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Competition and Corporate Performance
Abstract
Are people right to think that competition improves corporate performance? My investigations indicate first that there are some theoretical reasons for believing this hypothesis to be correct, but they are not overwhelming. Furthermore, the existing empirical evidence on this question is weak. However, the results reported here, based on an analysis of around 670 U.K. companies, do provide some support for this view. Most important, I present evidence that competition, as measured by increased numbers of competitors or by lower levels of rents, is associated with a significantly higher rate of total factor productivity growth.
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Citations
Cited by
Javorcik, B. S. (2004) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828041464605 · Cited by 2,950
Measuring and Explaining Management Practices Across Firms and Countries
Bloom, N., & Van Reenen, J. (2007) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/qjec.2007.122.4.1351 · Cited by 2,373
Competition and Innovation: An Inverted U Relationship
Aghion, P., Bloom, N., Blundell, R. W., Griffith, R., & Howitt, P. (2004) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1306944 · Cited by 2,117
Competition and innovation: an inverted U relationship
Blundell, R., Howitt, P., Griffith, R., Aghion, P., & Bloom, N. (2002) · Working Paper Series · doi:10.1920/wp.ifs.2002.0204 · Cited by 2,109
Corporate social responsibility and stakeholder value maximization: Evidence from mergers
Deng, X., Kang, J.-K., & Low, B. S. (2013) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.04.014 · Cited by 1,647
Metadata
- Authors
- Nickell, S. J.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1996-08
- Volume
- 104
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 724-746
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2111465968
- Cited by
- 2,461
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 67.45
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.