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Cited by 1,117

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 26 of the 26 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch, and Systemic Bailouts

Open access
Farhi, Emmanuel, Tirole, Jean·2012·American Economic Review
DOI 10.1257/aer.102.1.60
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Abstract

The article shows that time-consistent, imperfectly targeted support to distressed institutions makes private leverage choices strategic complements. When everyone engages in maturity mismatch, authorities have little choice but intervening, creating both current and deferred (sowing the seeds of the next crisis) social costs. In turn, it is profitable to adopt a risky balance sheet. These insights have important consequences, from banks choosing to correlate their risk exposures to the need for macro-prudential supervision. (JEL D82, E52, E58, G01, G21, G28)

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Metadata

Authors
Farhi, E., & Tirole, J.
Venue
American Economic Review
Publisher
American Economic Association
Published
2012-02-01
Volume
102
Issue
1
Pages
60-93
ISSN
0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1257/aer.102.1.60
OpenAlex
W2171022524
Cited by
1,117
References
26
FWCI
149.65
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch, and Systemic Bailouts. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1257/aer.102.1.60
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Farhi, E., & Tirole, J. (2012). Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch, and Systemic Bailouts. American Economic Review. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.1.60

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.