Cited by 2,175Experimental Behavioral Economics StudiesDecision-Making and Behavioral EconomicsAccounting and Organizational Management

Pay Enough or Don't Pay at All*

Gneezy, Uri, Rustichini, Aldo·2000·Quarterly Journal of Economics

Abstract

Economists usually assume that monetary incentives improve performance, and psychologists claim that the opposite may happen. We present and discuss a set of experiments designed to test these contrasting claims. We found that the effect of monetary compensation on performance was not monotonic. In the treatments in which money was offered, a larger amount yielded a higher performance. However, offering money did not always produce an improvement: subjects who were offered monetary incentives performed more poorly than those who were offered no compensation. Several possible interpretations of the results are discussed.

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Registry

Crossref · 10.1162/003355300554917

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44 of 44 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • Financial rewards can weaken or even reverse the behaviors' social signals, because rewards may create doubt about why the person engaged in the action and decrease both motivation and actual behavior.

    “Financial rewards can weaken or even reverse the behaviors ' social signals, because rewards may create doubt about why the person engaged in the action and decrease both motivation and actual behavior (Gneezy and Rustichini 2000).”

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Authors
Gneezy, U., & Rustichini, A.
Affiliations
Boston University (US)
Venue
Quarterly Journal of Economics
Published
2000-08
Volume
115
Issue
3
Pages
791-810
ISSN
  • 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
  • 1531-4650
OpenAlex
W2168112513
Cited by
2,175
References
44
Citations by year
2026: 61 · 2025: 67 · 2024: 70 · 2023: 127 · 2022: 78 · 2021: 126 · 2020: 93 · 2019: 111 · 2018: 93 · 2017: 119 · 2016: 138 · 2015: 140 · 2014: 132 · 2013: 129 · 2012: 109
FWCI
57.67
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • The Quarterly Journal of Economics (publishedVersion)
  • Research portal (Tilburg University) (submittedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • HighWire Press Open Archive (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Management Information Systems › Accounting and Organizational Management
Keywords
financial incentives, financial compensation, performance, incentive effects, non-monetary incentives, non-monotonic effects

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