The DOI matches its Crossref record; 63 of the 63 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Could Fisher, Jeffreys and Neyman Have Agreed on Testing?
Abstract
Ronald Fisher advocated testing using p-values, Harold Jeffreys proposed use of objective posterior probabilities of hypotheses and Jerzy Neyman recommended testing with fixed error probabilities. Each was quite critical of the other approaches. Most troubling for statistics and science is that the three approaches can lead to quite different practical conclusions. This article focuses on discussion of the conditional frequentist approach to testing, which is argued to provide the basis for a methodological unification of the approaches of Fisher, Jeffreys and Neyman. The idea is to follow Fisher in using p-values to define the "strength of evidence" in data and to follow his approach of conditioning on strength of evidence; then follow Neyman by computing Type I and Type II error probabilities, but do so conditional on the strength of evidence in the data. The resulting conditional frequentist error probabilities equal the objective posterior probabilities of the hypotheses advocated by Jeffreys.
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Cites
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Toward Evidence-Based Medical Statistics. 2: The Bayes Factor
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Calibration of ρ Values for Testing Precise Null Hypotheses
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Self-citationJoseph, L., Gyorkos, T. W., & Coupal, L. (1995) · American Journal of Epidemiology · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.aje.a117428 · Cited by 705
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A practical solution to the pervasive problems ofp values
Wagenmakers, E.-J. (2007) · Psychonomic Bulletin & Review · doi:10.3758/bf03194105 · Cited by 2,490
Fay, M. P., & Proschan, M. A. (2010) · Statistics Surveys · doi:10.1214/09-ss051 · Cited by 1,118
Bayesian Versus Orthodox Statistics: Which Side Are You On?
Dienes, Z. (2011) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/1745691611406920 · Cited by 938
Ellison, A. M. (2004) · Ecology Letters · doi:10.1111/j.1461-0248.2004.00603.x · Cited by 786
The Deviance Information Criterion: 12 Years on
Spiegelhalter, D. J., Best, N. G., Carlin, B. P., & Linde, A. (2014) · Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series B: Statistical Methodology · doi:10.1111/rssb.12062 · Cited by 629
Metadata
- Authors
- Berger, J. O.
- Venue
- Statistical Science
- Publisher
- Institute of Mathematical Statistics
- Published
- 2003-02-01
- Volume
- 18
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-32
- ISSN
- 0883-4237 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2038290376
- Cited by
- 346
- References
- 63
- FWCI
- 10.11
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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