The DOI matches its Crossref record; 11 of the 11 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Efficient Patent Pools
Abstract
The paper builds a tractable model of patent pools, agreements among patent owners to license sets of their patents. It provides a necessary and sufficient condition for patent pools to enhance welfare and shows that requiring pool members to be able to independently license patents matters if and only if the pool is otherwise welfare reducing. The paper allows patents to differ in importance, asymmetric blocking patterns, and licensors to also be licensees. We undertake some initial exploration of the impact of pools on innovation. The analysis has broader applicability than pools, being relevant to a number of co-marketing arrangements.
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Citations
Cites
Discrete Choice Theory of Product Differentiation
Anderson, S. P., de Palma, A., & Thisse, J.-F. (1992) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/2450.001.0001 · Cited by 2,324
Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting
Shapiro, C. (2000) · Innovation Policy and the Economy · doi:10.1086/ipe.1.25056143 · Cited by 1,510
The Economics of Technology Sharing: Open Source and Beyond
Lerner, J., & Tirole, J. (2005) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/0895330054048678 · Cited by 395
Self-citationClimbing atop the Shoulders of Giants: The Impact of Institutions on Cumulative Research
Furman, J. L., & Stern, S. (2011) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.101.5.1933 · Cited by 344
Judd, K. L. (1985) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555407 · Cited by 280
The Price Effects of International Airline Alliances
Brueckner, J. K., & Whalen, W. T. (2000) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/467464 · Cited by 276
Rasmusen, E. (1988) · Journal of Industrial Economics · doi:10.2307/2098468 · Cited by 91
Cooperative Marketing Agreements Between Competitors: Evidence from Patent Pools
Lerner, J., Jean Tirole, Z., & Strojwas, M. (2003) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w9680 · Cited by 65
Self-citationCartels and Patent License Arrangements
Priest, G. L. (1977) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466905 · Cited by 56
Sequential innovation and the patent-antitrust conflict
Denicolò, V. (2002) · Oxford Economic Papers · doi:10.1093/oep/54.4.649 · Cited by 34
Cited by
Recent Research on the Economics of Patents
Hall, B. H., & Harhoff, D. (2012) · Annual Review of Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-economics-080511-111008 · Cited by 548
Patents and Innovation: Evidence from Economic History
Moser, P. (2013) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.27.1.23 · Cited by 452
Patents and Cumulative Innovation: Causal Evidence from the Courts *
Galasso, A., & Schankerman, M. (2015) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qju029 · Cited by 448
The Economics of Technology Sharing: Open Source and Beyond
Lerner, J., & Tirole, J. (2005) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/0895330054048678 · Cited by 395
Self-citationTwo‐Sided Platforms: Product Variety and Pricing Structures
Hagiu, A. (2009) · Journal of Economics & Management Strategy · doi:10.1111/j.1530-9134.2009.00236.x · Cited by 352
Metadata
- Authors
- Lerner, J., & Tirole, J.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2004-05-01
- Volume
- 94
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 691-711
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1649969137
- Cited by
- 446
- References
- 11
- FWCI
- 45.59
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.