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Cited by 739

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

On Doctors, Mechanics, and Computer Specialists: The Economics of Credence Goods

Open access
Dulleck, Uwe, Kerschbamer, Rudolf·2006·Journal of Economic Literature

Abstract

Most of us need the services of an expert when our apartment's heating or our washing machine breaks down, or when our car starts to make strange noises. And for most of us, commissioning an expert to solve the problem causes concern. This concern does not disappear even after repair and payment of the bill. On the contrary, one worries about paying for a service that was not provided or receiving some unnecessary treatment. This article studies the economics underlying these worries. Under which conditions do experts have an incentive to exploit the informational problems associated with markets for diagnosis and treatment? What types of fraud exist? What are the methods and institutions for dealing with these informational problems? Under which conditions does the market provide incentives to deter fraudulent behavior? And what happens if all or some of those conditions are violated?

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Metadata

Authors
Dulleck, U., & Kerschbamer, R.
Venue
Journal of Economic Literature
Published
2006-02-01
Volume
44
Issue
1
Pages
5-42
ISSN
0022-0515 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2171340883
Cited by
739
References
2
FWCI
51.76
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: On Doctors, Mechanics, and Computer Specialists: The Economics of Credence Goods. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1257/002205106776162717
The paper
Dulleck, U., & Kerschbamer, R. (2006). On Doctors, Mechanics, and Computer Specialists: The Economics of Credence Goods. Journal of Economic Literature. https://doi.org/10.1257/002205106776162717

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.