Demand and Supply of Infrequent Payments as a Commitment Device: Evidence from Kenya
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Despite extensive evidence that preferences are often time-inconsistent, there is only scarce evidence of willingness to pay for commitment. Infrequent payments for frequently provided goods and services are a common feature of many markets and they may naturally provide commitment to save for lumpy expenses. Multiple experiments in the Kenyan dairy sector show that: (i) farmers are willing to incur sizable costs to receive infrequent payments as a commitment device, (ii) poor contract enforcement, however, limits competition among buyers in the supply of infrequent payments. We then present a model of demand and supply of infrequent payments and test its additional predictions. (JEL K12, L66, O13, O17, Q12, Q13)
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Citations
Cites
Status quo bias in decision making
Samuelson, W., & Zeckhauser, R. (1988) · Journal of Risk and Uncertainty · doi:10.1007/bf00055564 · Cited by 5,897 · cited 1×
“A potential concern with the experimental designs is that, since the coop pays monthly, farmers’ choices may be driven by status quo bias (see, e.g., Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988; and Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1991).”
BackgroundAnomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L., & Thaler, R. H. (1991) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.5.1.193 · Cited by 5,019 · cited 1×
“, Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988 and Kahneman et al., 1991). Several pieces of evidence mitigate this concern. First, farmers’ motivations to choose monthly payments are mostly consistent with a demand for infrequent payments, arising from a demand for commitment. Second, the results of the additional lab-in-the-field…”
Trade Credit: Theories and Evidence
Petersen, M. A., & Rajan, R. G. (1997) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/10.3.661 · Cited by 2,593
Gollin, D. (2002) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/338747 · Cited by 1,977
Savings by and for the Poor: A Research Review and Agenda
Karlan, D., Ratan, A. L., & Zinman, J. (2014) · Review of Income and Wealth · doi:10.1111/roiw.12101 · Cited by 548
Cited by
Agri-food value chain revolutions in low- and middle-income countries
Barrett, C. B., Reardon, T., Swinnen, J., & Zilberman, D. (2022) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.20201539 · Cited by 371
Behavioral development economics
Kremer, M., Rao, G., & Schilbach, F. (2019) · Handbook of Behavioral Economics: Applications and Foundations 1 · doi:10.1016/bs.hesbe.2018.12.002 · Cited by 188
Ericson, K. M., & Laibson, D. (2019) · Handbook of Behavioral Economics: Applications and Foundations 1 · doi:10.1016/bs.hesbe.2018.12.001 · Cited by 125
Competition and relational contracts in the rwanda coffee chain
Macchiavello, R., & Morjaria, A. (2021) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjaa048 · Cited by 124
Self-citationThe role of market concentration in the agrifood industry
Hernandez, M. A., Espinoza, A., Berrospi, M. L., Deconinck, K., Swinnen, J., & Vos, R. (2023) · doi:10.2499/p15738coll2.136567 · Cited by 13
Metadata
- Authors
- Casaburi, L., & Macchiavello, R.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2019-02-01
- Volume
- 109
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 523-555
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2913007203
- Cited by
- 100
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 8.97
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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