring, and moral hazard
Open accessAbstract
Whether one-shot interactions can stably sustain mutual cooperation if they are based on a minimal form of reputation building has been the subject of considerable debate. We show by mathematical modeling that the answer is positive if we assume an individual's social network evolves in time. In this case, a stable mixture of discriminating and undiscriminating altruists can be proof against invasion by defectors. This sheds light on current discussions about the merits of different types of moral assessment, an issue where theoretical arguments and experimental findings seem at odds.Unexpectedly, our approach also relates to the proverbial observation that people tend to become more tightfisted with age.
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SHUNNING emerges as the winner in a computer tournament, if errors in perception are included and if there are only a few rounds in the game.
“Yet it emerges as the winner in a computer tournament, if errors in perception are included and if there are only a few rounds in the game 56 .”
From Evolution of indirect reciprocity (2005) · cites this paper as [56]
The Results and Discussion (p. 4) report that, in simulations with errors of perception, a strategy that assigns a Bad score to anyone meeting a Bad coplayer did much better than standing. The passage does not say it won the tournament or that this result depended on there being only a few rounds. (LLM, conf=0.84)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredIf players have different views about the reputation of others, then errors in perception can undermine cooperation.
“But if players have different views about the reputation of others, then errors in perception can undermine cooperation 56 .”
From Evolution of indirect reciprocity (2005) · cites this paper as [56]
Such a population structure (many separate groups with exchange) facilitates the evolution of altruism via group selection.
“Such a population structure, however, facilitates the evolution of altruism via group selection 56 .”
From Evolution of indirect reciprocity (2005) · cites this paper as [56]
The Continuous-Entry Model for Indirect Reciprocity (pp. 2–3) analyzes reputation and information within a population, not group selection. Searches for separate groups, exchange, and migration found no passage addressing whether that population structure facilitates altruism. (LLM, conf=0.73)
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Cites
Altruistic punishment in humans
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Indirect reciprocity can stabilize cooperation without the second-order free rider problem
Panchanathan, K., & Boyd, R. (2004) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature02978 · Cited by 881 · see citing works
Evolution of cooperation through indirect reciprocity
Leimar, O., & Hammerstein, P. (2001) · Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2000.1573 · Cited by 673 · see citing works
A tale of two defectors: the importance of standing for evolution of indirect reciprocity
Panchanathan, K., & Boyd, R. (2003) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/s0022-5193(03)00154-1 · Cited by 388 · see citing works
Donors to charity gain in both indirect reciprocity and political reputation
Milinski, M., Semmann, D., & Krambeck, H. (2002) · Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2002.1964 · Cited by 285 · see citing works
Indirect Reciprocity and Strategic Reputation Building in an Experimental Helping Game
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Flagged first, then by citations
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Cited by
Sorted by citations
Evolution of indirect reciprocity
Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K. (2005) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature04131 · Cited by 2,762 · see citing works
Self-citationEffectiveness of conditional punishment for the evolution of public cooperation
Szolnoki, A., & Perc, M. (2013) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2013.02.008 · Cited by 173 · see citing works
- Authors
- Brandt, H., & Sigmund, K.
- Affiliations
- University of Vienna (AT)
- Corresponding author
- Sigmund, Karl
- ORCID
- Sigmund, Karl
- Venue
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Publisher
- National Academy of Sciences
- Published
- 2005-02-04
- Volume
- 102
- Issue
- 7
- Pages
- 2666-2670
- ISSN
- 0027-8424 (ISSN-L)
- 1091-6490
- PMC
- PMC548983
- OpenAlex
- W2056000877
- Cited by
- 178
- References
- 8
- Citations by year
- 2026: 8 · 2025: 6 · 2024: 6 · 2023: 10 · 2022: 7 · 2021: 9 · 2020: 3 · 2019: 10 · 2018: 10 · 2017: 6 · 2016: 15 · 2015: 9 · 2014: 8 · 2013: 5 · 2012: 8
- FWCI
- 37.67
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- europepmc.org
- Locations
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (publishedVersion)
- Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- IIASA PURE (International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis) (submittedVersion)
- WU Research (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
- Keywords
- indirect reciprocity, image scoring, moral hazard, reputation building, cooperation, social networks, altruism, defectors, one-shot interactions, evolution of cooperation
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