Building Routines: Learning, Cooperation, and the Dynamics of Incomplete Relational Contracts
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This paper studies how agents with conflicting interests learn to cooperate when the details of cooperation are not common knowledge. It considers a repeated game in which one player has incomplete information about when and how her partner can provide benefits. Initially, monitoring is imperfect and cooperation requires inefficient punishment. As the players' common history grows, the uninformed player can learn to monitor her partner's actions, which allows players to establish more efficient cooperative routines. Because revealing information is costly, it may be optimal not to reveal all the existing information, and efficient equilibria can be path-dependent. (JEL C73, D82, D83, D86)
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Cites
Exploration and Exploitation in Organizational Learning
March, J. G. (1991) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.2.1.71 · Cited by 21,942 · cited 1×
“This differs slightly from the usual trade-off between exploration and exploitation (see Rothschild (1974) or March (1991)) as the cost of experimentation is not the opportunity cost of forgoing current profits, but rather the anticipated cost of inducing information revelation.”
BackgroundA two-armed bandit theory of market pricing
Rothschild, M. (1974) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(74)90066-0 · Cited by 618
Cited by
Relational Contracts and Organizational Capabilities
Gibbons, R., & Henderson, R. (2012) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.1110.0715 · Cited by 537
Cognition and Capabilities: A Multi-Level Perspective
Eggers, J. P., & Kaplan, S. (2013) · Academy of Management Annals · doi:10.1080/19416520.2013.769318 · Cited by 493
Salvato, C., Reuer, J. J., & Battigalli, P. (2017) · Academy of Management Annals · doi:10.5465/annals.2014.0001 · Cited by 86
Formal and Informal Contracting: Theory and Evidence
Gil, R., & Zanarone, G. (2017) · Annual Review of Law and Social Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-lawsocsci-110316-113413 · Cited by 56
Socially Responsible Firms Outsource Less
Murcia, M. J., Panwar, R., & Tarzijan, J. (2021) · Business & Society · doi:10.1177/0007650319898490 · Cited by 56
Metadata
- Authors
- Chassang, S.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2010-03-01
- Volume
- 100
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 448-465
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2121426643
- Cited by
- 133
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 13.95
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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