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On Doctors, Mechanics, and Computer Specialists: The Economics of Credence Goods
Open accessAbstract
Most of us need the services of an expert when our apartment's heating or our washing machine breaks down, or when our car starts to make strange noises. And for most of us, commissioning an expert to solve the problem causes concern. This concern does not disappear even after repair and payment of the bill. On the contrary, one worries about paying for a service that was not provided or receiving some unnecessary treatment. This article studies the economics underlying these worries. Under which conditions do experts have an incentive to exploit the informational problems associated with markets for diagnosis and treatment? What types of fraud exist? What are the methods and institutions for dealing with these informational problems? Under which conditions does the market provide incentives to deter fraudulent behavior? And what happens if all or some of those conditions are violated?
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Cites
The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism
Akerlof, G. A. (1970) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1879431 · Cited by 23,016
Free competition and the optimal amount of fraud
Darby, M. R., & Karni, E. (1973) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466756 · Cited by 3,947 · cited 2×
“We start by stating our efficiency result: PROPOSITION 1: Under Assumptions H (Homogeneity), C (Commitment), and either”
Cited by
Quality of Primary Care in Low-Income Countries: Facts and Economics
Das, J., & Hammer, J. (2014) · Annual Review of Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-economics-080213-041350 · Cited by 188
OECD (2010) · doi:10.1787/9789264079663-en · Cited by 54
Efficient informal trade: Theory and experimental evidence from the Cape Town taxi market
Bengtsson, N. (2015) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2015.02.003 · Cited by 14
Koster, R., Pîslar, M., Tacchetti, A., Balaguer, J., Liu, L., Elie, R., Hauser, O. P., Tuyls, K., Botvinick, M., & Summerfield, C. (2025) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/s41467-025-58043-7 · Cited by 12
Metadata
- Authors
- Dulleck, U., & Kerschbamer, R.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Literature
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2006-02-01
- Volume
- 44
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 5-42
- ISSN
- 0022-0515 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2171340883
- Cited by
- 739
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 51.76
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- Dulleck, U., & Kerschbamer, R. (2006). On Doctors, Mechanics, and Computer Specialists: The Economics of Credence Goods. Journal of Economic Literature. https://doi.org/10.1257/002205106776162717
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.