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A Study of the Internal Organization of a Bidding Cartel
Abstract
This paper examines bidding in over 1,700 knockout auctions used by a bidding cartel (or ring) of stamp dealers in the 1990s. The knockout was conducted using a variant of the model studied by Daniel Graham, Robert Marshall, and Jean-Francois Richard (1990). Following a reduced form examination of these data, damages, induced inefficiency, and the ring's benefit from colluding are estimated using a structural model in the spirit of Emmanuel Guerre, Isabelle Perrigne, and Quang Vuong (2000). A notable finding is that nonring bidders suffered damages that were of the same order of magnitude as those of the sellers. (JEL D43, D44, L12)
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Cited by
Bid Preference Programs and Participation in Highway Procurement Auctions
Krasnokutskaya, E., & Seim, K. (2011) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.101.6.2653 · Cited by 300
Comparing open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Evidence from Timber Auctions*
Athey, S., Levin, J., & Seira, E. (2011) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjq001 · Cited by 289
Lewis-Faupel, S., Neggers, Y., Olken, B. A., & Pande, R. (2016) · American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · doi:10.1257/pol.20140258 · Cited by 194
The Price Effects of a Large Merger of Manufacturers: A Case Study of Maytag-Whirlpool
Ashenfelter, O. C., Hosken, D. S., & Weinberg, M. C. (2013) · American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · doi:10.1257/pol.5.1.239 · Cited by 111
Metadata
- Authors
- Asker, J.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2010-06-01
- Volume
- 100
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 724-762
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2068860947
- Cited by
- 213
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 15.26
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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