The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
On the Very Idea of Direction of Fit
Abstract
Direction of fit theories usually claim that beliefs are such that they “aim at truth” or “ought to fit” the world and desires (or intentions) are such that they “aim at realization” or the world “ought to fit” them. This essay argues that no theory of direction of fit is correct. The two directions of fit are supposed to be determinations of one and the same determinable two-place relation, differing only in the ordering of favored terms. But there is no such determinable because of ineliminable asymmetries between the way that beliefs “aim at truth” and the way that desires (or intentions) “aim at realization.” This essay traces the ills of direction of fit theory to a misunderstanding of Anscombe and proposes a cure that distinguishes theoretical and practical thought by appeal to a distinction between thought in the form of a state and thought in the form of an event.
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Citations
Cites
Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind
Searle, J. R. (1983) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139173452 · Cited by 4,575
Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts
Searle, J. R. (1979) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511609213 · Cited by 3,502
The Humean Theory of Motivation
SMITH, M. (1987) · Mind · doi:10.1093/mind/xcvi.381.36 · Cited by 1,005
Wedgwood, R. (2002) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/1468-0068.36.s16.10 · Cited by 279
Cited by
Nanay, B. (2026) · Cognitive Science · doi:10.1111/cogs.70258
“While this distinction may seem to be a straightforward one, the concept of direction of fit has been used in a variety of different ways and has been used to play a variety of different explanatory roles (Gregory, 2012; Frost, 2014).”
Metadata
- Authors
- Frost, K.
- Venue
- The Philosophical Review
- Publisher
- Duke University Press
- Published
- 2014-10-01
- Volume
- 123
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 429-484
- ISSN
- 0031-8108 (ISSN-L)
- 1558-1470
- OpenAlex
- W2009944276
- Cited by
- 320
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 3.10
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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