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The Trouble with Stock Options
Open accessAbstract
The benefits of stock options are often not large enough to offset the inefficiency implied by the large divergence between the cost of options to companies and the value of options to risk-averse, undiversified executives and employees. Moreover, the benefits of options can often be achieved more effectively and economically through other means. Why are options so prevalent? Several explanations include changes in corporate governance, reporting requirements, taxes, the bull market and managerial rent-seeking. We offer an alternative hypothesis: boards and managers incorrectly perceive stock options to be inexpensive because options create no accounting charge and require no cash outlay.
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Cites
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Cited by
Optimal Taxation of Top Labor Incomes: A Tale of Three Elasticities
Piketty, T., Saez, E., & Stantcheva, S. (2014) · American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · doi:10.1257/pol.6.1.230 · Cited by 713
CEO Compensation and Board Structure
CHHAOCHHARIA, V., & GRINSTEIN, Y. (2009) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01433.x · Cited by 611
Frydman, C., & Jenter, D. (2010) · Annual Review of Financial Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-financial-120209-133958 · Cited by 542
Metadata
- Authors
- Hall, B. J., & Murphy, K. J.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Perspectives
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2003-08-01
- Volume
- 17
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 49-70
- ISSN
- 0895-3309 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3122575551
- Cited by
- 774
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 166.61
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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