The DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Studying Optimal Paternalism, Illustrated by a Model of Sin Taxes
Abstract
The classical economic approach to policy analysis assumes that people always respond optimally to the costs and benefits of their available choices. A great deal of evidence suggests, however, that in some contexts people make errors that lead them not to behave in their own best interests. Economic policy prescriptions might change once we recognize that humans are humanly rational rather than superhumanly rational, and in particular it may be fruitful for economists to study the possible advantages of paternalistic policies that help people make better choices. We propose an approach for studying optimal paternalism that follows naturally from standard assumptions and methods of economic theory: Write down assumptions about the distribution of rational and irrational types of agents, about the available policy instruments, and about the government’s information about agents, and then investigate which policies achieve the most efficient outcomes. In other words, economists ought to treat the analysis of optimal paternalism as a mechanism-design problem when some agents might be boundedly rational. This approach has many advantages. First and foremost, by explicitly addressing when and how people do and don’t pursue their own best interests, economists will be better able to contribute to policy debates. To contribute to debates over regulating private financial decisions, we must study
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Cites
Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review
Frederick, S., Loewenstein, G. F., & O’Donoghue, T. (2002) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/002205102320161311 · Cited by 6,381
Self-citationGolden eggs and hyperbolic discounting
Laibson, D. (1997) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355397555253 · Cited by 6,122
O'Donoghue, T., & Rabin, M. (1999) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.89.1.103 · Cited by 3,121
Self-citationA Contribution to the Theory of Taxation
Ramsey, F. P. (1927) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2222721 · Cited by 2,891
Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for "Asymmetric Paternalism" \n
Camerer, C. F., Issacharoff, S., Loewenstein, G. F., O’Donoghue, T., & Rabin, M. (2003) · CaltechAUTHORS (California Institute of Technology) · Cited by 1,105
Self-citationO'Donoghue, T., & Rabin, M. (2001) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355301556365 · Cited by 944
Self-citationLibertarian Paternalism is Not an Oxymoron
Sunstein, C. R., & Thaler, R. H. (2003) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.405940 · Cited by 403
Do Cigarette Taxes Make Smokers Happier?
Gruber, J., & Mullainathan, S. (2006) · Happiness and Public Policy · doi:10.1057/9780230288027_6 · Cited by 272
Welch, F. (1999) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.89.2.1 · Cited by 193
Procrastination in Preparing for Retirement
Aaron, H. (2010) · Rowman & Littlefield Publishers eBooks · doi:10.5771/9780815705536-125 · Cited by 135
Cited by
Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review
Frederick, S., Loewenstein, G. F., & O’Donoghue, T. (2002) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/002205102320161311 · Cited by 6,381
Self-citationObesity and the Economics of Prevention: Fit not Fat
OECD (2010) · OECD eBooks · doi:10.1787/9789264084865-en · Cited by 720
The Case for Mindless Economics
GUL, F., & PESENDORFER, W. (2008) · The Foundations of Positive and Normative Economics · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195328318.003.0001 · Cited by 484
Schildberg-Hörisch, H. (2018) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.32.2.135 · Cited by 467
O'Donoghue, T., & Rabin, M. (2006) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.03.001 · Cited by 453
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Metadata
- Authors
- O'Donoghue, T., & Rabin, M.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2003-04-01
- Volume
- 93
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 186-191
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2016810440
- Cited by
- 368
- References
- 13
- FWCI
- 8.21
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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