The DOI matches its Crossref record; 18 of the 18 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
What Really Matters in Auction Design
Open accessAbstract
The most important issues in auction design are the traditional concerns of competition policy-preventing collusive, predatory, and entry-deterring behavior. Ascending and uniform-price auctions are particularly vulnerable to these problems. The Anglo-Dutch auctiona hybrid of the sealed-bid and ascending auctions-may perform better. Effective antitrust is also critical. Notable fiascoes in auctioning mobile-phone licenses, television franchises, companies, eletricty, etc., and especially the European “third-generation” (UMTS) spectrum auctions, show that everything depends on the details of the context. Auction design is not “one size fits all.”
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Citations
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Metadata
- Authors
- Klemperer, P.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Perspectives
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2002-02-01
- Volume
- 16
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 169-189
- ISSN
- 0895-3309 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1486678498
- Cited by
- 977
- References
- 18
- FWCI
- 110.44
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.