The DOI matches its Crossref record; 26 of the 26 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch, and Systemic Bailouts
Open accessAbstract
The article shows that time-consistent, imperfectly targeted support to distressed institutions makes private leverage choices strategic complements. When everyone engages in maturity mismatch, authorities have little choice but intervening, creating both current and deferred (sowing the seeds of the next crisis) social costs. In turn, it is profitable to adopt a risky balance sheet. These insights have important consequences, from banks choosing to correlate their risk exposures to the need for macro-prudential supervision. (JEL D82, E52, E58, G01, G21, G28)
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Cited by
How does capital affect bank performance during financial crises?
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Where the Risks Lie: A Survey on Systemic Risk
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Metadata
- Authors
- Farhi, E., & Tirole, J.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2012-02-01
- Volume
- 102
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 60-93
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2171022524
- Cited by
- 1,117
- References
- 26
- FWCI
- 149.65
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.