The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Stakes Matter in Ultimatum Games
Open accessAbstract
One of the most robust findings in experimental economics is that individuals in one-shot ultimatum games reject unfair offers. Puzzlingly, rejections have been found robust to substantial increases in stakes. By using a novel experimental design that elicits frequent low offers and uses much larger stakes than in the literature, we are able to examine stakes' effects over ranges of data that are heretofore unexplored. Our main result is that proportionally equivalent offers are less likely to be rejected with high stakes. In fact, our paper is the first to present evidence that as stakes increase, rejection rates approach zero. JEL: C72, C78, C91
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Cites
What Do Laboratory Experiments Measuring Social Preferences Reveal About the Real World?
Levitt, S. D., & List, J. A. (2007) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.21.2.153 · Cited by 2,668
Self-citationPay Enough or Don't Pay at All*
Gneezy, U., & Rustichini, A. (2000) · Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355300554917 · Cited by 2,175
Learning in High Stakes Ultimatum Games: An Experiment in the Slovak Republic
Slonim, R., & Roth, A. E. (1998) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2998575 · Cited by 512 · cited 1×
“Sep. 2023 Department of Economics Copenhagen Business School Working paper 1-2011 Title Author _________________________________________________________ Department of Economics -Porcelænshaven 16A, 1.fl. - DK-2000 Frederiksberg Stakes Matter in Ultimatum Games Steffen Andersen, Seda Ertaç, Uri…”
Cited by
Awe, the small self, and prosocial behavior
Piff, P. K., Dietze, P., Feinberg, M., Stancato, D. M., & Keltner, D. (2015) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/pspi0000018 · Cited by 1,214
Experimental methods: Pay one or pay all
Charness, G., Gneezy, U., & Halladay, B. (2016) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2016.08.010 · Cited by 380
Self-citationEconomic games on the internet: the effect of $1 stakes
Amir, O., Rand, D. G., & Gal, Y. K. (2012) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0031461 · Cited by 364
Güth, W., & Kocher, M. G. (2014) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2014.06.006 · Cited by 362
4. Other-Regarding Preferences A Selective Survey of Experimental Results
Cooper, D. J., & Kagel, J. H. (2016) · The Handbook of Experimental Economics, Volume Two · doi:10.1515/9781400883172-005 · Cited by 360
Metadata
- Authors
- Andersen, S., Ertaç, S., Gneezy, U., Hoffman, M., & List, J. A.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2011-12-01
- Volume
- 101
- Issue
- 7
- Pages
- 3427-3439
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2058582869
- Cited by
- 228
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 28.38
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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