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Cited by 1,763Corruption and Economic DevelopmentMerger and Competition AnalysisHousing Market and Economics

Rents, Competition, and Corruption

Open access
Ades, Alberto, Di Tella, Rafael·1999·American Economic Review
DOI 10.1257/aer.89.4.982
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Abstract

Theoretically the effect of competition on corruption is ambiguous. Less competition means firms enjoy higher rents, so that bureaucrats with control rights over them, such as tax inspectors or regulators, have higher incentives to engage in malfeasant behavior. Examples of a positive connection between rents and corruption abound, however. The hypothesis that natural rents, as in the case of oil, and rents induced by lack of product market competition foster corruption, is examined. A model is set up connecting rents to corruption.

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Crossref · 10.1257/aer.89.4.982

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  • A positive relationship between resource abundance and levels of corruption is established in a number of studies.

    “the positive relationship between resource abundance and levels of corruption is established in a number of studies (for example, Ades and Di Tella 1999; Leite and Weidman 1999).”

    From Using Natural Resources for Development: Why Has It Proven So Difficult? (2016) · cites this paper as Ades and Di Tella 1999

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Authors
Ades, A., & Di Tella, R.
Affiliations
  • Goldman Sachs (United States) (US)
  • Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, Soldiers Field, Boston, MA 02163.
Venue
American Economic Review
Publisher
American Economic Association
Published
1999-09-01
Volume
89
Issue
4
Pages
982-993
ISSN
0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1257/aer.89.4.982
OpenAlex
W1990186700
Cited by
1,763
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 22 · 2025: 47 · 2024: 52 · 2023: 77 · 2022: 66 · 2021: 80 · 2020: 78 · 2019: 118 · 2018: 64 · 2017: 78 · 2016: 84 · 2015: 85 · 2014: 93 · 2013: 75 · 2012: 90
FWCI
102.02
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
cc-by
Locations
  • American Economic Review (publishedVersion)
  • Digital Access to Scholarship at Harvard (DASH) (Harvard University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Corruption and Economic Development
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Merger and Competition Analysis
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Housing Market and Economics
Keywords
rent-seeking, competition, corruption

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