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Cited by 734

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 24 of the 24 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Competition, Risk, and Managerial Incentives

Open access
Raith, Michael·2003·American Economic Review
DOI 10.1257/000282803769206395
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Abstract

This paper examines how the degree of competition among firms in an industry affects the optimal incentives that firms provide to their managers. A central assumption is that there is free entry and exit in the industry, which implies that changes in the nature of competition lead to changes in the equilibrium market structure. The main result is that as the intensity of product market competition increases, principals unambiguously provide stronger incentives to their agents to reduce costs, and hence agents work harder. At the same time, more intense competition also leads to a higher volatility of both firm-level profits and managers' compensation. Consequently, managers' incentives are positively correlated with firm-level risk, consistent with empirical evidence.

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Metadata

Authors
Raith, M.
Venue
American Economic Review
Publisher
American Economic Association
Published
2003-08-01
Volume
93
Issue
4
Pages
1425-1436
ISSN
0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1257/000282803769206395
OpenAlex
W3124374602
Cited by
734
References
24
FWCI
42.15
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Competition, Risk, and Managerial Incentives. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1257/000282803769206395
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Raith, M. (2003). Competition, Risk, and Managerial Incentives. American Economic Review. https://doi.org/10.1257/000282803769206395

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.