The DOI matches its Crossref record; 20 of the 20 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Comparing open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Evidence from Timber Auctions*
Abstract
We study entry and bidding patterns in sealed bid and open auctions. Using data from the U.S. Forest Service timber auctions, we document a set of systematic effects: sealed bid auctions attract more small bidders, shift the allocation toward these bidders, and can also generate higher revenue. A private value auction model with endogenous participation can account for these qualitative effects of auction format. We estimate the model's parameters and show that it can explain the quantitative effects as well. We then use the model to assess bidder competitiveness, which has important consequences for auction design.
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Cites
COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS
Vickrey, W. (1961) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.x · Cited by 7,722
Large sample properties of matching estimators for average treatment effects
Abadie, A., & Imbens, G. W. (2006) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00655.x · Cited by 2,908
Entry and Competition in Concentrated Markets
Bresnahan, T. F., & Reiss, P. C. (1991) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261786 · Cited by 1,447
The Winner's Curse, Reserve Prices, and Endogenous Entry: Empirical Insights from eBay Auctions
Bajari, P., Hortaçsu, A., & Hortacsu, A. (2003) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1593721 · Cited by 1,024
Estimation of a Model of Entry in the Airline Industry
Berry, S. T. (1992) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2951571 · Cited by 1,005
Optimal Nonparametric Estimation of First-price Auctions
Guerre, E., Perrigne, I., & Vuong, Q. (2000) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00123 · Cited by 710
Detection of Bid Rigging in Procurement Auctions
Porter, R. H., & Zona, J. D. (1993) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261885 · Cited by 491
Inference with an Incomplete Model of English Auctions
Haile, P. A., & Tamer, E. (2003) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/344801 · Cited by 487
Deciding Between Competition and Collusion
Bajari, P., & Ye, L. (2003) · The Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.1162/003465303772815871 · Cited by 385
Ohio School Milk Markets: An Analysis of Bidding
Porter, R. H., & Zona, J. D. (1999) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2556080 · Cited by 356
Cited by
Integrating explanation and prediction in computational social science
Hofman, J. M., Watts, D. J., Athey, S., Garip, F., Griffiths, T. L., Kleinberg, J., Margetts, H., Mullainathan, S., Salganik, M. J., Vazire, S., et al. (2021) · Nature · doi:10.1038/s41586-021-03659-0 · Cited by 371
Self-citationBidding for Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Analysis of Adaptation Costs
Bajari, P., Houghton, S., & Tadelis, S. (2014) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.104.4.1288 · Cited by 363
Bid Preference Programs and Participation in Highway Procurement Auctions
Krasnokutskaya, E., & Seim, K. (2011) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.101.6.2653 · Cited by 300
Metadata
- Authors
- Athey, S., Levin, J., & Seira, E.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2011-02
- Volume
- 126
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 207-257
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W2889685733
- Cited by
- 289
- References
- 20
- FWCI
- 20.81
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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