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Cited by 184

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalitions, and Clubs

Open access
Acemoglu, Daron, Egorov, Georgy, Sonin, Konstantin · 2012 · American Economic Review

Abstract

In dynamic collective decision making, current decisions determine the future distribution of political power and influence future decisions. We develop a general framework to study this class of problems. Under acyclicity, we characterize dynamically stable states as functions of the initial state and obtain two general insights. First, a social arrangement is made stable by the instability of alternative arrangements that are preferred by sufficiently powerful groups. Second, efficiency-enhancing changes may be resisted because of further changes they will engender. We use this framework to analyze dynamics of political rights in a society with different types of extremist views. (JEL D71, D72, K10)

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Metadata

Authors
Acemoglu, D., Egorov, G., & Sonin, K.
Venue
American Economic Review
Published
2012-06-01
Volume
102
Issue
4
Pages
1446-1476
ISSN
0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2137831538
Cited by
184
References
1
FWCI
32.57
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalitions, and Clubs. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1257/aer.102.4.1446
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Acemoglu, D., Egorov, G., & Sonin, K. (2012). Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalitions, and Clubs. American Economic Review. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.4.1446

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.