The DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Asymmetric Information and Imperfect Competition in Lending Markets
Open accessAbstract
We study the effects of asymmetric information and imperfect competition in the market for small business lines of credit. We estimate a structural model of credit demand, loan use, pricing, and firm default using matched firm-bank data from Italy. We find evidence of adverse selection in the form of a positive correlation between the unobserved determinants of demand for credit and default. Our counterfactual experiments show that while increases in adverse selection increase prices and defaults on average, reducing credit supply, banks’ market power can mitigate these negative effects. (JEL D22, D82, G21, G32, L13, L25)
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Cites
The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism
Akerlof, G. A. (1970) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1879431 · Cited by 23,016
Determinants of corporate borrowing
Myers, S. C. (1977) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(77)90015-0 · Cited by 13,169
Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information
Stiglitz, J. E., & Weiss, A. (1981) · Columbia University · doi:10.7916/d8v12ft1 · Cited by 12,769 · cited 14×
“The theoretical model we develop is based on the following assumptions: (1) Asymmetric Information: Following Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), we assume that the asymmetry of information is on the riskiness of the firm, known by the firm but not by the bank, whereas the distribution of riskiness among all firms is known by…”
InfluentialDiscrete Choice Methods with Simulation
Train, K. E. (2001) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511805271 · Cited by 7,784
SOME PRACTICAL GUIDANCE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PROPENSITY SCORE MATCHING
Caliendo, M., & Kopeinig, S. (2008) · Journal of Economic Surveys · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6419.2007.00527.x · Cited by 6,238
Matching as an econometric evaluation estimator: Evidence from evaluating a job training programme
Heckman, J. J., Ichimura, H., & Todd, P. E. (1997) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2971733 · Cited by 5,486
The Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence from Small Business Data
PETERSEN, M. A., & RAJAN, R. G. (1994) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1994.tb04418.x · Cited by 5,440
The effect of credit market competition on lending relationships
Petersen, M. A., & Rajan, R. G. (1995) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2118445 · Cited by 3,294 · cited 1×
“40 Petersen and Rajan (1995) use the amount of trade credit as a key variable to determine if borrowers are credit constrained, as it’s typically a more expensive form of credit than banks’ credit lines.”
BackgroundPanel data and unobservable individual effects
Hausman, J., & Taylor, W. (1981) · Journal of Econometrics · doi:10.1016/0304-4076(81)90085-3 · Cited by 2,309
Using Propensity Scores to Help Design Observational Studies: Application to the Tobacco Litigation
Rubin, D. B. (2001) · Health Services and Outcomes Research Methodology · doi:10.1023/a:1020363010465 · Cited by 2,228
Cited by
Bank liquidity provision across the firm size distribution
Chodorow-Reich, G., Darmouni, O., Luck, S., & Plosser, M. (2022) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.06.035 · Cited by 257
Metadata
- Authors
- Crawford, G. S., Pavanini, N., & Schivardi, F.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2018-07-01
- Volume
- 108
- Issue
- 7
- Pages
- 1659-1701
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3124669255
- Cited by
- 177
- References
- 12
- FWCI
- 15.86
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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