The DOI matches its Crossref record; 51 of the 51 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Assertion, Knowledge, and Rational Credibility
Abstract
Research Article| October 01 2006 Assertion, Knowledge, and Rational Credibility Igor Douven Igor Douven Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (4): 449–485. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2006-010 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email Tools Icon Tools Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation Igor Douven; Assertion, Knowledge, and Rational Credibility. The Philosophical Review 1 October 2006; 115 (4): 449–485. doi: https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2006-010 Download citation file: Zotero Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search Books & JournalsAll JournalsThe Philosophical Review Search Advanced Search The text of this article is only available as a PDF. Cornell University2006 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal Issue Section: Front Matter You do not currently have access to this content.
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Cites
Grice, H. P. (1975) · Speech Acts · doi:10.1163/9789004368811_003 · Cited by 23,221
Jeffreys, H., Moran, P. A. P., & Chatfield, C. (1922) · Nature · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198503682.001.0001 · Cited by 7,878
Buhr, R., & Dummett, M. (1983) · Language · doi:10.2307/414091 · Cited by 3,368
Williamson, T. (2002) · doi:10.1093/019925656x.001.0001 · Cited by 2,788
Fraassen, B. C. V. (1989) · doi:10.1093/0198248601.001.0001 · Cited by 1,821
Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth
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van Fraassen, B. C. (1989) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 1,279
The Structure of Empirical Knowledge.
Moser, P. K., & Bonjour, L. (1987) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.2307/2107238 · Cited by 1,206
Contemporary Theories of Knowledge.
Kornblith, H., & Pollock, J. (1988) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.2307/2108001 · Cited by 1,152
Levi, I., & Brandom, R. B. (1996) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2940874 · Cited by 1,147
Cited by
Justification and the Truth-Connection
Littlejohn, C. (2012) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139060097 · Cited by 530
Buchak, L. (2014) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-013-0182-y · Cited by 380
MacFarlane, J. (2011) · Assertion · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199573004.003.0004 · Cited by 292
Goldman, A. I. (2018) · Topoi · doi:10.1007/s11245-016-9410-3 · Cited by 107
Metadata
- Authors
- Douven, I.
- Venue
- The Philosophical Review
- Publisher
- Duke University Press
- Published
- 2006-10-01
- Volume
- 115
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 449-485
- ISSN
- 0031-8108 (ISSN-L)
- 1558-1470
- OpenAlex
- W2068468488
- Cited by
- 357
- References
- 51
- FWCI
- 46.05
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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