The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Lure of Authority: Motivation and Incentive Effects of Power
Open accessAbstract
Authority and power permeate political, social, and economic life, but empirical knowledge about the motivational origins and consequences of authority is limited. We study the motivation and incentive effects of authority experimentally in an authority-delegation game. Individuals often retain authority even when its delegation is in their material interest—suggesting that authority has nonpecuniary consequences for utility. Authority also leads to overprovision of effort by the controlling parties, while a large percentage of subordinates underprovide effort despite pecuniary incentives to the contrary. Authority thus has important motivational consequences that exacerbate the inefficiencies arising from suboptimal delegation choices. (JEL C92, D23, D82)
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Generalized expectancies for internal versus external control of reinforcement.
Rotter, J. B. (1966) · Psychological Monographs: General and Applied · doi:10.1037/h0092976 · Cited by 21,937
Regret Theory: An Alternative Theory of Rational Choice Under Uncertainty
Loomes, G., & Sugden, R. (1982) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2232669 · Cited by 4,042
A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences
Koszegi, B., & Rabin, M. (2006) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/121.4.1133 · Cited by 2,728
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Management of Bureaucrats and Public Service Delivery: Evidence from the Nigerian Civil Service
Rasul, I., & Rogger, D. (2018) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/ecoj.12418 · Cited by 441
The Intrinsic Value of Decision Rights
Bartling, B., Fehr, E., & Herz, H. (2014) · Econometrica · doi:10.3982/ecta11573 · Cited by 268
Self-citationBernacchio, C., & Foss, N. (2024) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4736313 · Cited by 17
Power Asymmetry, Negotiations and Conflict Management in Organizations
Fousiani, K. (2022) · Organizational Conflict - New Insights · doi:10.5772/intechopen.95492 · Cited by 16
Metadata
- Authors
- Fehr, E., Herz, H., & Wilkening, T.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2013-06-01
- Volume
- 103
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1325-1359
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3124057674
- Cited by
- 277
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 62.43
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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