The Interplay of Bayesian and Frequentist Analysis
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 106 of the 107 references it cites were found in a registry or an index, and 1 are not checked yet.
Abstract
Statistics has struggled for nearly a century over the issue of whether the Bayesian or frequentist paradigm is superior. This debate is far from over and, indeed, should continue, since there are fundamental philosophical and pedagogical issues at stake. At the methodological level, however, the debate has become considerably muted, with the recognition that each approach has a great deal to contribute to statistical practice and each is actually essential for full development of the other approach. In this article, we embark upon a rather idiosyncratic walk through some of these issues.
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In the citing paper
“However, roughly speaking, the Bayesian and frequentist approaches are usually considered the main paradigms [33,34].”
From Reverse engineering and identification in systems biology: strategies, perspectives and challenges (2014) · cites this paper as [33]
In the citing paper
“For models with tens to hundreds of parameters this is numerically demanding or even infeasible because high dimensional spaces cannot be sampled densely.”
From Likelihood based observability analysis and confidence intervals for predictions of dynamic models (2012) · cites this paper as [9]
In the citing paper
“Non-identifiable parameters cause the posterior PDF to be non-proper [28].”
From Joining forces of Bayesian and frequentist methodology: a study for inference in the presence of non-identifiability (2013) · cites this paper as [28]
Citations
Cites
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Cited by
A practical solution to the pervasive problems ofp values
Wagenmakers, E.-J. (2007) · Psychonomic Bulletin & Review · doi:10.3758/bf03194105 · Cited by 2,490
“The statistical world has always been dominated by two superpowers: the Bayesians and the frequentists (see, e.g., Bayarri & Berger, 2004; Berger, 2003; Christensen, 2005; R. T. Cox, 1946; Efron, 2005; Lindley & Phillips, 1976; Neyman, 1977).”
MethodPhilosophy and the practice of Bayesian statistics
Gelman, A., & Shalizi, C. R. (2013) · British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology · doi:10.1111/j.2044-8317.2011.02037.x · Cited by 825
“…the 10There is some controversy in the literature about whether posterior predictive checks have too little power to be useful statistical tools (Bayarri and Berger, 2000, 2004), how they might be modified to increase their power (Robins et al., 2000; Fraser and Rousseau, 2008), whether some…”
The case for objective Bayesian analysis
Berger, J. (2006) · Bayesian Analysis · doi:10.1214/06-ba115 · Cited by 728
“Bayarri and Berger (2004) review the vast literature showing that objective Bayesian methods are the most promising route to the unification of Bayesian and frequentist statistics.”
BackgroundSelf-citationColella, S., Yau, C., Taylor, J. M., Mirza, G., Butler, H., Clouston, P., Bassett, A. S., Seller, A., Holmes, C. C., & Ragoussis, J. (2007) · Nucleic Acids Research · doi:10.1093/nar/gkm076 · Cited by 616
“In instances where little or no substantive prior knowledge is available, the Objective Bayes approach provides a principled method to set parameters of the priors; such that the resulting Bayesian procedures possess good long-run frequency properties (29) (for general discussion of Objective Bayes see (21,22)).”
BackgroundMethodIntegrated Sensing and Communications: Recent Advances and Ten Open Challenges
Lu, S., Liu, F., Li, Y., Zhang, K., Huang, H., Zou, J., Li, X., Dong, Y., Dong, F., Zhu, J., et al. (2024) · IEEE Internet of Things Journal · doi:10.1109/jiot.2024.3361173 · Cited by 516
“We remark that the CRB and BCRB/PCRB represent different perspectives in statistics, which constitute fundamental philosophical and cognitive issues [145].”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Bayarri, M. J., & Berger, J. O.
- ORCID
- Berger, J. O.
- Venue
- Statistical Science
- Publisher
- Institute of Mathematical Statistics
- Published
- 2004-02-01
- Volume
- 19
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 58-80
- ISSN
- 0883-4237 (ISSN-L)
- 2168-8745
- OpenAlex
- W647244699
- Cited by
- 525
- References
- 94
- Citations by year
- 2026: 11 · 2025: 13 · 2024: 24 · 2023: 23 · 2022: 24 · 2021: 34 · 2020: 34 · 2019: 20 · 2018: 49 · 2017: 26 · 2016: 34 · 2015: 28 · 2014: 40 · 2013: 21 · 2012: 33
- FWCI
- 14.90
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Statistical Science (publishedVersion)
- Project Euclid (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
- Quality Engineering
- Funders
- National Science Foundation
- Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología
- Division of Mathematical Sciences
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Mathematics › Statistics and Probability › Statistical Methods and Bayesian Inference
- Physical Sciences › Mathematics › Statistics and Probability › Probability and Statistical Research
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference
- Keywords
- Bayesian inference, frequentist inference, philosophy of statistics, statistical methodology
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