Do We Follow Others when We Should? A Simple Test of Rational Expectations
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Abstract
The paper presents a meta dataset covering 13 experiments on social learning games. It is found that in situations where it is empirically optimal to follow others and contradict one's own information, the players err in the majority of cases, forgoing substantial parts of earnings. The average player contradicts her own signal only if the empirical odds ratio of the own signal being wrong, conditional on all available information, is larger than 2:1, rather than 1:1 as would be implied by rational expectations. A regression analysis formulates a straightforward test of rational expectations which strongly rejects the null. (JEL D82, D83, D84)
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Citations
Cited by
Engel, C. (2011) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-011-9283-7 · Cited by 1,783
Abeler, J., Nosenzo, D., & Raymond, C. (2016) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2840132 · Cited by 840
The evolutionary basis of human social learning
Morgan, T. J. H., Rendell, L. E., Ehn, M., Hoppitt, W., & Laland, K. N. (2012) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2011.1172 · Cited by 364
Experimenting with Measurement Error: Techniques with Applications to the Caltech Cohort Study
Gillen, B., Snowberg, E., & Yariv, L. (2019) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/701681 · Cited by 350
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Bénabou, R. (2013) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1093/restud/rds030 · Cited by 319
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Morin, O., Jacquet, P. O., Vaesen, K., & Acerbi, A. (2021) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B · doi:10.1098/rstb.2020.0052 · Cited by 80
Metadata
- Authors
- Weizsäcker, G.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2010-12-01
- Volume
- 100
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 2340-2360
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2100609530
- Cited by
- 194
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 13.01
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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