Shared Agency and Contralateral Commitments
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
My concern here is to motivate some theses in the philosophy of mind concerning the interpersonal character of intentions.I will do so by investigating aspects of shared agency.The main point will be that when individuals act together one must be able to act directly on the intention of another or others in a way that is relevantly similar to the manner in which an agent acts on his or her own intentions.What exactly this means will become clearer once we understand what it is to act directly on one's own intentions.But I take it to be a fundamental assumption of the prevailing individualism of the theory of action-one at the core of its conception of the separateness of individuals -that one person cannot act directly on another's intention.I agree that there is an important way in which we are or can be separate and autonomous thinkers and agents.But the way the individualist tries to capture this separateness is misguided.Taking a participant's contribution to shared activity to be an exercise of individual agency, the individualist considers which acts of independent agents add up to instances of acting together, and tries to articulate the conditions under which they do.Acting together -so understood -is constituted by individual acts, and the theory and
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency
Bratman, M. E. (1999) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511625190 · Cited by 1,496
Burge, T. (1993) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2185680 · Cited by 929
Cited by
Psychological Research on Joint Action
Knoblich, G., Butterfill, S., & Sebanz, N. (2011) · Psychology of Learning and Motivation · doi:10.1016/b978-0-12-385527-5.00003-6 · Cited by 540
Shared intention and personal intentions
Gilbert, M. (2009) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-009-9372-z · Cited by 335
“The position involving conditional personal commitments criticized in Roth (2004) , then, is not mine.”
BackgroundTwo Approaches to Shared Intention: An Essay in the Philosophy of Social Phenomena
Gilbert, M. (2008) · Analyse & Kritik · doi:10.1515/auk-2008-0208 · Cited by 54
Metadata
- Authors
- Roth, A. S.
- Venue
- The Philosophical Review
- Publisher
- Duke University Press
- Published
- 2004-07-01
- Volume
- 113
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 359-410
- ISSN
- 0031-8108 (ISSN-L)
- 1558-1470
- OpenAlex
- W2055701662
- Cited by
- 198
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 0.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Shared Agency and Contralateral Commitments. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1215/00318108-113-3-359
- The paper
- Roth, A. S. (2004). Shared Agency and Contralateral Commitments. The Philosophical Review. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-113-3-359
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.