The DOI matches its Crossref record; 31 of the 31 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Survival of the Welfare State
Open accessAbstract
This paper provides an analytical characterization of Markov perfect equilibria in a model with repeated voting, where agents vote over distortionary income redistribution. A key result is that the future constituency for redistributive policies depends positively on current redistribution, since this affects both private investments and the future distribution of voters. The model features multiple equilibria. In some equilibria, positive redistribution persists forever. In other equilibria, even a majority of beneficiaries of redistribution vote strategically so as to induce the end of the welfare state next period. Skill-biased technical change makes the survival of the welfare state less likely.
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Cites
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Katz, L. F., & Murphy, K. M. (1992) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2118323 · Cited by 4,793
Distributive Politics and Economic Growth
Alesina, A., & Rodrik, D. (1994) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2118470 · Cited by 4,406
Is Inequality Harmful for GrowthPreprint
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On the Rationale of Group Decision-making
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Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective
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Cited by
Persistence of power, Elites, and institutions
Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2008) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.98.1.267 · Cited by 1,268
Belief in a Just World and Redistributive Politics
Benabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2006) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/qjec.2006.121.2.699 · Cited by 1,036
A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation, and Debt
Battaglini, M., & Coate, S. (2008) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.98.1.201 · Cited by 421
Democracy, Redistribution, and Inequality
(2015) · Handbook of Income Distribution · doi:10.1016/b978-0-444-59429-7.00022-4 · Cited by 354
The Rise and Decline of General Laws of Capitalism
Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2015) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.29.1.3 · Cited by 330
Metadata
- Authors
- Hassler, J., Rodríguez Mora, J. V., Storesletten, K., & Zilibotti, F.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2003-02-01
- Volume
- 93
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 87-112
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1964623564
- Cited by
- 272
- References
- 31
- FWCI
- 126.09
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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